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Abstract
The study of an evolutionary process has traditionally considered a population with a homo-
geneous structure where each pair of individuals is equally likely to interact with one another.
Later studies have considered heterogeneous structures implemented using evolutionary graph
theory, and other studies have considered group interactions of fixed size. This work builds upon
these later studies by implementing a set of evolutionary dynamics that can be used to study
more complex evolutionary processes consisting of a population with a heterogeneous structure
where individuals interact in groups of varying size.
This research begins by analytically studying simple evolutionary processes using a set of
standard evolutionary dynamics. Results are derived that identify the structures for which
an evolutionary process is identical to a Moran process, which has a homogeneous population
structure, for each of the evolutionary dynamics. These results form a basis for the work that
follows by providing a better understanding of evolutionary dynamics.
Before considering more complex evolutionary processes, a class of multiplayer games called
social dilemmas are defined for variable group sizes. The two main types of social dilemmas are
identified, namely public goods dilemmas and commons dilemmas, and examples of each type
of dilemma are given whose characteristics are visually illustrated.
More complex evolutionary processes are then studied based on the framework of Broom-
Rychta´rˇ that provides the mathematical tools to model group interactions in mobile individuals.
First, the evolutionary dynamics that can be used within this framework are developed. The
updated version of the framework is then used to demonstrate how it can applied to study
various kinds of behaviour in an evolutionary setting.
The first application is the territorial raider model. It considers territorial behaviour where
each individual has their own territory that overlaps with those of other individuals. Interactions
take place between groups of individuals when they meet in the overlapping parts of their
territories. Two kinds of social dilemmas are studied in this model: a multiplayer hawk-dove
game and a multiplayer public goods game. It is shown that the temperature, which measures
how often an individual is likely to be replaced, plays an important role in determining the
success of a given strategy.
A generalized version of the territorial raider model is also considered where subpopulations
rather than individuals share the same territory. A multiplayer public goods game is used to
study the evolution of cooperation, which is a suboptimal strategy at the individual level but
an optimal strategy at the group level. The structure and dynamics are shown to be critical in
the evolution of cooperation where an extension of the temperature, called the subpopulation
temperature, dictates the relative success of cooperators.
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Finally, a model where individual move base upon their previous interactions is considered
called the Markov movement model. A multiplayer public goods game is used to study the
evolution of cooperation. It is shown that cooperators can benefit by staying with one another
provided that there is a movement cost that slows down their competitors, the defectors. In
this case, the dynamics play a less critical role in the evolution of cooperation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Population evolution is a fascinating subject that has been studied both theoretically and practi-
cally. In simple terms, evolution is the process though which the genetic makeup of a population
changes over time. To explain how evolution works, Charles Darwin proposed the idea of natural
selection in his 1859 book The Origin of Species. Natural selection acts on individuals and states
that they are more likely to pass on their genetic makeup through their offspring if it gives them
a survival and reproductive advantage. This is because an individual with a survival and re-
productive advantage is more likely to produce more offspring than one who does not. Instead,
the genetic makeup of individuals with a survival and reproductive disadvantage is likely to
eventually vanish. Mutation also plays an important role in the evolutionary process. Through
mutation the genetic makeup that is passed on to an offspring can change. The mutated genetic
makeup may or may not give the offspring a survival and reproductive advantage but through
natural selection this mutation will either spread or die out. On the other hand, the mutation
could be neutral, that is, it is neutral to natural selection because it is neither beneficial nor
disadvantageous. In this case neutral drift comes into play which means that the change in
this mutated genetic makeup in a population is random. The population in question could be
a humans, animals or even cells, though, the mechanism of evolution can also be applied to
non-biological phenomena like language evolution.
The study of population evolution through evolutionary game theory has proven to be a
popular approach. It is a powerful mathematical modelling tool that has shown its versatility in
terms of modelling different kinds of interactions between individuals. Whilst a lot of the work
on evolutionary game theory focuses on interactions between pairs of individuals, considering
the interactions between multiple individuals is now more common presenting room for further
development in this area.
This chapter introduces the basics of evolutionary game theory. The starting point is game
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theory itself followed by bridging the connection to evolution giving rise to evolutionary game
theory. Various developments to evolutionary game theory over the years are then highlighted,
like the Moran process and evolutionary graph theory. These developments in the context of
multiplayer models are then considered. Finally, the comprehensive evolutionary game theory
framework of Broom-Rycha´rˇ is introduced and this chapter ends by outlining the work contained
in this thesis.
1.1 Classical Game Theory
Game theory is a mathematical theory used to study the interaction between individuals that
involve strategic decisions. It was developed by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern
[63], and has been widely applied in various fields of study. We start by defining a game before
looking at at how it is applied to population evolution.
In the games that will be considered, called symmetric normal form games, interactions
take place between a finite number of individuals. The actions that individuals take against one
another is determined by their strategy. A strategy is a plan of action for all possible scenarios
an individual can find themselves in. A strategy is pure if there is only one specific action for
all possible scenarios. Mixed strategies on the other hand combine pure strategies such that
each pure strategy is played with a given probability. Note that one can consider an infinite
population composed of different proportions using pure strategies or every individual using a
mixed strategy composed of those pure strategies. The former is considered here. The outcome
of an interaction is determined by the payoff function that represents the motivation of the
players to play a strategy. In symmetric games all players have the same set of pure strategies
and payoff function.
In general, for two player symmetric games with N strategies, labelled S1, . . . , SN , the payoffs
can be represented using a payoff matrix as follows
S1 S2 · · · SN
S1 E(1, 1) E(1, 2) · · · E(1, N)
S2 E(2, 1) E(2, 2) · · · E(2, N)
...
...
...
. . .
...
SN E(N, 1) E(N, 2) · · · E(N,N)
(1.1)
where each entry E(i, j) is the payoff to an individual using strategy Si against an opponent
using strategy Sj . Much of the theory that follows with regards to matrix games will involve
multiple strategies, however, for simplicity, the examples given have two strategies A and B
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with payoff matrix
A B
A a b
B c d
(1.2)
The entries a, b, c, d give the payoffs where, for example, b is the payoff to an individual using
strategy A with opponent using strategy B.
Games are analysed in terms of the best possible strategy an individual should take against
their opponent. A best response to a particular strategy is one that gives the highest possible
payoff to all the other set of strategies. A Nash equilibrium [62] is where every individual is
using a strategy that is a best response. In this case, no individual can improve their payoff
by using another strategy. A Nash equilibrium strategy is one that is a best response to itself,
in general, strategy i is a Nash equilibrium if E(i, i) ≥ E(j, i) for all j. For example, for the
game defined by payoff matrix (1.2), strategy A is a Nash equilibrium if a ≥ c and a strict Nash
equilibrium if a > c. Similarly, strategy B is a Nash equilibrium if d ≥ b and a strict Nash
equilibrium if d > b.
1.2 Evolutionary Game Theory
One of the first published works in evolutionary game theory was by Hamilton [34]. The ap-
plication of game theory to population evolution was later considered in more detail by John
Maynard Smith and George Price [56]. Classical game theory considers isolated interactions
between players where the strategy used by each player remains fixed therefore, assuming that
players behave rationally, we analyse what is the best strategy for each individual to play by
finding the Nash equilibria. Evolutionary game theory considers multiple isolated interactions
over time in a constantly changing population where the players can replicate, i.e. make copies
of themselves. In this case, the objective is find the evolutionary equilibria, which are points
where the strategic composition of the population remains constant.
In evolutionary game theory the payoff a player receives is assumed to contribute to their
fitness, which in turn determines how likely an individual is to replicate itself. The forces of
evolution come into play in the replication stage. In particular, a player with a higher fitness
is more likely to be selected to replicate itself thereby increasing the number of players in the
population playing that strategy. However, a mutation during the replication process may result
in the replicated player playing a different strategy. When studying evolutionary games, it is
assumed that individuals have either constant or frequency-dependent fitness. In the latter case,
the fitness of the individuals depends upon the frequencies of the strategies in the population.
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Overall, the number of individuals in the population playing a more successful strategy should
increase.
1.2.1 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS)
One of the traditional approaches to analysing evolutionary games is the Evolutionarily Stable
Strategy (ESS) [56]. An ESS is a strategy that, if adopted by the population, can prevent
invasion from any alternative strategy used by a small fraction of the population. The ESS con-
siders a snapshot in time where the invading strategy is already introduced into the population
through mutation and does not consider the replication process. We are interested in finding the
condition that will oppose the invading strategy from being selected. In particular, this is the
case when individuals using the invading strategy have a lower fitness than the residents of the
population. This means that the invading strategy will die out in the subsequent generations of
the population.
For an infinite population with two-player interactions where every individual is equally
likely to meet each other, the condition is given as follows. Suppose that 1 −  proportion of
individuals are using strategy i and  proportion of individuals are using some other strategy
j 6= i. The fitness of individuals using strategy i is given by (1− )E(i, i) + E(i, j) and that of
the individuals using strategy j 6= i is (1 − )E(j, i) + E(j, j). For the population to prevent
invasion from the individuals using strategy j 6= i we require that
(1− )E(i, i) + E(i, j) > (1− )E(j, i) + E(j, j).
As  → 0, we can ignore the terms with , which give E(i, i) > E(j, i). However, if E(i, i) =
E(j, i) then the terms with  should satisfy E(i, j) > E(j, j). This means that strategy i is
evolutionarily stable against strategy j whenever
E(i, i) > E(j, i) or E(i, i) = E(j, i) and E(i, j) > E(j, j).
Furthermore, if this is true for all strategies j 6= i, strategy i is an ESS. For example, for the
two strategy game defined by payoff matrix (1.2), strategy A is an ESS if
a > c or a = c and b > d.
1.2.2 The Replicator Equation
The other traditional approach to analysing evolutionary games involves defining the replica-
tion process using a deterministic equation and solving that equation to find the evolutionary
equilibria of the population. The replicator equation [38, 39, 40, 101] is defined as follows
x˙i = xi[Fi − φ] (1.3)
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where xi is the frequency of individuals using strategy i, Fi is the fitness of individuals using
strategy i and φ is the average fitness of the population. The replicator equation says that the
frequency of individuals using a strategy will increase if their fitness is higher than the average
fitness of the population and will decrease if it is lower.
We can find the evolutionary equilibria for the two strategy payoff matrix (1.2), by solving
equation (1.3). Assuming the frequency of individuals playing strategy A is x and B is 1 − x,
we have that
FA = xa+ (1− x)b and FB = xc+ (1− x)d.
The average fitness of the population is given by
φ = xFA + (1− x)FB .
The change in frequency of type A individuals is then given by
x˙A = x [FA − φ]
= x [FA − xFA + (1− x)FB ]
= x [(1− x)FA − (1− x)FB ]
= x(1− x) [FA − FB ]
= x(1− x) [x(a− b− c+ d) + b− d]
The equilibrium points x∗ are found by solving x˙A = 0, giving the following equilibrium points
x∗ = 1, x∗ = 0, x∗ =
d− b
a− b− c+ d .
Whether these equilibrium points are stable or not depends upon the payoff values. We have
the following cases:
1. x∗ = 1 stable: in this case we have that a > c and b > d. Regardless of the starting
frequency x of type A individuals, we always end up at the equilibrium point where there
are only type A individuals. This is because strategy A is a strict Nash equilibrium strategy
and therefore dominates strategy B.
2. x∗ = 0 stable: in this case we have that c > a and d > b, which is the exact opposite of
the previous case.
3. x∗ = 0 and x∗ = 1 are both stable: in this case we have that a > c and d > b. This
means that both A and B are best responses to themselves. The equilibrium point we
converge to depends upon the starting frequency x. In particular, if x > d−ba−b−c+d then
the population converges to x∗ = 1, and x∗ = 0 otherwise.
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4. x∗ = d−ba−b−c+d is stable: in this case a < c and d < b. This means that A is a best response
to B and vice versa. Both types can stably coexist with each other and will converge to
this equilibrium.
1.3 Evolutionary Game Theory in a Finite Population
Finding the ESS and using the replicator equation to find the equilibrium points are based
on models that assume that the population is infinite. While this gives us an idea about how
successful a given strategy is, in reality populations are finite and we therefore have to con-
sider analysing strategies in such conditions. In finite populations capturing relevant biological
phenomena, like genetic drift, requires that stochastic dynamics are used. A classical model of
evolution in a finite population with stochastic dynamics is the Moran process [58, 59].
The Moran process considers a population of size N where there are n type A individuals and
N − n type B individuals. Type A individuals have fitness FA(n) = r and type B individuals
have fitness FB(n) = 1 for all n i.e. there is constant fitness where r can be thought of as the
relative fitness of type A with respect to type B. Note here that the fitness does not depend on n,
that is, it is not frequency dependent. The individuals are homogeneous in every other respect
and, in particular, are equally likely to meet each other. The Moran process uses stochastic
dynamics with the property that the population size remains constant, that is, the population
size is always N . This means that for every birth there is a death in the population. These
replacement events are assumed to be asynchronous, which means that there is only one birth
and one death per replacement event. An individual is chosen to replicate proportional to its
fitness, in particular, for type A and B individuals the probability of being selected for birth
are respectively given by
bA(n) =
FA(n)
nFA(n) + (N − n)FB(n) , bB(n) =
FB(n)
nFA(n) + (N − n)FB(n) . (1.4)
An individual’s offspring then randomly replaces another individual in the population with
probability 1N−1 . Note that the birth event affects the death event because the individual that
gives birth is excluded, that is, there is simple random sampling without replacement. This
means that the individual that gives birth is excluded before selecting an individual for death
from the population. The order of the birth and death events therefore matters, and the Moran
process uses birth-death with selection on birth (BD-B) dynamics.
It is assumed that there are no mutations in the population. This implies that one of the types
will eventually fixate in the population, which means that only one of the types, A or B, will
persist. Note that this does not mean that mutation is ignored, rather, we start by considering
a population of only type B individuals and a mutation takes place that introduces a type A
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individual into the population. It is at this point that the following question is asked, ‘what is
the probability of type A fixating?’. More specifically, the probability of 1 type A individual
fixating in a population of N − 1 type B individuals is called the fixation probability of type
A, denoted ρA. In other words, this is the probability that all individuals in the population
have this 1 type A individual introduced into the population as their ancestor. To calculate the
fixation probabilities, we need to define the state transition probabilities Pn,k of transitioning
from a state where there are n type A individuals to a state where there are k type A individuals.
These are defined as follows
Pn,k =

nbA(n)× N−nN−1 k = n+ 1
(N − n)bB(n)× nN−1 k = n− 1
1− Pn,n+1 − Pn,n−1 k = n
(1.5)
The evolution of the population is therefore described as a discrete time absorbing Markov chain
with N + 1 states. The solution to the fixation probability is given by [41] as follows
ρA =
1
1 +
N−1∑
j=1
j∏
k=1
Pk,k−1
Pk,k+1
. (1.6)
Substituting in the transition probabilities gives
ρA =
1
1 +
N−1∑
j=1
j∏
k=1
1
r
=

1− 1r
1− 1
rN
r 6= 1,
1
N
r = 1.
(1.7)
This solution to ρA is referred to as the Moran probability. Ideally, we should observe that in
a finite population the success of type A is subject to random drift because of the stochastic
evolutionary dynamics and, therefore, there is no guarantee that type A will fixate. In the case
where r = 1 the fixation probability of type A is ρA = 1/N and there is said to be neutral drift.
Here, the type A mutant has an equal chance of fixating to any other of the N − 1 type B
individuals and selection neither favours type A or B individuals. On the other hand, selection
favours the type A mutant when r > 1 since ρA > 1/N and favours the type B individuals
when r < 1 since ρA < 1/N . Note that the fixation probability is not the only measure for
evolutionary success and the fixation time [12, 27] can be looked at as well.
1.3.1 Games in finite populations
The Moran process is extended to the case where fitness is frequency dependent as in [69, 99].
The individuals are assumed to be playing a game whose payoff matrix is given by equation (1.2)
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and, therefore, all that changes from the constant fitness case is the fitness of the individuals.
In particular, the fitness of the individuals needs to calculated with respect to equation (1.2) so
that the state transition probabilities can be plugged into equation (1.6). Then, under certain
assumptions, a rule stating when selection favours type A individuals fixating is obtained.
The fitness of a type A individual in the state where there are n type A individuals is given
by
FA(n) = 1− w + w
[
a(n− 1) + b(N − n)
N − 1
]
. (1.8)
The terms inside the square brackets gives the average payoff to a type A individual when it is
equally likely to interact with all members of the population, that is, the probability of meeting
a type A (B) individual is n−1N−1 (
N−n
N−1 ), which gives a payoff of a (b). The background fitness
is 1. The intensity of selection is controlled by w ∈ [0, 1]. With w = 1, selection with respect
to this game is strong as it determines a substantial part of the fitness with the background
fitness being negligible. With w → 0, selection is weak with respect to this game as the fitness
is dominated by the background fitness and the game contributing only a small portion. With
w = 0, there is neutral drift. Similarly, we obtain the fitness of a type B individual as follows
FB(n) = 1− w + w
[
cn+ d(N − n− 1)
N − 1
]
(1.9)
where the probability of meeting a type A (B) individual is nN−1 (
N−n−1
N−1 ), which gives a payoff
of c (d). Using these fitness values we can calculate the state transition probabilities and plug
them into equation (1.6).
After plugging in the appropriate state transition probabilities, the following Taylor expan-
sion of equation (1.6) is obtained for w → 0
ρA ≈ 1
N
1
1− (αN − β)w/6 (1.10)
where α = a+ 2b− c− 2d and β = 2a+ b+ c− 4d. We know that selection favours the type A
individuals if 1/N < ρA, which is the same as saying that β < αN . Plugging in the values of α
and β gives
c(N + 1) + d(2N − 4) < a(N − 2) + b(2N − 1). (1.11)
Assuming that N is large, we only need to consider the terms multiplied by N and, therefore,
the following is obtained
c+ 2d < a+ 2b⇒
2d− 2b < a− c⇒
3d− 3b < a− c+ d− b⇒
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d− b
a− b− c+ d <
1
3
. (1.12)
This is known as the rule of 1/3 [99] and states that selection favours type A fixating if the
internal equilibrium point is less than 1/3. Note that it was previously shown that that d−ba−b−c+d
is an internal equilibrium point using the replicator equation.
1.4 Evolutionary Graph Theory
Evolutionary graph theory was introduced by [52] and used graphs to describe the structure of
the population. In the Moran process as we have seen that the population is homogeneous such
that the offspring of an individual can replace any individual in the population. However, in
reality populations are generally structured in the sense that certain individuals are more likely
to interact with one another than others, for example scientific collaboration networks seem to
be scale-free [64]. Representing the individuals as nodes on a graph, as done in [52], is one way
of describing the structure such that only individuals who are connected to one another can
interact with/ replace one another, see figure 1.1.
A
B
B
B
A
A
A
A
(a)
A
B
B
B
A
A
A
A
(b)
Figure 1.1: The figures shows two populations with type A and B individuals. Figure (a)
represents an unstructured population where all individuals can interact with one another.
Figure (b) shows a structured population represented using a graph. Each node represents an
individual such that only connected individuals can interact with one another.
A graph represented by an N×N weighted adjacency matrix W = (wij) is used to define the
structure of a population. Each vertex represents an individual such that there exists an edge an
edge (i, j) when wij > 0 that gives the probability that the offspring of individual i can replace
individual j. The BD-B dynamics used in the Moran process can be adapted to be used on an
evolutionary graph such that an individual i will be selected to reproduce proportional to its
fitness as before but its offspring will replace individual j with probability wij . The temperature
then measures how often an individual is likely to be replaced and is given by
Tj =
N∑
i=1
wij . (1.13)
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Like for the Moran process, it is possible to calculate the fixation probability of a type A mutant
in a population of type B individuals for an evolutionary graph, in some cases the exact formula
has been given [15] otherwise it can be calculated numerically. There are several important
results with regards to this for the constant fitness case. One of these is the isothermal theorem
[52] that states if the evolutionary graph is isothermal, which means that every individual has
the same temperature, then the fixation probability of a type A mutant ρA is equal to the Moran
probability. This is an important result because it helps identify those structures that have no
effect on the selection of individuals.
A more general way of describing the structure of the population is using weights that are
not probabilities. In this case, individual i would replace individual j proportional to Fiwij
where Fi is the fitness of individual i and wij ≥ 0. Once again for the constant fitness case, the
fixation probability of a type A mutant in a population of type B individuals can be calculated.
In this case, the circulation theorem [52] states that if the evolutionary graph is a circulation,
which means that the incoming weights and outgoing weights for all individuals are the same,
that is,
N∑
j=1
wkj =
N∑
j=1
wjk ∀k = 1, . . . , N, (1.14)
then ρA is equal to the Moran probability. This result is more general and includes isothermal
graphs as well. In addition to showing what kind of graphs have no effect on the selection of
individuals, certain graphs can be shown to have an amplifying or suppressing effect on the
selection of individuals. For example a star graph [52], where all vertices are connected to one
central vertex, amplifies the effect of selection such that the fixation probability of a type A
mutant in a population of type B individuals is greater (less) than the Moran probability if
r > 1 (r < 1).
There has been a lot of interest in evolutionary graph theory where different evolutionary
dynamics have been studied. In [15] obtained analytical results for the fixation probability of
a mutant type on a line graph and compared it to that of a circle graph. It was found that
that average fixation probability of a fitter mutant type was larger on a line graph than a circle
graph. In [54, 55] it was shown that for directed degree-correlated small-world networks the
global connectivity plays an important role in the fixation probability of a mutant type for three
different update rules. [103] also studied directed graphs and found that there is correlation
between the vertex in-degree variation and the difference between the fixation probabilities for
a given graph and a complete graph. The implicit assumptions made when calculating the
fixation probability was investigated by [53] and it was shown that, given the heterogeneity of
the population, mutations were more likely to appear in certain locations, for example, in a star
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graph where all vertices are connected to one central hub a mutant is more likely to appear in
the hub for death birth dynamics.
1.4.1 Games on Graphs
In this section frequency-dependent fitness is considered in the context of evolutionary graph
theory. As opposed to traditional evolutionary game theory that mainly considers infinite well-
mixed populations, the use of graphs to model population structure on standard games enables
finite inhomogeneous populations to be studied [32, 70, 88]. This follows earlier work considering
finite and/or spatial populations such as [67, 68] that studied the prisoner’s dilemma on an
n × n square lattice of patches such that each patch is occupied by one individual and games
are played between immediate neighbours. Other games in this kind of setting were studied in
[46]. To motivate the idea of games on graphs, a public goods game that requires its players
to cooperate in order to reach the optimal outcome is studied. In particular, [65] outlined 5
different mechanisms for cooperation to evolve of which network reciprocity will be focused on
here. This idea of network reciprocity was studied in [70] where a two-player public goods game
was studied on evolutionary graphs with degree k, that is, each vertex is connected to k other
vertices such that each edge has weight 1/k.
The two-player public goods game used in [70] has payoff matrix
A B
A b− c −c
B b 0
. (1.15)
Here, type A individuals are cooperators because they are willing to pay a cost c so that they
can provide a public good to the individual they are interacting with. On the other hand, type
B players are called defectors because they do not pay a cost to provide a public good but
receive one if they are present with a cooperator. The evolutionary graph is used to determine
the payoff an individual receives such that two individuals who are connected to each other on
the evolutionary graph will play a game with one another. Note that it is possible to define
another interaction graph instead of using the evolutionary graph as demonstrated in [73]. The
payoff to a cooperator connected to k individuals, of which i are cooperators, is given by bi−ck.
The payoff to a defector connected to j cooperators is given by bj. The fitnesses of cooperators
and defectors are respectively given by
FA(k, i) = R+ w − w(bi− ck), FB(j) = R+ w − wbj
where R is the background fitness and w controls of the intensity of selection. For small w there
is weak selection, which means that there are other factors other than this game that determines
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their overall fitness, which is captured by the background fitness R. The background fitness also
ensures that the fitness does not go negative because the fitnesses are used in the dynamics,
which are stochastic so negative fitnesses would not make sense.
For the weak selection limit and large population size, it was shown for BD-B dynamics that
selection favours defection because ρA < 1/N < ρB . To see why this is the case, consider a
circular graph where each vertex is connected to two other vertices such that it forms a closed
chain. Consider a sequence of cooperators within this circular graph. A cooperator at the end
of the sequence interacts with a cooperator who is inside the sequence and a defector at the
border of this sequence giving a payoff of b − 2c. The defector at the border of the sequence
has payoff b and, therefore, a higher fitness. With BD-B dynamics, this defector is more likely
to be selected for reproduction than the cooperator at the end of the sequence. This leads to
the sequence of cooperators shrinking as the defectors at the border of the sequence will get
more chances to replace the cooperator at the end of the sequence with their offspring. On the
other hand, death-birth with selection on birth (DB-B) dynamics can be used. In this case, an
individual randomly dies and is replaced by the offspring of one of its k neighbours proportional
to their fitness. With DB-B dynamics, selection favours cooperators, that is, ρB < 1/N < ρA,
if
b/c > k. (1.16)
Once again we consider what happens at the border of a sequence of cooperators in a circular
graph for the DB-B dynamics. Note that the payoffs remain the same as the interactions are
the same between the individuals. A cooperator at the end of the sequence, randomly chosen
for death, is more likely to be replaced by its neighbouring cooperator inside the sequence, who
has payoff 2b − 2c, than its neighbouring defector at the border, who has payoff b, whenever
b/c > k, where k = 2 in this case. This is because 2b−2c > b whenever b/c > 2. The probability
of cooperators reducing is therefore lower. A defector at the border who is randomly chosen for
death is more likely to be replaced by its neighbouring cooperator who has payoff b − 2c > 0,
since b/c > 2, than its neighbouring defector who has payoff 0. The probability of cooperators
increasing is therefore higher.
Evolutionary graph theory with games has been studied quite extensively. [71] derived the
replicator equation for evolutionary graphs using various evolutionary dynamics. [8] studied the
average time to fixation for a Moran process and found that, independent of the payoff matrix
elements and population size, the fixation time for two strategies is identical. [100] used an
alternative method to predict the fixation probabilities for the cooperation game on graphs.
For games on regular graphs [72] derived the ESS conditions. [12] gave the exact fixation
probabilities for a general two player game on certain non-directed graphs, and [32] considered
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the star graph where they calculated the exact fixation probability for various evolutionary
dynamics and games. A [93] lists a set of open problems in evolutionary graph theory that are
related to game theoretic extensions together with various other developments like evolutionary
graphs that change over time.
1.5 Multiplayer Games
The games we have considered up to this point are based on interactions between two players.
However, many interactions in reality include interactions between multiple individuals. In par-
ticular, many multiplayer interactions cannot be obtained from aggregating the corresponding
pairwise interactions. Consider two types A and B and suppose that a type A individual is
interacting with a and b other type A and type B individuals, respectively, in a group. The
payoff to this individual can be obtained by aggregating the pairwise interactions between the
individuals in this group if the payoff function is linear in a and b. However, non-linear payoff
functions are more common in biology [9]. For example, cooperative hunters share the prey
evenly amongst themselves regardless of the effort they put in, some examples include Harris’
hawks [10], lions [75, 97] and African wild dogs [21].
Determining the payoffs for multiplayer games involves complexities that are not present
in 2-player games. Multi-player games were introduced into biology in [76] and the theory
developed by [11], see also [19]. The games considered in [11] are symmetric. This means that
the payoff an individual receives depends upon the strategy it uses and the combination of
strategies used by its opponents rather than each opponent’s strategy. To elaborate, consider
3 players playing a multiplayer game where players 1, 2, 3 use strategies A,A,B or A,B,A.
For symmetric games, player 1 would receive the same payoff regardless of whether the first or
the second set of strategies is used, however, for asymmetric games the two payoffs could be
different. The order of the players matters in asymmetric games and examples of biological
interactions of this kind include hunting in lioness packs [98] where the position taken by each
lioness during the hunt matters. Since the ordering does not matter, a power notation can be
used when writing the payoffs to account for identical strategies. For example, the payoff to a
type A individual playing against n type A and k type B individuals is written E[A;An, Bk].
The multiplayer games considered in this thesis will not consider the order of the players. For
a comparison between multiplayer payoffs and pairwise payoffs see Figure 1.2.
For multiplayer games the group sampling also needs to be determined. In [11] a population
of infinite size is considered where groups of fixed size m are randomly chosen to play a game.
This simplifies the analysis of the multiplayer games. The complete randomness in which the
groups are picked implies that here symmetric and asymmetric games are essentially the same
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]
(b)
Figure 1.2: This figure shows two graphs where each node represents a type A or B individual
and only connected individuals can interact with one another. In figure (a), the payoffs are
obtained by aggregating the pairwise interactions between the individuals such that E[A,B]
is the payoff to a type A individual interacting with a type B individual. In figure (b), the
payoffs are given by a multiplayer payoff function in which the ordering of the players does not
matter, that is, E[A;Ai, Bj ] is the payoff to a type A individual interacting with i other type
A individuals and j other type B individuals.
[29]. With these assumptions the ESS of m-player games can be defined [11, 19, 76], as well as the
replicator equation [85]. In particular, the ESS for an m-player game can be naturally extended
from the a two-player game as follows. Strategy A in an m-player game is evolutionarily stable
against strategy B if there exists B ∈ (0, 1] such that for all  ∈ (0, B ]
m−1∑
k=0
(
m− 1
k
)
(1− )km−1−kE[A;Ak, Bm−1−k] >
m−1∑
k=0
(
m− 1
k
)
(1− )km−1−kE[B;Ak, Bm−1−k]
(1.17)
such that this is derived using the fact that the population is infinite and groups are formed with
complete randomness so that the probability of a group forming in contests with two strategies
follows a binomial distribution. Now, A is called an ESS if, for every B 6= A, there exists B > 0
such that equation (1.17) holds for all  ∈ (0, B ], for more details see [17] Chapter 9. In finite
populations, [29, 48] adapted the Moran process for m-player games with two strategies and
extended the 1/3 law for multiple players, which was further studied by [50].
A substantial part of the literature considers mutliplayer games between a fixed group size of
m individuals, for example, in [9] groups of size m form in an infinite and well mixed population,
[74] considers a finite population, [81, 83] considers a spatially structured population with groups
of fixed size and [102] considers a specific structure, the cycle, where an unbroken sequence of
m players play a game. One advantage of doing this is that group structure can be easily
incorporated using regular graphs [80]. However, group heterogeneity plays an important role,
for example, [86, 90] showed that group heterogeneity between individuals helps the evolution
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of cooperation, similarly, cooperation was shown to dominate in scale-free networks where the
few highly connected individuals are also directly interconnected [87]. In [91] a multiplayer
public goods game was studied on a complex network. In the multiplayer public goods game
each cooperator pays a contribution c towards a public good and defectors contribute nothing.
The total contribution that is received is multiplied by a synergy factor r and evenly shared
between all players. Each individual i plays ki + 1 games, where ki is the degree of player i on
the complex network, such that 1 game is played with its neighbours and another game with
each of its ki neighbours in their neighbourhood. It was shown that with heterogeneous groups
selection favoured cooperation.
Group formation is important when there are heterogeneous group size and has to be ac-
counted for. In [91], the individuals that can interact with each other are connected to each
other. However, there are many ways in which these groups can be formed where the method
used, as described in the previous paragraph, is just one of the possibilities. One solution to
resolve this ambiguity is to use bi-partite graphs to preserve the pairwise connections and the
group structure [30, 31]. With these bi-partite graphs one set of nodes represents the individuals
and another the groups. Individuals can interact in a group if they are connected to the same
group node, which also implies that they are connected to each other on a graph. For these
kinds of bi-partite graph, it was shown that the actual group structure plays an important role
in the evolution of cooperation in a multiplayer public goods game. In particular, [82] showed
that the driving force behind the evolution of cooperation was the degree of overlap between
the groups.
There are various other ways group structure has been modelled in multiplayers games. In
[104] a hierarchical structure was considered where individuals are part of different groups at
multiple levels such that groups at higher levels are larger than those at a lower level. Another
way to allow groups to form is to allow individuals to be mobile and there are several ways in
which one can model this. For example, [20] considered the random movement of individuals in
a continuous two-dimensional plane such that the group structure is determined by a random
geometric graph with constant radius, which means that individuals that are within a certain
radius of each other are connected to each other and, therefore, interact in a group. With mobile
agents the group structure is always changing. Other ways in which this can be achieved is by
updating the group structure depending upon the payoffs individuals receive [105]. The idea
behind this kind of mechanism is to strengthen beneficial ties between individuals, which helps
cooperation evolve in a multiplayer public goods game. There are many more examples in which
group structure can be accounted for, in particular, [84] gives several different examples. The
material in this thesis is predominantly based on multiplayer interactions between individuals.
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Notation Description
N Population size
I1, . . . , IN Individuals in population
M Number of places in habitat
P1, . . . , PM Places in habitat
X(t) Matrix representing population distribution at time t
Xn,m(t) Indicates presence of In in Pm at time t
x Current distribution of X(t)
xn,m Indicates presence of In in Pm for current distribution
x<t Entire history of the system
pn,m,t(x<t) Probability of In being in Pm at time t given x<t
Pn Home range or territory of In
R(n,x, t,x<t) Reward function
Rn Mean reward
Table 1.1: Notation used in the framework of Broom-Rychtar [16].
The models used are constructed using the comprehensive mutliplayer evolutionary game theory
framework of Broom-Rychta´rˇ [16].
1.6 The Framework of Broom-Rychta´rˇ
The framework of Broom-Rychta´rˇ [16] forms the basis for the work done in this thesis. The
motivation behind this framework is to incorporate group interactions that take place in real
life, for example, in African wild dogs [28] and roadrunners [43]. The framework is based on
the premise that there are N individuals distributed over M places and group interactions take
place whenever two or more individuals are present in the same place at the same time. Varying
degrees of complexity can be achieved depending upon the exact assumptions made about the
movement of individuals, for example, the movement of the individuals can be defined in such
a way that resembles a metapopulation [51]. The framework consists of several building blocks
that are described below. The notation used is summarised in Table 1.1.
1.6.1 Structure
The structure of a population is given by the number of places, the number of individuals and
the probability of these individuals being present in these places.
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Population Distribution
The location of every individual in the population at time t is given by the N×M binary matrix
X(t) = (Xn,m(t)) such that
Xn,m(t) =
1 if In is in Pm at time t0 otherwise. (1.18)
The current distribution of the population is x = (xn,m) and the entire history of the population
distributions is x<t = (x1,x2, . . . ,xt−1). In the most general case, the current distribution of the
population is conditional on the entire history of the population distributions which is denoted
as
P(X(t) = x)(x<t) = P(X(t) = x|X(1) = x1, . . . ,X(t− 1) = xt−1). (1.19)
There is a unique distribution of the values of X(t) because at any time t an individual has to
be present at exactly one place which means that every system must satisfy the property∑
x
P(X(t) = x)(x<t) = 1 ∀ t,x<t. (1.20)
Focal Individual
In addition to being able to describe the population as a whole, the characteristics of a particular
individual in a population need to be described as well. This individual is referred to as the
focal individual. The presence of the focal individual In in place Pm at time t conditional on
the history x<t is given by the probability
P(Xn,m(t) = 1)(x<t) = pn,m,t(x<t). (1.21)
The focal individual can be present at one place only at any given time therefore every system
should satisfy the property ∑
m
pn,m,t(x<t) = 1 ∀ n, t,x<t. (1.22)
The subset of all the places the focal individual can visit is called its home range or territory
and is defined as follows
Pn = {Pm : pn,m,t(x<t) > 0} (1.23)
History Dependency
Depending upon the movement behaviour being modelled, varying levels of dependency on the
historical distributions can be considered. Examples of history dependency include the following
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• Dependence on entire history: This is an extreme case such that the current distribution
depends upon all historical population distributions. It is also the most general case and
was introduced earlier as follows
P(X(t) = x)(x<t) = P(X(t) = x|X(1) = x1, . . . ,X(t− 1) = xt−1). (1.24)
• Markov: This is an intermediate case where the current distribution depends upon the
previous historical population distribution only. The population distribution simplifies to
P(X(t) = x)(x<t) = P(X(t) = x|X(t− 1) = xt−1) (1.25)
• History independent: This is the simplest case of all where the the current distribution is
independent of all historical population distributions, and the population distribution is
given by
P(X(t) = x)(x<t) = P(X(t) = x) (1.26)
Time homogeneous structure
In general, the movement of individuals can depend upon time to take into account, for example,
seasonal movement patterns. With time homogeneity, the movement of individuals does not
change with time, and, therefore, the population distribution that is independent of time satisfies
the following
P(X(t) = x)(x<t) = P(X(s) = x)(x<s) ∀ s, t ≥ 1. (1.27)
Row independent structure
Row indpendence is the assumption that individuals move independently of what others are
doing at time t. For any In1 , In2 in such a structure who are moving to Pm1 , Pm2 respectively,
the following holds
P(Xn1,m1(t) = 1 & Xn2,m2(t) = 1)(x<t) = pn1,m2,t(x<t)pn1,m2,t(x<t). (1.28)
Independent and fully independent structures
An independent structure is history independent and row independent. The subset of indepen-
dent structures that are also time homogeneous are known as fully independent structures. The
fully independent structures are the simplest to work with.
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1.6.2 Fitness
The fitness of individuals will be determined by the game played. The reward the focal individual
receives for playing a game is determined by the reward function
R(n,x, t,x<t). (1.29)
The mean reward is the average reward over all possible population distributions at time t
conditional on the historical distributions that is
Rn =
∑
x
P(X(t) = x)(x<t)R(n,x, t,x<t). (1.30)
In general, the mean reward is the preferred way of calculating the fitness because it is more
natural.
1.7 Outline
An outline of the work contained in the following chapters in given. All the work is new and
where a paper has been published, the details are provided.
In chapter 2, evolutionary graphs are identified where a fixed fitness evolutionary process
is identical to the Moran process for different types of dynamics. The work of [52] identified
such evolutionary graphs for the Link and BD-B dynamics in the form of the circulation and
isothermal theorems. This is extended to a whole set of standard dynamics used in the literature.
Even though this work focuses on the fixed fitness case, it provides a better understanding of
evolutionary dynamics in general, especially in the context of evolutionary graphs. The work in
this chapter was published in Royal Society Proceedings A article [79]. For this paper I developed
the original concept in discussion with my supervisor, M. Broom, and carried out the majority
of the analysis and writing.
In chapter 3, social dilemmas with variable group sizes are mathematically defined. Social
dilemmas are essentially mutliplayer games where the optimal strategy for an individual is not
the best for the group. In the literature, such multiplayer interactions between individuals have
considered groups of fixed size. However, the framework of Broom-Rychta´rˇ is suited to groups
of variable size and, hence, this work is a logical precursor to work involving this framework.
This work has not been published, though, at the time of writing, the material in this chapter
is a subset of a yet to be completed article.
In chapter 4, the framework of Broom-Rychta´rˇ is developed further to allow the consideration
of a dynamic evolutionary process. A bulk of the work involved defining the evolutionary
dynamics and describing how they can be derived based on the assumptions in the framework.
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This was influenced by the work in chapter 2, whose focus is predominantly on the dynamics.
The notation used was also changed from the original framework to allow for a more coherent
description of the complete framework. The framework of Broom-Rychta´rˇ is then used to model
territorial behaviour in what is called the territorial-raider model. This work is the first instance
in which a dynamic evolutionary process is illustrated within the framework. The success of
a mutation in a population of 3 and 4 individuals with different territories is considered for
two types of multiplayer interactions based on social dilemmas. Here, the temperature of the
individuals, or how often individuals are replaced, plays a key role in determining the success
of a mutation. This work was published in the Journal of Mathematical Biology article [14].
For this paper I helped construct the dynamics used in the model and carried out part of the
analysis.
In chapter 5, the territorial-raider model of the previous chapter is generalized to allow a
subpopulation to occupy a territory rather than just a lone individual. This generalization
increases the frequency of interactions between individuals and, therefore, may help or hinder
a mutation. As in the territorial raider model, the subpopulation temperature, or how often
one subpopulation replaces another, plays a key role in predicting the success of a mutation.
This work also considers a full set of dynamics as opposed to just the BD-B dynamics in the
territorial raider model. This work was published in the Journal of Theoretical Biology article
[77]. For this paper I helped develop the original concept through joint discussions with my
supervisor, M. Broom, and carried out the majority of the analysis and writing.
In chapter 6, the framework is used to model movement behaviour that is characterized by
Markov history dependence known as the Markov movement model. Individuals would make a
choice of where to go next depending upon whether their current group interaction was ben-
eficial or not. The group interactions are characterized by a social dilemma that involves the
production of a public good. A beneficial interaction would therefore involve cooperators who
contribute towards the production of this public good as opposed to defectors who do not.
Given that movement is Markov, several new variables are introduced to deal with this. In
particular, the movement cost and exploration time play important roles in helping cooperative
behaviour spread. This work had been accepted by the journal Discrete and Continuous Dy-
namical Systems Series B (DCDS-B) article [78]. For this paper I helped develop the original
concept through discussions with the other authors, M. Broom and J. Rychta´rˇ, and carried out
the majority of the analysis and writing.
In chapter 7, the final chapter, different variations of the dynamics that can be used with
the framework are discussed. To illustrate how these variations differ from one another the
territorial raider model of chapter 4 is used. The dynamics used shown in this chapter resulted
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from the investigations that went into the development of the dynamics for the framework. The
main aim is to demonstrate the flexibility of the dynamics used within the framework. This
work has not been published but forms a basis for a lot of the work in the previous chapters
and is therefore included to give a complete picture of the work in this thesis.
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Chapter 2
When is an evolutionary process
equivalent to the Moran process?
2.1 Introduction
This chapter considers a model of population evolution based on the evolutionary graph theory
framework of [52], which was a development of the classical Moran population model [58]. The
model population has a finite size that is fixed at all times and is allowed to evolve through
replacement events that occur at successive discrete time points. The replacement events are
stochastically determined by the fitness of the individuals and the structure of the population.
The individuals are assumed to have fixed fitness, i.e. there are no game-theoretic interactions,
rather, two types of individuals are considered whose fitness are given relative to each other.
The structure is given by a weighted digraph where each node represents an individual with the
directed edges indicating where an individual’s offspring can be placed. For the replacement
events, several different dynamics are considered that depend upon whether birth or death is
the first event and whether selection, i.e. fitness, acts on the first or second event. In particular
the single most important property of such a process is the fixation probability, the probability
that a randomly placed mutant individual of one type will eventually completely replace the
population of the other type.
The objective of this chapter is to expand on the central theme of the classic paper [52] that
identified the circumstances in which the dynamics and structure of the population interact in
such a way that the fixation probability is equivalent to that of the Moran model, that is, it
behaves just as if the population was homogeneous. The reason for doing this is to be able
to identify population structures that neither amplify or suppress the effect of selection. Two
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important results, the circulation theorem and the isothermal theorem, were developed that
addressed this question (see also [94] for related work). In this chapter, six different dynamics
are considered of which two were originally considered in [52]. The circulation theorem and
isothermal theorem are expanded by showing that they apply to four of these dynamics, including
the two original ones. For the two remaining dynamics, a proposition is given to classify the
population structures that are equivalent to a homogeneous population. All the results given in
this chapter apply to graphs with general weights.
2.2 The Model
The population model used in this chapter is of [52] as described in Section 1.4 (pg. 31), which
generalises the model of [58] by incorporating a replacement structure. The notation used is
summarised in Table 2.1. The main assumptions of the model are as follows.
The population has a constant size N ∈ Z, N ≥ 2, consisting of individuals I1, . . . , IN . Every
individual is either of type A or B.
This implies that there are 2N different states of the population given by the combination
of type A and B individuals. Each state is represented by a set S such that n ∈ S if an
individual In is of type A. It is easier to revert to using the number of type A individuals, |S|,
if the population is homogeneous. The states ∅ and N = {1, 2, . . . , N} have only type B and A
individuals respectively.
Individuals have a constant fitness that may depend upon their type.
The fitness of individuals in state S is thus given by the vector F(S) = (Fn(S))n=1,2,...,N
where
Fn(S) =
1 n /∈ S,r ∈ (0,∞) n ∈ S,
is the fitness of In. Here the fitness r of a type A individual is given relative to the fitness of a
type B individual assumed to be 1.
During a stochastic replacement event (that happens in an instant) an exact copy of an individual
Ii replaces an individual Ij.
This information is summarised by the N ×N weighted adjacency matrix W = (wij), which
is called the replacement matrix, such that Ii can replace Ij if and only if wij > 0. Note that
wii > 0 is allowed and therefore Ii can replace itself.
The replacement events are stochastic which means that there is a probability rij = rij(F(S),W)
associated with (a copy of) Ii replacing Ij . There are several potential evolutionary dynamics
on graphs that govern how the probability is determined. There three main types of dynamics
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Notation Definition Description
N ∈ Z+ \ {0, 1} Population size.
A,B The two types of individuals in population.
In Individual n.
S = {n : In of type A} State of the population.
N = {1, 2, . . . , N} State in which all In of type A.
r ∈ (0,∞) Fitness of a type A individual.
Fn(S) ∈ {1, r} Fitness of In in state S.
wij ∈ [0,∞) Edge weight such that wij > 0 if and only if (i, j) ∈ E.
W = (wij) Replacement matrix: N ×N weighted adjacency matrix.
T+n =
∑N
j=1 wnj Out temperature: Sum of all outgoing weights.
T−n =
∑N
i=1 win In temperature: Sum of all incoming weights.
bi ∈ [0, 1] Probability Ii chosen for birth.
dij ∈ [0, 1] Probability a copy of Ii replaces Ij , given that Ii chosen for birth.
dj ∈ [0, 1] Probability Ij chosen for death.
bij ∈ [0, 1] Probability a copy of Ii replaces Ij , given that Ij chosen for death.
rij ∈ [0, 1] Probability a copy of Ii replaces Ij .
PSS′ ∈ [0, 1] State transition probability.
S = (PSS′) State transition matrix.
E∗,W,r Stochastic process using ∗ dynamics, W and r.
ρAS ∈ [0, 1] Fixation probability of type A individual from initial state S.
W Set of all strongly connected replacement matrices.
WC {W : T+n = T−n ∀n} Replacement matrices that are circulations.
WI {W : T+i = T−j ∀i, j} Replacement matrices that are isothermal.
WR {W : T+n = 1 ∀n} Right stochastic replacement matrices.
WL {W : T−n = 1 ∀n} Left stochastic replacement matrices.
CN Set of W that are cycles of length N .
fR (wij) 7→ (wij/
∑
n win) Map from W to WR.
fL (wij) 7→ (wij/
∑
n wnj) Map from W to WL.
f ′ (wij) 7→ (wij/
∑
n,k wnk) Map from W to W .
M∗ Set of W where E∗,W,r is ρ-equivalent to a Moran process.
Table 2.1: Notation used in this chapter.
that are summarised below, see also [93]. The convention that Ii is chosen for birth and Ij is
chosen for death is used.
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1. Birth-Death (BD): Ii is chosen first then Ij . In particular, i ∈ V is chosen with probability
bi and then (i, j) ∈ Ei is chosen with probability dij , where Ei are all edges starting in
vertex i. dij is used to signify that there is ‘replacement by death’. Finally, rij = bidij .
2. Death-Birth (DB): Ij is chosen first then Ii. In particular, j ∈ V is chosen with probability
dj and then (i, j) ∈ Ej is chosen with probability bij , where Ej are all edges ending in
vertex j. bij is used to signify that there is ‘replacement by birth’. Finally, rij = djbij .
3. Link (L): Ii and Ij are chosen simultaneously. In this case (i, j) ∈ E is simply chosen with
probability rij .
For each type of these dynamics, the natural selection can, through the fitness parameter,
influence either the choice at birth (resulting in adding “B”) or at death (adding “D”). It yields
6 kinds of evolutionary dynamics on graphs summarized in Table 2.2. These dynamics have
been extensively studied, in particular, see [54] for a detailed comparison of them. Of these, the
BDB and LB dynamics were used in [52].
2.2.1 The fixation probability
The fixation probability, ρAS = ρ
A
S (∗,W, r), is the probability that the population with initial
state S is absorbed in N where ∗ is the dynamics being used.
Given that the replacement events are random, the transitions between the states of the popu-
lation are described by a stochastic process, which is denoted E . The properties of E can be inves-
tigated once the state transition probabilities of moving from state S to S′, PSS′ = PSS′(∗,W, r),
are calculated using the replacement probabilities as follows:
PSS′ =

∑
i/∈S
rij(F(S),W) if S
′ = S \ {j} for some j ∈ S,
∑
i∈S
rij(F(S),W) if S
′ = S ∪ {j} for some j /∈ S,
∑
i,j∈S
∨i,j /∈S
rij(F(S),W) if S
′ = S.
The transition probabilities, PSS′ , satisfy the Markov property because they only depend upon
the state S, that is, the probability of transitioning from the present state to another state is
independent of any past and future state of the population. The stochastic process E∗,W,r with
state transition matrix S = S(∗,W, r) = (PSS′)S,S′⊂{1,2,...,N} is therefore a Markov chain. The
Markov chain E∗,W,r is part of the class of evolutionary Markov chains described in [5].
The absorbing states of E∗,W,r are ∅,N , which means that if the population is in either one
of these states then it remains there indefinitely. This property of E∗,W,r can be used to measure
48
the success of a type A individual by calculating the probability that it fixates, that is, everyone
in the population is of type A. The fixation probability is then given by solving
ρAS =
∑
S′⊂{1,2,...,N}
PSS′ρ
A
S′ (2.1)
with boundary conditions ρA∅ = 0 and ρ
A
N = 1.
As demonstrated in [54], LB and LD dynamics may differ in time scale but they yield the
same fixation probabilities when fitness is constant (which is the case here). Thus, for purposes
in this chapter the dynamics are the same. They will be considered together and denoted by L.
2.2.2 The Moran Process
The Moran process [58] can be reconstructed as EBDB,WH,r for a constant replacement matrix
WH = (1/N)i,j . (2.2)
For any r ∈ (0,∞) and any S ⊂ {1, . . . , N}, the fixation probability for this process, or Moran
probability, is given by
ρAS =

1− r−|S|
1− r−N if r 6= 1,
|S|/N if r = 1.
The objective is to characterize graphs (and evolutionary dynamics) that yield the same fixation
probabilities as the homogeneous matrix WH given in (2.2). Note that for this matrix all of
the transition probabilities rij take the same value independent of i, j or the dynamics, and
consequently the fixation probability under each of the dynamics is the same.
2.2.3 Classes of Graphs/ Matrices
The set of all admissible replacement matrices is defined as follows
W = {W : for every i, j, there is n such that (Wn)i,j > 0}.
This definition means that W is strongly connected as for any pair of vertices i and j, there is
a path (of length n) going from i to j. Unless specified otherwise, only admissible replacement
matrices will be considered.
As in [52], for any W (admissible or not) the in temperature of In, T
−
n , and the out temper-
ature of In, T
+
n , is defined by
T−n =
N∑
j=1
wjn and T
+
n =
N∑
j=1
wnj .
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W is called a circulation if T+n = T
−
n , for all n ∈ V and it is called isothermal if T+i = T−j ,
for all i, j ∈ V . W is called right stochastic if T+n = 1, for all n ∈ V and it is called left
stochastic if T−n = 1, for all n ∈ V . The sets of all circulations, isothermal matrices, right
stochastic matrices, and left stochastic matrices, respectively are denoted by WC ,WI ,WR, and
WL respectively.
The set CN denotes the sets of matrices representing cycles of length N , more specifically,
when (wij) ∈ CN then wii = 1/2 for i = 1, 2, . . . N , wi1i2 = · · · = winin+1 = · · · = wiN−1iN =
wiN i1 = 1/2 for some permutation i1, i2, . . . , iN of the sequence 1, 2, . . . , N , and wij = 0 other-
wise.
The maps fR : W →WR, fL : W →WL, and f ′ : W →W are respectively defined by
fR ((wij)) =
(
wij∑
n win
)
, fL ((wij)) =
(
wij∑
n wnj
)
, and f ′ ((wij)) =
(
wij∑
n,k wnk
)
.
Note that fR preserves right stochastic matrices and fL preserves left stochastic matrices. More-
over, fR(W) = fL(W) for all W ∈ WI . Also, since f ′ simply involves multiplying W by the
constant 1/
∑
n,k wnk, it implies that W ∈WC ⇔ f ′(W) ∈WC.
When the dynamics ∗, matrices W1 and W2, and fitness r are given, it will be said that
an evolutionary Markov chain E∗,W1,r is ρ-equivalent to E∗,W2,r if for every S ⊂ {1, . . . , N},
ρAS (∗,W1, r) = ρAS (∗,W2, r), in which case it will be written W1 ∼∗,r W2.
This chapter is specifically interested in finding matrices equivalent to the Moran process.
For a dynamics ∗, the following is defined
M∗ = {W : W ∼∗,r WH for all r > 0}.
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Table 2.2: List of dynamics used in this chapter together with their definition of M∗.
Process P(Ii replaces Ij) Order chosen P(Chosen first) P(Chosen second) Definition of M∗ Illustration of M∗
BDB
[7, 15, 52, 70,
71, 95, 103]
rij = bidij Ii then Ij bi =
Fi(S)∑
n
Fn(S)
dij =
wij∑
n
win
MBDB = {W : fR(W) ∈WC}
= f−1R (WC)
BDD
[54]
rij = bidij Ii then Ij bi =
1
N
dij =
wij/Fj(S)∑
n
win/Fn(S)
MBDD = {W : fR(W) ∈ {WH} ∪
CN}
= f−1R ({WH} ∪ CN )
DBD
[6, 7, 60, 95]
rij = dibij Ij then Ii dj =
1/Fj(S)∑
n
1/Fn(S)
bij =
wij∑
n
wnj
MDBD = {W : fL(W) ∈WC}
= f−1L (WC)
DBB
[61, 67, 70,
71, 86]
rij = dibij Ij then Ii dj =
1
N
bij =
wijFi(S)∑
n
wnjFn(S)
MDBB = {W : fL(W) ∈ {WH} ∪
CN}
= f−1L ({WH} ∪ CN )
LB
[7, 52, 95]
rij =
wijFi(S)∑
n,k
wnkFn(S)
Simultaneous N/A N/A
MLB = {W : f ′(W) ∈WC}
= f ′−1(WC) = WC
LD
[55]
rij =
wij/Fj(S)∑
n,k
wnk/Fk(S)
Simultaneous N/A N/A
MLD = {W : f ′(W) ∈WC}
= f ′−1(WC) = WC
Key for Illustration of M∗:
W
W8
W1
W2
W3
W4
W5
W6
W7
W1 =WI ∩ f−1R ({WH} ∪ CN )
=WI ∩ f−1L ({WH} ∪ CN )
W2 =WI \ f−1R ({WH} ∪ CN )
=WI \ f−1L ({WH} ∪ CN )
W3 =WC \WI
W4 =
(
f−1R (WC) \WC
) ∩ f−1R ({WH} ∪ CN )
W5 =
(
f−1R (WC) \WC
) \ f−1R ({WH} ∪ CN )
W6 =
(
f−1L (WC) \WC
) ∩ f−1L ({WH} ∪ CN )
W7 =
(
f−1L (WC) \WC
) \ f−1L ({WH} ∪ CN )
W8 =W \⋃7i=1Wi
The key on the left gives the definition of partitions W1,W2, . . . ,W8 of W . The
partitions Wi that make up M∗ are highlighted for each of the dynamics in the last
column. The partition of W where E is ρ-equivalent to a Moran process regardless of
the standard dynamics being used is given by ML∩MBDB∩MBDD∩MDBD∩MDBB ≡
MBDD ∩MDBB ≡W1.
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2.3 Results
The map fR preserves the equivalence classes of BDB and BDD dynamics, fL preserves the
equivalence classes of DBB and DBD dynamics and f ′ preserves the equivalence classes for link
dynamics. Specifically, as one can see from the proofs in Section 2.5, for any W and any r > 0
W ∼BDB,r fR(W), (2.3)
W ∼BDD,r fR(W),
W ∼DBD,r fL(W),
W ∼DBB,r fL(W),
W ∼L,r f ′(W).
The following results are thus obtained, which completely specify the graphs which are equivalent
to the homogeneous matrix WH for each of the evolutionary dynamics considered here.
Proposition 1 (Link). ML = WC . More precisely, the following statements are equivalent:
(a) W is a circulation.
(b) For all r > 0, W ∼L,r WH.
(c) There is r > 0 such that W ∼L,r WH.
Note that WC = f
′−1(WC) = {W : f ′(W) ∈ WC} and thus, similarly to Proposition 2
below, Proposition 1 can be written as ML = f
′−1(WC).
Proposition 2 (BDB and DBD). MBDB = f
−1
R (WC) and MDBD = f
−1
L (WC). More precisely,
the following statements are equivalent:
(a) fR(W) is a circulation.
(b) For all r > 0, W ∼BDB,r WH.
(c) There is r > 0 such that W ∼BDB,r WH
The equivalent conditions for DBD are similar to the above for BDB but fR is replaced by fL.
Proposition 3 (BDD and DBB). MBDD = f
−1
R ({WH}∪CN ) and MDBB = f−1L ({WH}∪CN )
. More precisely, the following statements are equivalent:
(a) fR(W) = WH or fR(W) ∈ CN .
(b) For all r > 0, W ∼BDD,r WH.
The equivalent conditions for DBB are similar to the above for BDD but fR is replaced by fL.
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In particular, MBDD ⊂MBDB and MDBB ⊂MDBD. The sets M∗ are illustrated in Table 2.2.
Note that unlike in Propositions 1 and 2, Proposition 3 does not contain “any r implies all
r”. In fact, when r = 1, there is no selection and thus the dynamics BDB and BDD are the
same (and also the dynamics DBB and DBD are the same). Consequently, by Proposition 2,
W ∼BDD,1 WH ⇔ fR(W) ∈WC ⇔W ∈MBDB,
W ∼DBB,1 WH ⇔ fL(W) ∈WC ⇔W ∈MDBD.
2.3.1 Results here in the context of known results
For the LB dynamics, Proposition 1 was stated and proved in [52] as the Circulation theorem.
For the LD dynamics, Proposition 1 follows from the Circulation theorem and the result of [54]
that the fixation probabilities for LB and LD are the same.
As shown in Section 2.5.1, BDB is the same as the LB dynamics for right stochastic matrices
(in particular, for BDB dynamics, Proposition 2 can be seen as the Isothermal theorem from
[52]). Proposition 2 thus follows from Proposition 1 thanks to (2.3). The natural symmetries
between fR and fL and BDB and DBD dynamics allow us to extend the Isothermal theorem to
DBD dynamics as well (see also [42]).
Overall, Propositions 1 and 2 and the occurrence of WC within them are consistent with the
claim made in [52] that the circulation criterion completely classifies all replacement matrices
where E∗,W,r is ρ-equivalent to a Moran process. Figure 2.1 shows two graphs with the same
number of edges, but one is a circulation and the other is not, i.e. a circulation graph can be
constructed by changing the edge weights.
1(a) 2 3
2
2
1
1
1(b) 2 3
3
5
1
4
Figure 2.1: Two graphs are shown that have the same number of edges but different weights.
Figure (a) is a circulation since the in temperature and out temperature is the same for each
vertex, i.e. T+1 = T
−
1 = 4, T
+
2 = T
−
2 = 3 and T
+
3 = T
−
3 = 2. Figure (b) shows that by changing
the edge weights the graph is no longer a circulation. It suffices to check that only one edge
does not satisfy the circulation criterion, i.e. T+1 = 3 6= T−1 = 5.
The most important new result is Proposition 3. It shows that the BDD and DBB dynamics
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require very strict conditions to yield the Moran process. Either the population structure
is homogeneous, or it is a directed cycle. This latter structure is an interesting theoretical
example, but is unlikely to apply to real populations, meaning that the homogeneous population
is practically the only way to get the Moran process for a realistic population.
2.3.2 The importance of self-loops in BDD and DBB dynamics
Proposition 3 by definition requires that wii > 0 ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Without such self-loops,
EBDD,W,r, EDBB,W,r cannot ever be ρ-equivalent to the Moran process. The ability of an in-
dividual to replace itself therefore plays an important role in the replacement structure of the
population and cannot be discounted. For BD dynamics, when increasing the diagonal weights
of W, the fixation probability decreases for BDB and increases for BDD. For DB dynamics,
the increase in fixation probability DBB is greater than that for DBD. For LB dynamics, the
fixation probability remains the same.
With BDD and DBB evolutionary dynamics on graphs one may encounter the following
problems if there are no self-loops. For DBB dynamics, a type A individual with almost infinite
fitness still has a fixation probability bounded away from 1 because even type A individuals
can be randomly picked for death and replaced by type B individuals [17, page 245]. With self-
loops, however, a type A individual will almost always be replaced by itself (or another type A
individual) and therefore has a fixation probability approaching 1. Similarly, for BDD dynamics,
a type A individual with almost zero fitness does not have near probability 0 of fixating as type
A individuals can be randomly picked for birth and replace type B individuals [17, page 245].
With self-loops, such an individual will almost always pick itself (or another type A) to replace
and therefore its fixation probability is near 0. Thus the inclusion of self-loops removes some
problematic features of the BDD and DBB dynamics, and makes them more attractive dynamics
to use in models.
2.4 Discussion
This fixation probability depends upon the fitnesses of the two types of individuals, but can also
be heavily influenced by the population structure as given by the weights, and by the evolu-
tionary dynamics used. These effects are commonly observed, although in some circumstances
evolution proceeds as if on a well-mixed population as from the original work of [58], dependent
only upon the fitnesses of the two types, and some important results in this regard were already
given in [52]. The aim of this chapter was to provide a generalised set of conditions for when
this would be the case.
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By defining what is meant by fixation-equivalence to the Moran process, a general result
was provided which, independent of the specific dynamics used, helps identify graphs that
do not affect the fixation probability. With respect to each of the standard dynamics, sets
of evolutionary graphs were classified that have the same fixation probability as the Moran
process (or well mixed population). These sets include graphs that are circulations and therefore
generalises the work of [52].
An important new result shows that the set of weights for which fixation equivalence to the
Moran process is obtained for the BDD and DBB dynamics is very restricted, and so that for
most populations with any structure this equivalence will not hold for these dynamics. Note
also that the inclusion of non-zero self weights wii eliminates some problematic features of these
two dynamics (i.e. that individuals with 0 fitness could fixate or those with infinite fitness could
be eliminated) and so improves the applicability of these dynamics.
Presenting evolutionary dynamics on graphs in the way done here allows one to incorporate a
variety of dynamics in their analysis, both of standard type and other definitions. This improves
the understanding of dynamics on graphs in general. Note that the list of dynamics in Table 2.2
is not exhaustive. For example, [71] used imitation dynamics, which is a class of DBB dynamics
with an additional requirement wii > 0 ∀i, and [106] consolidates the BDB and DBD dynamics
such that one is chosen with a given probability.
In general the inclusion of non-zero self weights, in contrast to many earlier evolutionary
graph theory works, allows for a greater flexibility of modelling. Note that this is consistent
with the original work of [58], which allowed self-replacement as an integral part of the process.
For well-mixed populations it does not matter much whether this possibility is included or not
(at least for sufficiently large populations with intermediate fitness values), and it is likely that
it has often been excluded for reasons of convenience because of this without the ramifications
being fully considered in many later works. It is thus important to consider whether to include
such self weights when modelling spatial structure using evolutionary graph theory.
2.5 Proofs
2.5.1 BDB is the same as LB for right stochastic matrices
For BDB dynamics we have rij = bidij . By definition
∑
ij bidij = 1, we can therefore write this
as rij = bidij
/∑
n,k bndn,k . Substituting bi = Fi
/∑N
m=1 Fm gives
rij =
dijFi
/∑N
m=1 Fm∑
n,k
(
dnkFn
/∑N
m=1 Fm
) = dijFi∑
n,k dnkFn
.
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If W is right stochastic, i.e.
∑N
n=1 win = 1 for all i = 1, 2, . . . N , for BDB dynamics we have
that dij = wij
/∑N
n=1 win = wij giving rij = wijFi
/∑
n,k wnkFn which is the LB dynamics as
required. We also have that DBD is the same as LD for left stochastic matrices. The explanation
follows the same procedure as above.
2.5.2 Lemma 1 (Forward Bias)
The key Lemma 1 stated below is used in the proofs of all propositions and it relies heavily on
the notion of forward bias of state S which is then given by the ratio of the probabilities of a
forward transition to a backward transition from S. A forward and backward transition from S
occurs when the number of type A individuals increase and decrease by one respectively, which
happen with probability
P+S =
∑
n/∈S
PS,S∪{n} and P
−
S =
∑
n∈S
PS,S\{n}.
Lemma 1 (Constant Forward Bias). Let E be an evolutionary process on states S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N}
with transition probabilities PS,S′ that satisfy
• PS,S′ > 0 only if S and S′ differ in at most one element
• for every S 6= ∅, {1, . . . , N}, there are S+ and S− such that |S+| = |S|+1 and |S−| = |S|−1
and PS,S+ > 0, PS,S− > 0.
Then, the following are equivalent
a) There is a constant c > 0 such that for all S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N}
ρAS =

1− c−|S|
1− c−N if c 6= 1,
|S|/N if c = 1
b) E has constant forward bias, that is, there is a constant d such that for all S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N}
P+S
/
P−S = d.
Moreover, if either (a) or (b) hold, then c = d.
Note that a similar result is given in [4, 52] where the forward bias is explicitly defined as
r
∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
wab
/∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
wba ,
which is what one gets when using Link dynamics, or BDB dynamics if W ∈WR. Note that in
Lemma 1 the forward bias is defined independent of the dynamics and therefore applies to all
dynamics that satisfy the assumptions.
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Proof. “(a) ⇒ (b)”: Take any S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N}. It is known that
ρAS =
∑
S′
PS,S′ρ
A
S′ = PS,Sρ
A
S +
∑
n/∈S
(
PS,S∪{n}ρAS∪{n}
)
+
∑
n∈S
(
PS,S\{n}ρAS\{n}
)
and using PS,S = 1− P+S − P−S gives
0 =
∑
n/∈S
(
PS,S∪{n}
(
ρAS∪{n} − ρAS
))
+
∑
n∈S
(
PS,S\{n}
(
ρAS\{n} − ρAS
))
. (2.4)
For c 6= 1, equation (2.4) simplifies to
0 =
1− c−|S|−1 − 1 + c−|S|
1− c−N P
+
S +
1− c−|S|+1 − 1 + c−|S|
1− c−N P
−
S ⇒
P+S
/
P−S =
c−|S| − c−|S|+1
c−|S|−1 − c−|S| =
1− c
c−1 − 1 = c.
For c = 1, equation (2.4) simplifies to
0 = (|S|+ 1− |S|)P+S + (|S| − 1− |S|)P−S ⇒ P+S
/
P−S = 1.
“(b) ⇐ (a)”: The state transition matrix S = (PS,S′) can be scaled to give S′ = (P ′S,S′) such
that P ′S,S = 0 and P
′
S,S′ = PS,S′/(1 − PS,S) = PS,S′/(P+S + P−S ) where S is a non-absorbing
state. The fixation probability ρAS will be the same whether S
′ or S is used. This is because
equation (2.1) can be rearranged as follows
ρAS =
∑
S′
PSS′ρ
A
S′ ⇒ ρAS = PSSρAS +
∑
S′:S′ 6=S
PSS′ρ
A
S′ ⇒
ρAS (1− PSS) =
∑
S′:S′ 6=S
PSS′ρ
A
S′ ⇒ ρAS =
∑
S′:S′ 6=S
PSS′
P+S + P
−
S
ρAS′ .
Let {S0,S1, . . . ,SN} be a partition of the states S such that S ∈ Si if |S| = i. The probability
Pi,j(S) of transitioning from state S ∈ Si to lumped state Sj with respect to S′ is
Pi,j(S) =

0 j 6= i± 1,
1/(d+ 1) j = i− 1,
d/(d+ 1) j = i+ 1
for i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1. (2.5)
This can be easily verified, for example, take j = i− 1 then
Pi,i−1(S) =
∑
S′∈Si−1
P ′S,S′ =
∑
S′∈Si−1
PS,S′
P+S + P
−
S
=
P−S
P+S + P
−
S
=
1
1 + d
since the forward bias is equal to d. Equation (2.5) satisfies the necessary and sufficient condition
for the Markov chain with state transition matrix S′ to be lumpable with respect to the partition
{S0,S1, . . . ,SN} (Theorem 6.3.2 page 124, [44]). Let Sˆ = (Pi,j) be the state transition matrix
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for this lumped Markov chain then the probability Pi,j of transitioning from lumped states Si
to Sj is given by
Pi,j = Pi,j(S).
The state transition matrix Sˆ describes a random walk with absorbing barriers and therefore
the probability ρAi of type A individuals fixating when the population starts in lumped state Si
is calculated using the methods in [41] to give
ρAi = 1 +
i−1∑
j=1
j∏
k=1
Pk,k−1
Pk,k+1
/
1 +
N−1∑
j=1
j∏
k=1
Pk,k−1
Pk,k+1
.
In this case,
ρAi =

1− d−i
1− d−N d 6= 1,
i/N d = 1
since Pk,k−1/Pk,k+1 = 1/r for k = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1. By definition, ρAS = ρAi where i = |S| as
required.
2.5.3 Proposition 1 (Link)
The following statements are equivalent:
(a) W is a circulation.
(b) For all r > 0, W ∼L,r WH.
(c) There is r > 0 such that W ∼L,r WH.
(d) For all r > 0 and for all S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N}, the forward bias of EL,W,r is r, i.e.
P+S
/
P−S = r.
(e) There is r > 0 such that for all a ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, the forward bias of the one element set
S = {a} is r, i.e. ∑
b6=a
P{a},{a,b}
Pa,∅
= r.
Proof. For LB dynamics the forward bias is given by
P+S
P−S
=
∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
wabFa∑
n,k
wnkFn
∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
wbaFb∑
n,k
wnkFn
=
r
∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
wab∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
wba
.
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For LD dynamics the forward bias is given by
P+S
P−S
=
∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
wab/Fb∑
n,k
wnk/Fk
∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
wba/Fa∑
n,k
wnk/Fk
=
r
∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
wab∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
wba
.
“(a) ⇒ (d)”: W is a circulation i.e. T+n = T−n for all n ∈ {1, . . . , N} and thus∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
wab =
∑
a∈S
(∑
n
wan −
∑
k∈S
wak
)
=
∑
a∈S
(
T+a −
∑
k∈S
wak
)
⇒
∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
wab =
∑
a∈S
(
T−a −
∑
k∈S
wka
)
=
∑
a∈S
(∑
n
wna −
∑
k∈S
wka
)
⇒
∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
wab =
∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
wba.
Note that
∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S wab 6= 0 because W is admissible and represents a strongly connected
graph. Thus, the forward bias for both LB and LD is equal to r.
“(d)⇒(e)” is trivial as (d) is much stronger than (e).
“(e)⇒(a)” Let a and r is fixed. By above calculations of the forward bias, we have
∑
b/∈S={a}
wab =
∑
b/∈S={a}
wba ⇒ −waa +
N∑
i=1
wai = −waa +
N∑
i=1
wia ⇒
N∑
i=1
wai =
N∑
i=1
wia
therefore W is a circulation.
“(d)⇒(b)” follows from Lemma 1.
“(b)⇒(c)” is trivial.
“(c)⇒(e)” follows from Lemma 1.
2.5.4 Proposition 2 (BDB and DBD)
More precisely, the following statements are equivalent:
(a) fR(W) is a circulation.
(b) For all r > 0, W ∼BDB,r WH.
(c) There is r > 0 such that W ∼BDB,r WH
(d) For all r > 0 and for all S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N}, the forward bias of EBDB,W,r is r, i.e.
P+S
/
P−S = r.
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(e) There is r > 0 such that for all a ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, the forward bias of EBDB,W,r of the one
element set S = {a} is r, i.e. ∑
b6=a
P{a},{a,b}
Pa,∅
= r.
Proof. Let U = (uij) = fR(W) = (wij/
∑
n win) then for BDB dynamics the forward bias of
EBDB,W,r is given by
P+S
P−S
=
∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
Fa∑
n
Fn
wab∑
n
wan∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
Fb∑
n
Fn
wba∑
n
wbn
=
r
∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
uab∑
b/∈S
∑
a∈S
uba
and therefore the forward bias of EBDB,W,r is the same as forward bias of EBDB,U,r.
Similarly, with almost identical working as above, when V = fL(W), the forward bias of
EDBD,W,r is the same as forward bias of EDBD,V,r and is given by
P+S
P−S
=
∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
1/Fb∑
n
1/Fn
wab∑
n
wnb∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
1/Fa∑
n
1/Fn
wba∑
n
wna
=
∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
vab
1
r
∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
vba
.
and the proof of the Proposition for DBD closely follows the one for BDB given below with U
and fR appropriately replaced by V and fL.
“(a)⇒ (d)”: If U = fR(W) ∈ WC, i.e. if U is doubly stochastic, then the forward bias (for
S 6= ∅,N ) is equal to
P+S
P−S
=
r
∑
a∈S
(∑
n
(uan)−
∑
k∈S
(uak)
)
∑
a∈S
(∑
n
(una)−
∑
k∈S
(uka)
) = r
(
|S| −
∑
a∈S
∑
k∈S
uak
)
|S| −
∑
a∈S
∑
k∈S
uka
= r
“(d)⇒(e)” is trivial as (d) is stronger than (e).
“(e)⇒(a)” Let a and r is fixed. By above calculations of the forward bias, we have∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
uab =
∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
uba.
Consider the states S = {a} in which there is only one individual of type A then
∑
b/∈S
uab =
∑
b/∈S
uba ⇒ −uaa +
N∑
i=1
uai = −uaa +
N∑
i=1
uia ⇒ 1 =
N∑
i=1
uia
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is true for all a = 1, 2, . . . , N and therefore U is doubly stochastic and thus fR(W) is a circula-
tion.
“(d)⇒(b)” follows from Lemma 1.
“(b)⇒(c)” is trivial.
“(c)⇒(e)” follows from Lemma 1.
2.5.5 Proposition 3 (BDD and DBB)
The following statements are equivalent:
(a) fR(W) = WH or fR(W) ∈ CN .
(b) For all r > 0, W ∼BDD,r WH.
Proof. The replacement probabilities rij(F(S),W) for BDD dynamics can be rewritten as
rij(F(S),U) where U = (uij) = fR(W) = (wij/
∑
n win) by multiplying the numerator and
denominator with
∑
n win as follows
rij(F(S),W) =
1
N
wij/Fj(S)∑
n win/Fn(S)
=
1
N
wij/ (Fj(S)
∑
n win)∑
n win/ (Fn(S)
∑
n win)
⇒
uij/Fj(S)∑
n uin/Fn(S)
= rij(F(S),U)
and therefore we have that W ∼BDD,r U, for all r > 0. The forward bias using U for state S is
given by
P+S
P−S
=
∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
1
N
uab/Fb∑
n
uan/Fn∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
1
N
uba/Fa∑
n
ubn/Fn
=
∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
uab∑
n
uan/Fn
1
r
∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
uba∑
n
ubn/Fn
. (2.6)
Similarly, let V = (vij) = fL(W) = (wij/
∑
n wnj). Then for DBB dynamics we have
bij =
wijFi∑
n wnjFn
=
wijFi/
∑
n wnj∑
n wnjFn/
∑
n wnj
=
vijFi∑
n vnjFn
and therefore the forward bias when using V is given by
P+S
P−S
=
∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
1
N
vabFa∑
n
vnbFn∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
1
N
vbaFb∑
n
vnaFn
=
r
∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
vab∑
n
vnbFn∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
vba∑
n
vnaFn
.
The proof of the Proposition for DBB closely follows the one for BDD given below with U and
fR appropriately replaced by V and fL.
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If U ∈ CN , then U ∼BDD,r WH
If U ∈ CN then there are only two nonzero elements in each row. In particular, in row i of U
we have that uii, uiki = 1/2 for some ki 6= i. In the numerator of equation (2.6) for a ∈ S, b /∈ S
and ka 6= a we have that for all S
uab∑
n
uan/Fn(S)
=
uab
uaa/Fa(S) + uaka/Fka(S)
=
0 if b 6= ka,1/2
1/2r+1/2 if b = ka.
Similarly, in the denominator of equation (2.6) for a ∈ S, b /∈ S and kb 6= b we have that for all
S
uba∑
n
ubn/Fn(S)
=
uba
ubb/Fb(S) + ubkb/Fkb(S)
=
0 if a 6= kb,1/2
1/2+1/2r if a = kb.
This means that equation (2.6) for all S can be written as
x/2
1/2r + 1/2
/
1
r
y/2
1/2 + 1/2r
= rx/y
where x (y) is the number of nonzero uab (uba) terms in the numerator (denominator). If we
partition the vertices of the graph of U into any two sets V1, V2 then the number of edges e(i, j)
and e(j, i) for i ∈ V1 and j ∈ V2 are by definition the same because it is a cycle. This means that
for a ∈ S and b /∈ S the number of nonzero uab, uba terms in the numerator and denominator
respectively are the same hence x = y and rx/y = r as required. As per Lemma 1, EBDD,U,r is
ρ-equivalent to the Moran process.
If U ∼BDD,r WH for all r > 0, then U = WH or U ∈ CN
By Lemma 1, the forward bias (2.6) is equal to r for all S ⊂ {1, . . . , N} giving∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
uab∑
n
uan/Fn
=
∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
uba∑
n
ubn/Fn
⇒
∑
a∈S
∑
b/∈S
uab
∑
j /∈S
uaj +
1
r
∑
i∈S
uai
=
∑
b/∈S
∑
a∈S
uba∑
j /∈S
ubj +
1
r
∑
i∈S
ubi
. (2.7)
Note that if r = 1, (2.7) holds for all U ∈ WC . From now, we will consider r 6= 1 only. For
clarity, the remainder of this section of the proof is broken down into the following six steps.
Step 1: Derivation of general state dependent row-sum equation
Let U(a, S) =
∑
i∈S uai, i.e. 1− U(a, S) =
∑
j /∈S uaj . Equation (2.7) thus becomes∑
a∈S
1− U(a, S)
1− U(a, S) + U(a, S)/r =
∑
b/∈S
U(b, S)
1− U(b, S) + U(b, S)/r ⇒
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∑
a∈S
1
1 + U(a, S)(1/r − 1) =
N∑
n=1
U(n, S)
1 + U(n, S)(1/r − 1) . (2.8)
Equation (2.8) can be written as a Taylor series as follows
∑
a∈S
∞∑
k=0
(−1)k(1/r − 1)k [U(a, S)]k =
N∑
n=1
U(n, S)
∞∑
k=0
(−1)k(1/r − 1)k [U(n, S)]k ⇒
∑
a∈S
∞∑
k=0
(1− 1/r)k [U(a, S)]k =
N∑
n=1
∞∑
k=0
(1− 1/r)k [U(n, S)]k+1 (2.9)
For equation (2.9) to hold for all r the coefficients of (1−1/r)k should be same, that is, for all k
∑
a∈S
[U(a, S)]
k
=
N∑
n=1
[U(n, S)]
k+1
. (2.10)
Step 2: The diagonal of U consists of non-zero elements
Consider the state S = {a} then equation (2.10) gives
ukaa =
N∑
n=1
uk+1na . (2.11)
If uaa = 0 or 1 then (2.11) implies that all off-diagonal terms in column n are zero which is a
contradiction with W (and thus also U = fR(W)) being strongly connected, which means that
0 < uaa < 1.
Step 3: The nth column of U contains mn nonzero elements, all equal to 1/mn
Since 0 < uaa < 1, we can divide equation (2.11) by u
k
aa giving
1 =
N∑
n=1
una
(
una
uaa
)k
. (2.12)
We have that
lim
k→∞
(
una
uaa
)k
=

∞ una > uaa,
1 una = uaa,
0 una < uaa,
and therefore (2.12) implies that 0 ≤ una ≤ uaa. There must be n 6= a such that una = uaa as
otherwise, by (2.12), we would have uaa = 1. Let Ca = {i : uia = uaa}. (2.12) becomes
1 =
( ∑
i∈Ca
uaa
)
+
( ∑
j /∈Ca
uk+1ja
ukaa
)
= |Ca|uaa +
( ∑
j /∈Ca
uk+1ja
ukaa
)
. (2.13)
As k →∞, (2.13) implies that uaa = 1/|Ca|. Thus, again by (2.13), uja = 0 for all j /∈ Ca. This
means that in column n of U there should be mn = |Cn| with 2 ≤ mn ≤ N nonzero elements,
including unn, that are all equal to 1/mn.
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Step 4: mn is the same for all n
Considering state S = {i, j} and using uaa = 1/ma, (2.10) can be written as follows
(uii + uij)
k + (uji + ujj)
k =α
1
mk+1i
+ β
1
mk+1j
+ γ
(
1
mi
+
1
mj
)k+1
(2.14)
where α, β, γ are the number of rows where 1/mi is adjacent to 0, 0 is adjacent to 1/mj , and 1/mi
is adjacent to 1/mj in columns i and j respectively. More precisely, α is the cardinality of the set
Kiij = {n : uni = 1/mi, unj = 0}, β is the cardinality of the set Kjij = {n : uni = 0, unj = 1/mj}
and γ is the cardinality of the set Kijij = {n : uni = 1/mi, unj = 1/mj}.
Since Ci = Kiij ∪Kijij and Cj = Kjij ∪Kijij , we have that mi = α+ γ and mj = β + γ. Since
Kiij ,K
j
ij ,K
ij
ij are disjoint, we have α + β + γ ≤ N . Now, consider the different possibilities we
can have on the left-hand side of equation (2.14).
Case 1:
uii = 1/mi, uij = 0 in row i and uji = 1/mi, ujj = 1/mj in row j. Thus α, γ ≥ 1 and therefore
equation (2.14) gives
1
mki
+
(
mi +mj
mimj
)k
=
α
mk+1i
+
β
mk+1j
+ γ
(
mi +mj
mimj
)k+1
⇒
1
(α+ γ)k
+
(
α+ β + 2γ
(α+ γ)(β + γ)
)k
=
α
(α+ γ)k+1
+
β
(β + γ)k+1
+ γ
(
α+ β + 2γ
(α+ γ)(β + γ)
)k+1
⇒
(β + γ)k + (α+ β + 2γ)k
[(α+ γ)(β + γ)]k
=
α(β + γ)k+1 + β(α+ γ)k+1 + γ(α+ β + 2γ)k+1
[(α+ γ)(β + γ)]k+1
⇒
(β + γ)k + (α+ β + 2γ)k =
α(β + γ)k+1 + β(α+ γ)k+1 + γ(α+ β + 2γ)k+1
(α+ γ)(β + γ)
⇒
(β + γ)k + (α+ β + 2γ)k =
α(β + γ)k
α+ γ
+
β(α+ γ)k
β + γ
+
(αγ + βγ + 2γ2)(α+ β + 2γ)k
αβ + αγ + βγ + γ2
⇒
γ(β + γ)k
α+ γ
=
β(α+ γ)k
β + γ
+
(γ2 − αβ)(α+ β + 2γ)k
αβ + αγ + βγ + γ2
.
As k →∞, we get (β + γ)k 6= (α+ γ)k ± (α+ β + 2γ)k since α+β+2γ > β+γ, α+γ hence we
want γ2 = αβ to get rid off (α+β+2γ)k. This implies that β+γ = α+γ ⇒ α = β ⇒ α = β = γ
giving mi = mj .
Case 2:
uii = 1/mi, uij = 1/mj in row i and uji = 0, ujj = 1/mj in row j. This case is symmetrical
to Case 1 and therefore we get that α = β = γ giving mi = mj .
Case 3:
uii = 1/mi, uij = 1/mj in row i and uji = 1/mi, ujj = 1/mj in row j. Thus γ ≥ 2 and
therefore equation (2.14) gives
2
(
mi +mj
mimj
)k
=
α
mk+1i
+
β
mk+1j
+ γ
(
mi +mj
mimj
)k+1
⇒
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2(
α+ β + 2γ
(α+ γ)(β + γ)
)k
=
α(β + γ)k+1 + β(α+ γ)k+1 + γ(α+ β + 2γ)k+1
[(α+ γ)(β + γ)]k+1
⇒
2 (α+ β + 2γ)
k
=
α(β + γ)k+1 + β(α+ γ)k+1 + γ(α+ β + 2γ)k+1
(α+ γ)(β + γ)
⇒
2 (α+ β + 2γ)
k
=
α(β + γ)k
α+ γ
+
β(α+ γ)k
β + γ
+
(αγ + βγ + 2γ2)(α+ β + 2γ)k
αβ + αγ + βγ + γ2
⇒
(2αβ + αγ + βγ)(α+ β + 2γ)k
αβ + αγ + βγ + γ2
=
α(β + γ)k
α+ γ
+
β(α+ γ)k
β + γ
.
As k →∞, we get (α+ β + 2γ)k 6= (β + γ)k + (α+ γ)k since α+β+ 2γ > β+ γ, α+ γ hence
we want 2αβ + αγ + βγ = 0⇒ α, β = 0 giving mi = mj .
Case 4:
uii = 1/mi, uij = 0 in row i and uji = 0, ujj = 1/mj in row j. Thus α, β ≥ 1 and therefore
equation (2.14) gives
1/mki + 1/m
k
j =
α
mk+1i
+
β
mk+1j
+ γ
(
mi +mj
mimj
)k+1
⇒
1
(α+ γ)k
+
1
(β + γ)k
=
α
(α+ γ)k+1
+
β
(β + γ)k+1
+ γ
(
γ + β + 2γ
(α+ γ)(β + γ)
)k+1
⇒
(β + γ)k + (α+ γ)k
[(α+ γ)(β + γ)]k
=
α(β + γ)k+1 + β(α+ γ)k+1 + γ(α+ β + 2γ)k+1
[(α+ γ)(β + γ)]k+1
⇒
(β + γ)k + (α+ γ)k =
α(β + γ)k+1 + β(α+ γ)k+1 + γ(α+ β + 2γ)k+1
(α+ γ)(β + γ)
⇒
(β + γ)k + (α+ γ)k =
α(β + γ)k
α+ γ
+
β(α+ γ)k
β + γ
+
γ(α+ β + 2γ)k+1
αβ + αγ + βγ + γ2
.
As k → ∞, we get 0 6= (α + β + 2γ)k since α, β ≥ 1 hence we require that γ = 0 to get an
equality.
Conclusion from all the cases above
We see that mi 6= mj is potentially possible only in Case 4. However, U is strongly connected.
If one connects i and j by a path i = i0, i1, i2, . . . in = j, then one has mik = mik+1 as ik and
ik+1 must fall into Case 1, Case 2 or Case 3 above. Thus mi = mj . This implies that every
column of U has 2 ≤ m ≤ N nonzero elements, including unn, that are all equal to 1/m. This
is also true for every row of U because it is right stochastic by definition.
Step 5: There exists state S such that Ca = Ca′ for all a, a′ ∈ S
We can define the state Rx = {n : uxn = uxx} then, by definition, x ∈ Rx and |Rx| = m since
there are m nonzero elements in row x of U. Consider the state S = Rx \ {y} for y ∈ Rx \ {x}.
For this S (as well as any other state), we have that
if n ∈ S then 1/m
if n /∈ S then 0
 ≤ U(n, S) ≤ min(m, |S|)m .
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We can therefore write equation (2.10) in the form
min(m,|S|)∑
i=1
λS(i)
(
i
m
)k
=
min(m,|S|)∑
i=0
λ′S(i)
(
i
m
)k+1
(2.15)
where λS(i) is the number of U(n, S) terms equal to i/m for n ∈ S and λ′S(i) is the number
of U(n, S) terms equal to i/m for n ∈ N , which means that λ′S(i) ≥ λS(i) for i 6= 0. The
ratio of the left-hand side and right-hand side of equation (2.15) should always be equal to one.
Therefore, as k →∞, we require that
λS(imax) = λ
′
S(imax)
imax
m
where imax is the largest i such that λS(i) > 0.
We have that imax = m− 1 in equation (2.15) because |S| = m− 1 so U(x, S) = (m− 1)/m.
This means that for state S, as k →∞, we require that
λS(m− 1) = λ′S(m− 1)
m− 1
m
.
Since λS(m− 1) is an integer, λ′S(m− 1) has to be a multiple of m and the only possible value
that satisfies this criteria is λ′S(m− 1) = m hence λS(m− 1) = m− 1.
Since λ′S(m− 1) = m there exist m rows j1, j2, . . . , jm such that U(jn, S) = (m− 1)/m, that
is, ujna = 1/m ∀a ∈ S. This means that Ca = {j1, j2, . . . , jm} ∀a ∈ S hence Ca = Ca′ for all
a, a′ ∈ S.
Step 6: m = 2 or m = N
By contradiction, assume that 2 < m < N . We can consider another state S′ = Rx \ {z} such
that z ∈ Rx \ {x, y}. We then have that imax = m− 1 in equation (2.15) because |S′| = m− 1
so U(x, S′) = (m− 1)/m. As before, this means that Ca = Ca′ for all a, a′ ∈ S′. Since x ∈ S, S′
and Rx = S ∪ S′ we have that Ca = Ca′ for all a, a′ ∈ Rx. For 2 < m < N this implies that
vertices i ∈ Rx are disconnected from j ∈ N \ Rx and we therefore have disconnected graphs,
a contradiction.
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Chapter 3
Social Dilemmas with Variable
Group Size
3.1 Introduction
This chapter defines and classifies different multiplayer games that are social dilemmas. In social
dilemmas the group as a whole faces faces a dilemma because, collectively, unselfish behaviour,
i.e. cooperating, would benefit the entire group but, individually, selfish behaviour, i.e. defecting,
would leave the individual better off. A model of population evolution is not used to classify
these games and, instead, the payoff for variable group sizes are calculated and compared to one
another. Therefore, the structure of the population and dynamics (i.e. births and deaths) are
not required. For a focal individual in a group, changing the group composition, by adding or
removing a cooperator or defector, may or may not be beneficial in terms of the payoff received.
By looking at this behaviour, we get a better understanding of the social dilemma being studied.
In a social dilemma, there are several different interpretations of cooperative behaviour
[45]. The one we want to focus on in this chapter is the one considered in [83] that is a
slight variation of the individual-centered interpretation of [45] where the effect of cooperation
is measured through the change in payoff of individuals rather than the group. In particular,
this interpretation compares the payoff an individual receives when interacting in groups of
the same size and is therefore quite restrictive. The objective of this chapter is to extend this
interpretation to interactions in groups of variable size. Overall this will give us a more general
idea of what is meant by cooperative behaviour.
In chapter 2, the model considered worked with fixed fitness but the models considered later
have multiplayer game-theoretic interactions. Therefore, this chapter provides a preview of
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these kinds of multiplayer interactions before they are considered in the context of a population
evolution model.
3.2 Conditions for Cooperation
The social dilemmas considered involve two strategies called cooperate (C) and defect (D).
The games considered are symmetric [11], which means that only the combination of strategies
matters rather than the strategy used by each individual player. In particular, the payoff to
a cooperator (defector) in a group with c other cooperators and d other defectors is written
as RC(c, d) (RD(c, d)). When the type of the focal individual does not need to be specified,
R∗(c, d) will be used instead.
The cooperate and defect strategies depend upon the exact interpretation of cooperation
used, which imposes conditions on the payoffs received by a focal individual. In particular,
the conditions restrict how the payoffs to a focal individual should change when the group it
is present in changes. The change in payoff for three different scenarios are considered: the
composition of the group changes but its size remains the same; the number of defectors in the
group changes; and the number of cooperators in the group changes.
3.2.1 Conditions for groups of fixed size
For groups of fixed size where the composition of the group changes, the conditions that specify
the change in payoff to a focal individual are given by [83] and is based on the premise that
the focal individual, regardless of its own strategy, prefers group members who cooperate. For
groups of size m+ 1, this condition is given by
R∗(c,m− c) ≤ R∗(c′,m− c′) for 0 ≤ c < c′ ≤ m, (3.1)
which states that the payoff to a focal individual may increase if defectors are replaced by
cooperators in a group of fixed size. To ensure that cooperation has a chance to evolve, the
following additional condition is imposed by [83]
RC(m, 0) > RD(0,m). (3.2)
This condition says that a cooperator in a group of cooperators strictly has a higher payoff that
a defector in a group of defectors, i.e. the best possible situation for cooperators yields a higher
reward than the worst possible situation for defectors. However, this additional condition is not
required for cooperation.
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An equivalent way of expressing condition (3.1) without m and, therefore, more suitable
when talking about groups of variable size is the following
R∗(c, d) ≤ R∗(c+ 1, d− 1) c ≥ 0, d > 0. (3.3)
Note here that the group size remains the same because adding a cooperator is compensated for
by removing a defector. This equation can then be rewritten in either one of the following ways
R∗(c− 1, d) ≤ R∗(c, d− 1) c > 0, d > 0 (3.4)
or
R∗(c, d+ 1) ≤ R∗(c+ 1, d) c, d ≥ 0. (3.5)
This says that a focal individual, regardless of its type, prefers replacing a defector in the group
by a cooperator for groups of the same size. As will be seen later, both (3.4) and (3.5) are used
when making comparisons with R∗(c, d).
3.2.2 Conditions for changing the number of defectors
In the context of variable groups sizes, the conditions for cooperation when the number of
defectors changes has not been specified before and will therefore be specified here as follows.
A focal individual, regardless of its type, prefers not to add a defector to the group. This can
be written as
R∗(c, d+ 1) ≤ R∗(c, d) c, d ≥ 0 (3.6)
or, by induction,
R∗(c, d) ≤ R∗(c, d− 1) c ≥ 0, d > 0. (3.7)
Combining equations (3.6) and (3.7) gives the following condition
R∗(c, d+ 1) ≤ R∗(c, d) ≤ R∗(c, d− 1) c ≥ 0, d > 0. (3.8)
This is the condition required for cooperation when the number of defectors changes. This
condition is specified in this way in order to be able to clearly differentiate between defectors
and cooperators. In particular, a defector cannot benefit a focal individual but, as is specified
later, a cooperator can. In general, if a defector could benefit a focal individual, there would be
no pure defectors or cooperators, rather each individual’s behaviour would be determined by a
continuum of strategies with both cooperative and defective elements. So whether an individual
is a defector or not is relative to the behaviour of others. This is not what is wanted here, hence,
the condition used clearly separates defectors from cooperators.
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R∗(. . .) ≤ R∗(. . .) ≤ R∗(. . .) ≤ R∗(. . .) ≤ R∗(. . .)
c, d+ 1 c, d c− 1, d c, d− 1 c+ 1, d
c, d+ 1 c, d c− 1, d c+ 1, d c, d− 1
c− 1, d c, d+ 1 c, d c, d− 1 c+ 1, d
c, d+ 1 c− 1, d c, d c, d− 1 c+ 1, d
c− 1, d c, d+ 1 c, d c+ 1, d c, d− 1
c, d+ 1 c− 1, d c, d c+ 1, d c, d− 1
c, d+ 1 c− 1, d c+ 1, d c, d c, d− 1
c− 1, d c, d+ 1 c+ 1, d c, d c, d− 1
c, d+ 1 c, d c+ 1, d c− 1, d c, d− 1
c, d+ 1 c+ 1, d c, d c− 1, d c, d− 1
c, d+ 1 c+ 1, d c− 1, d c, d c, d− 1
Table 3.1: Possible payoff rankings for a cooperation game.
3.2.3 Conditions for changing the number of cooperators
The conditions required for cooperation when the number of cooperators changes are left open.
This means that, for the interpretation of cooperation used here, a focal individual may or
may not prefer adding a cooperator to the group. This interpretation of cooperation is more
general and allows many more cooperative strategies to be considered. For example, suppose
that cooperators provide a shared resource such that adding another cooperator increases the
shared resource. If the amount provided by each additional cooperator diminishes, a point will
be reached where adding another cooperator results in a fall in the share that each individual
receives. In this case, cooperators provide a benefit to the focal individual up to a certain point.
If cooperators always benefited the focal individual, this kind of behaviour would be excluded.
Therefore, conditions given by equations (3.4), (3.5) and (3.8) are all that is required for the
interpretation of cooperation used here.
3.2.4 Combining the conditions
By combining the conditions given by equations (3.4), (3.5) and (3.8), the payoffs where there
is one more cooperator (c+ 1, d), one more defector (c, d+ 1), one less cooperator (c− 1, d) and
one less defector (c, d− 1) can be ranked with respect to the group (c, d) for a focal individual,
regardless of its type. All the possible payoff rankings are given in Table 3.1.
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3.3 Types of Social Dilemmas
There are two broad categories of social dilemmas that identified in [47] that are described here
in relation to the conditions identified above.
3.3.1 Public Goods Dilemmas
This dilemma involves the production of a public good that can be enjoyed by all group members
whether or not they have contributed towards its production. This means that public goods are
non-excludable and, in additions to this, they may also be non-rival whereby its consumption
by one individual does not diminish its availability to another individual. A pure public good
is both entirely non-exludable and non-rival, however, in general public goods have a varying
degree of both non-excludability and non-rivalry. For public goods dilemmas, the cooperators
are assumed to always contribute towards the production of the public good and defectors do
not.
For the public goods dilemmas considered here, the payoffs are of the form
RC(c, d) = pC(c) · uC(c, d) · V − kC(c) ·K (3.9)
RD(c, d) = pD(c) · uD(c, d) · V (3.10)
where p∗(c) is the production function that determines how much of a public good V is produced
when a focal individual is present with c other cooperators, u∗(c, d) is the share of the public
good a focal individual gets when present with c (d) other cooperators (defectors), kC(c) is the
cost function that determines the share of the cost K paid by a focal cooperator present with
c other cooperators. The public good V > 0 and cost K > 0 are used as universal parameters
for the different public goods games. Note that since the defectors do not contribute to the
production of a good, the defector production function will be set to pD(c) = pC(c − 1). Also,
for the same reason, the defectors do not have a cost function.
In [47], several different forms of production functions are identified. Let ∆pC(c) = pC(c)−
pC(c− 1) then the production function can take the following forms:
• Convex (accelerating or increasing returns to scale):
∆pC(c+ 1) > ∆pC(c) > 0 ∀c.
• Linear (constant returns to scale):
∆pC(c+ 1) = ∆pC(c) ∀c.
• Concave (decelerating or decreasing returns to scale):
0 < ∆pC(c+ 1) < ∆pC(c) ∀c.
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• Step function: In this case no public good is produced if the number of cooperators is
below some threshold L, for example, pC(c) = 1c+1≥L where
1c+1≥L =
1 c+ 1 ≥ L,0 c+ 1 < L.
The public good sharing function u∗(c, d) can be interpreted in two different ways. First,
they can be constant such that uC(c, d) = uD(c, d) = x > 0. This implies that the public good is
pure, i.e. non-excludable and non-rivalrous, and all group members get the same amount of the
public good. Second, it is some non-constant function that represents a public good exhibiting
excludability or rivalry (or both). The cost function kC(c) behaves in the same way.
In Table 3.1, all the inequalities can appear within a public goods dilemma. For the inequal-
ities where R∗(c − 1, d) ≤ R∗(c + 1, d), this seems consistent because cooperators contribute
towards the production of a public good. The inequalities where R∗(c − 1, d) ≥ R∗(c + 1, d)
may at first seem inconsistent, however, they do appear in public goods dilemmas particularly
when the production function is decelerating. In this case, adding another cooperator may not
increase the payoff to the focal individual.
Examples of Public Goods Dilemmas
The public goods dilemmas considered are summarized in Table 3.2. An explanation of each
one is given in what follows.
Prisoner’s Dilemma [33] The public good is non-excludable but rivalrous such that it is
shared equally amongst all group members and grows linearly with the number of cooperators.
The cost is not shared amongst the cooperators in the group who each pay K. The payoffs are
given by
RC(c, d) =
c+ 1
c+ d+ 1
V −K, (3.11)
RD(c, d) =
c
c+ d+ 1
V. (3.12)
In Figure 3.1, the vector field for the prisoner’s dilemma is shown. The way in which the
vector field is constructed is explained in Section 3.4 (pg. 81). Each vector gives the direction
in which an increase in payoff to the focal individual can be achieved. Given that the x-axis (y-
axis) indicates the number of cooperators (defectors) present with the focal individual, a vector
pointing to the right (left) indicates that the payoff can be increased by adding (removing) a
cooperator and a vector pointing downwards indicates that an increase in payoff can be achieved
by removing a defector. Note that there are no vectors pointing upwards as adding a defector
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pC(c) uC(c, d) uD(c, d) kC(c)
Prisoner’s Dilemma c+ 1 1c+d+1
1
c+d+1 1
Prisoner’s Dilemma
with variable pro-
duction function
∑c
k=0 ω
k 1
c+d+1
1
c+d+1 1
Stag Hunt (c+ 1)1c+1≥L 1c+d+1
1
c+d+1 1
Fixed Stag Hunt 1c+1≥L 1c+d+1
1
c+d+1 1
Charitable Pris-
oner’s Dilemma
c+ 1

c
c+1
1
c+d c > 0
0 c = 0

1
c+d c > 0
0 c = 0
1
Volunteer’s
Dilemma
1 1 1 1
Threshold Volun-
teer’s Dilemma
1c+1≥L 1 1 1
Snowdrift 1 1 1 1c+1
Threshold Snow-
drift
1c+1≥L 1 1
1c+1<L
L +
1c+1≥L
c+1
Table 3.2: Summary of public goods dilemmas used in this chapter. In each case PD(c) =
PC(c− 1).
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cannot increase the payoff. A vector pointing diagonally right (left) and downwards indicates
that a payoff can be increased by either adding (removing) a cooperator and removing a defector.
However, if it biased more the the right (left) than downwards, adding (removing) a cooperator
is more effective than removing a defector.
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Figure 3.1: Vector field for prisoner’s dilemma where V = 5/2, K = 4/3. The construction of
the vector fields is explained in Section 3.4 (pg. 81). The direction of each vector indicates the
change in group composition required to increase the payoff to a focal individual. For example, a
vector pointing diagonally right indicates that an increase in payoff can be achieved by adding a
cooperator or removing a defector. If the vector has more rightward bias, adding a cooperator is
more effective that removing a defector, and, if the vector has more downward bias, the opposite
is true.
Prisoner’s dilemma with variable production function [9] Similar to the Prisoner’s
Dilemma but the public good can grow at a varying rate with respect to the number of cooper-
ators. The payoffs are given by
RC(c, d) = −K + V
c+ d+ 1
c∑
n=0
ωn ω > 0 (3.13)
RD(c, d) =
V
c+ d+ 1
c−1∑
n=0
ωn ω > 0 (3.14)
The production function is convex for ω > 1, concave for ω < 1, and linear for ω = 1 (this gives
the original prisoner’s dilemma).
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(a) Accelerating production function ω = 1.5.
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(b) Decelerating production function ω = 0.5.
Figure 3.2: Vector field for prisoner’s dilemma with variable production function where V =
5/2, K = 4/3.
Stag Hunt [74] This is a prisoner’s dilemma where the production function is a step function
such that at least L > 1 cooperators are required for the public good to be produced. The
cooperators always pay a cost K whether the threshold is met or not. The payoffs are given by
RC(c, d) =

c+1
c+d+1V −K c+ 1 ≥ L
−c c+ 1 < L
(3.15)
RD(c, d) =

c
c+d+1V c ≥ L
0 c < L
(3.16)
75
0 2 4 6 8 10
Number of Cooperators c
0
2
4
6
8
10
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
D
e
fe
ct
o
rs
 d
Payoff to Cooperator RC (c,d)
0 2 4 6 8 10
Number of Cooperators c
0
2
4
6
8
10
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
D
e
fe
ct
o
rs
 d
Payoff to Defector RD (c,d)
Figure 3.3: Vector field for stag hunt with threshold L = 5 where V = 5/2, K = 4/3.
Fixed Stag Hunt[74] Similar to the stag hunt but the public good is of a fixed size, i.e. it
does not grow with the number of cooperators. The payoffs are given by
RC(c, d) =

V
c+d+1 −K c+ 1 ≥ L
−c c+ 1 < L
(3.17)
RD(c, d) =

V
c+d+1 c ≥ L
0 c < L
(3.18)
0 2 4 6 8 10
Number of Cooperators c
0
2
4
6
8
10
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
D
e
fe
ct
o
rs
 d
Payoff to Cooperator RC (c,d)
0 2 4 6 8 10
Number of Cooperators c
0
2
4
6
8
10
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
D
e
fe
ct
o
rs
 d
Payoff to Defector RD (c,d)
Figure 3.4: Vector field for fixed stag hunt with threshold L = 5 where V = 5/2, K = 4/3.
Charitable Prisoner’s Dilemma [14] This is an extension of the prisoner’s dilemma where
the public good is now excludable so that a cooperator cannot consume its own contribution
to the public good. In other words, the cooperators behave charitably by giving away their
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contribution to the other members of the group. Furthermore, it is assumed that a cooperator
will still pay the cost K when alone but not receive the public good. The payoffs are then given
by
RC(c, d) =

c
c+dV −K c > 0
−K c = 0
(3.19)
RD(c, d) =

c
c+dV c > 0
0 c = 0
(3.20)
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Figure 3.5: Vector field for charitable prisoner’s dilemma where V = 5/2, K = 4/3.
Volunteer’s Dilemma [22] The public good is pure and of fixed size; it is provided if at
least one cooperator pays a cost K, which all cooperators do. The payoffs are given by
RC(c, d) = V −K (3.21)
RD(c, d) =
V c > 00 c = 0 (3.22)
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Figure 3.6: Vector field for volunteer’s dilemma where V = 5/2, K = 4/3.
Threshold Volunteer’s Dilemma [9] Volunteer’s dilemma with threshold production func-
tion such that L > 1 cooperators are required to provide the public good. The cooperators
always pay cost K regardless of whether the threshold is met or not. The payoffs are given by
RC(c, d) =
V −K c+ 1 ≥ L−K c+ 1 < L (3.23)
RD(c, d) =
V c ≥ L0 c < L (3.24)
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Figure 3.7: Vector field for threshold volunteer’s dilemma with L = 5 where V = 5/2, K = 4/3.
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Snowdrift [9] Volunteer’s dilemma where the cost is shared equally between all cooperators
in the group. The payoffs are given by
RC(c, d) = V − K
c+ 1
(3.25)
RD(c, d) =
V c > 00 c = 0 (3.26)
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Figure 3.8: Vector field for snowdrift where V = 5/2, K = 4/3.
Threshold Snowdrift [96] Snowdrift game with a threshold production function such that
at least L > 1 cooperators are required to produce the public good. The cost is shared equally
between the cooperators if the threshold is met, otherwise, each cooperator pays K/L. The
payoffs are given by
RC(c, d) =
V −
K
c+1 c+ 1 ≥ L
−KL c+ 1 < L
(3.27)
RD(c, d) =
V c ≥ L0 c < L (3.28)
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Figure 3.9: Vector field for threshold snowdrift with threshold L = 5 where V = 5/2, K = 4/3.
3.3.2 Commons Dilemmas
Commons dilemmas were popularized by [36], who gave an example of herders with access to
a common parcel of land. Each herder is interested in putting as many of their cows on that
land because they receive the benefit of each additional cow but the damage to the commons
is shared by the group. However, if all the herders chose this option, the commons will be
damaged irreparably and all will suffer. In an evolutionary biology context, consider the example
of parasitic viruses residing in a bacterial cell host [23]. A virus can be more competitive and
use up more resources resulting in a larger number of direct progeny. If all the viruses did this,
the host will die faster and the total number of progeny will be smaller. On the other hand,
the viruses can be less competitive and use less resources. In this case, the number of direct
progeny would be smaller, but the total number of progeny would be larger. These examples are
representative of commons dilemmas in general, in particular, they involve the use of commons
that are readily available resources freely available for any group member to consume. However,
commons are rivalrous, therefore, its consumption by one individual diminishes its availability
for another individual. The dilemma here is that the group is better off if a common is used in
an equitable manner but the individual is better off being greedy and having the entire common
to itself.
For commons dilemmas it will be assumed that cooperators consume a common in an equi-
table manner and defectors do not. In Table 3.1, the inequalities where R∗(c+1, d) ≤ R∗(c−1, d)
are the only ones that appear in commons dilemmas. This is because the focal individual is
better off having a common to itself and therefore prefers removing a cooperator to adding a
cooperator. The following is an example of a commons dilemma.
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Hawk-Dove [16] A group of cooperators share a common V equally, however, they flee if
there is a defector present getting no share of the common. A defector chases away cooperators
and fights other defectors for the common. Each defector has an equal chance of winning the
entire common V , with the losers incurring a cost K. The payoffs are given by
RC(c, d) =

V
c+1 d = 0
0 d > 0
(3.29)
RD(c, d) =
V − dK
d+ 1
(3.30)
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Figure 3.10: Vector field for hawk-dove commons dilemma where V = 5/2, K = 4/3.
3.4 Constructing the vector fields
This section explains how the 2-dimensional vector fields are constructed where the vectors
indicate the direction in which an increase in payoff can be achieved. The number of defectors
will be plotted on the y-axis and cooperators on the x-axis such that the following quantities
δ∗,C+(c, d) = max(R∗(c+ 1, d)−R∗(c, d), 0)
δ∗,C−(c, d) = max(R∗(c− 1, d)−R∗(c, d), 0)
δ∗,D−(c, d) = max(R∗(c, d− 1)−R∗(c, d), 0)
will be used to determined the vector at some point (c, d). In particular, if δ∗,C+(c, d) > 0, the
vector
v∗,C+(c, d) =
(
δ∗,C+(c, d)
δ∗,C+(c, d) + δ∗,D−(c, d)
,
−δ∗,D−(c, d)
δ∗,C+(c, d) + δ∗,D−(c, d)
)
(3.31)
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is drawn, which indicates that an increase in payoff can be achieved by either adding a cooperator
or removing a defector. However, it is more effective to add a cooperator than remove a defector
if δ∗,C+(c, d) > δ∗,D−(c, d). Also, if δ∗,C−(c, d) > 0, the vector
v∗,C−(c, d) =
(
δ∗,C−(c, d)
δ∗,C−(c, d) + δ∗,D−(c, d)
,
−δ∗,D−(c, d)
δ∗,C−(c, d) + δ∗,D−(c, d)
)
(3.32)
is drawn, which indicates that an increase in payoff can be achieved by either removing a
cooperator or removing a defector. However, if δ∗,C+(c, d) = δ∗,C−(c, d) = 0, neither v∗,C+(c, d)
nor v∗,C−(c, d) are drawn and only the vector
v∗,D−(c, d) =
(0, 0) δ∗,D−(c, d) = 0,(0,−1) δ∗,D−(c, d) 6= 0 (3.33)
is drawn, which indicates whether removing a defector increases the payoff or not. Note that
only the cases where the payoff can be increased are considered, therefore R∗(c, d + 1) is not
considered since R∗(c, d+ 1) ≤ R∗(c, d) by equation (3.8).
3.5 Discussion
Two main categories of social dilemmas were identified: public goods dilemmas and commons
dilemmas. The key difference between these two dilemmas is that the former involves the
production of a joint good and the latter does not. In public goods dilemmas, the dilemma faced
by a focal individual within a group is whether or not to contribute towards the production of
a public good because, regardless of what it does, it can still enjoy its benefits. However, if
all individuals decide not to contribute, the entire group is worse off as there will be no public
good to consume. In commons dilemmas, a common is a freely available resource that can be
consumed by the entire group, however, it is rivalrous thereby diminishing in availability as
more individuals consume it. A focal individual faces the dilemma where consuming as much
of the commons leaves itself better off but the group worse off. These characteristics of public
goods and commons dilemmas are captured in the conditions given.
Several examples of games of public goods and commons dilemmas are given. A bulk of
the examples given are public goods games because of the diversity of the production function.
In particular, multiplayer public goods games have been considered in a number of papers:
[37, 48, 49, 57, 89, 91, 96, 102]; where as the multiplayer Hawk-Dove has only been considered
in [16]. In order to visualize the behaviour found within these games, a vector field for each
of the games is plotted. The vectors indicate the direction of a preferred group change for the
focal that results in an increase in its payoff. The vector fields act a visual substitute for the
conditions given in Table 3.1. Some of the games are sensitive to the reward V , cost K and
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other parameters specific to the game, like the threshold L, and it here that the vector fields are
quite effective at spotting the changes that arise, for example, see Figure 3.2. In the following
chapters, some of these games will be investigated in the context of models where interactions
between individuals take place in groups of variables sizes.
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Chapter 4
Developments in the
Broom-Rychta´rˇ framework and
the Territorial Raider Model
4.1 Introduction
This chapter serves two purposes, the first part develops the Broom-Rychta´rˇ (BR) framework
[16], which was introduced in Section 1.6 (pg. 38), so that it can be used to create population
evolution models. The second part applies the BR framework to create a population evolution
model called the territorial raider model.
4.2 Developments in the Broom-Rychta´rˇ framework
When the BR framework was first introduced in [16], it described the structure of the population
in terms of individuals distributed over places and how this distribution changes over time. The
change in the population distribution could depend upon various different things, for example,
there could be history and time dependency. It was shown how this changing distribution affects
the interaction between individuals thereby provided a mechanism with which to determine
the fitness of the individuals. What was missing is how this changing distribution affects the
dynamics of the population, that is, the births and deaths. The developments discussed here
aims to address this and, to achieve this, the notation is slightly changed from that of the
original paper with some new terminology being introduced.
The objective of the BR framework is to provide a cohesive solution to developing population
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evolution models. Alternative approaches, for example, [73] uses two graphs, one called the
‘interaction’ graph to determine the fitness of individuals and another called the ‘replacement’
graph to determine the births and deaths of individuals. With this approach there is no clear link
between the two graphs that can be explained by some common population-derived factors. The
development of the BR framework therefore improves on this kind of approach by providing a way
of deriving both the fitness and dynamics from the same set of factors, which is the movement
of individuals. There is therefore a clear link between the interactions and replacements that
happen in the population.
The following sections describe the main components of the framework: structure, fitness,
and evolutionary dynamics. Notation used in this chapter is summarised in Table 4.1.
Notation Definition Description
mn,t ∈ {1, . . . ,M} Place where In is at time t.
mt = [mn,t]
N
n=1 Population distribution at time t.
m<t = (mt−1, . . . ,m0) Population distribution history.
pt(m|m<t) ∈ [0, 1] Probability population has distribution m at time t given m<t.
pit ∈ [0, 1] Population distribution probability function (PDPF).
P (m<t) ∈ [0, 1] Probability that population has history m<t.
pin,t ∈ [0, 1] Individual distribution probability function (IDPF).
fn,t ≥ 0 Fitness contribution of In at time t.
Fn,t > 0 Fitness of In at time t.
Gn ⊂ {1, 2 . . . , N} Direct group: group that In is in.
wi,j,t ≥ 0 Replacement weight that Ii replaces Ij at time t.
Wt = [wi,j,t]i,j=1,...,N Weighted adjacency matrix of evolutionary graph.
ui,j,t ≥ 0 Replacement weight contribution that Ii assigns to Ij at time t.
Table 4.1: New notation used in this chapter.
4.2.1 The population: structure and distribution
The population structure describes the restrictions placed on the interactions between the mem-
bers of the population. In [16], restrictions originate from the movement of individuals in the
population, which is considered to be stochastic. The structure of the population is mathemat-
ically described using the population distribution that gives the position of every individual in
the population. Let In represent individual n in the population and Pm represent place m in the
population. In a population of N individuals who can move around M places, the population
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distribution at time t is given in [16] by an N ×M binary matrix Xt = (X(t)n,m) where
X(t)n,m =
1 if In is in Pm at time t,0 otherwise. (4.1)
In this chapter an alternative matrix representation of the population distribution is presented
as it is more convenient to use when considering the models in the later chapters. Here, the
population distribution at time t will be denoted by the matrix Mt = [Mn,t]n=1,...,N , where
Mn,t = m if individual In is in place Pm at time t.
The framework assumes that the movement of individuals is probabilistic such that there is
dependence upon time and the current and past movements of individuals in the population. In
particular, the transition probability function denoted pt(m|m<t) gives the probability that the
movement of individuals at time t results in a population distribution m given the population
distribution history m<t = (mt−1, . . . ,m1,m0). The transition probability function is defined
as follows
pt(m|m<t) = P(Mt = m|Mt−1 = mt−1, . . . ,M0 = m0) (4.2)
whose exact form will depend upon the model being used but will always satisfy
1 =
∑
m
pt(m|m<t) ∀ t,m<t. (4.3)
The population distribution probability function (PDPF) pit(m) gives the probability that the
population distribution is m after t time steps regardless of the population distribution history.
The PDPF is expressed using the transition probabilities as follows
pit(m) =P(Mt = m) =
∑
m<t
pt(m|m<t)P (m<t) (4.4)
where P (m<t) denotes the historical PDPF that gives the probability that the population
distribution history is m<t, that is,
P (m<t) =P(M0 = m0,M1 = m1, . . . ,Mt−1 = mt−1)
=pt−1(mt−1|m<t−1) · · · p1(m1|m0)pi0(m0) (4.5)
assuming that the initial population distribution, pi0(m0), is known.
Individual movement model
In general, [16] assume that the movement of individuals could depend on each other. This can
be simplified by considering the individual movement model where individuals are assumed to
move independently of each other. The PDPF can is then given by
pit(m) =
∏
n
pin,t(mn) (4.6)
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where pin,t(mn) is the individual distribution probability function (IDPF) that gives the probabil-
ity of individual In being present in place Pmn at time t regardless of the history of the process.
The expression for pin,t(mn) will depend upon whether the movement of In is dependent upon
the whole population distribution history or just its own individual history.
Dependence on the population distribution history
When the movement of individual In depends upon the distribution history of the whole popu-
lation, the individual transition probability function pn,t(mn|m<t) gives the probability that In
moves to place mn at time t given the population history m<t, that is,
pt(mn|m<t) = P(Mn,t = mn|Mt−1 = mt−1, . . . ,M0 = m0). (4.7)
The IDPF is then given by
pin,t(mn) =
∑
m<t
pn,t(mn|m<t)P (m<t). (4.8)
Dependence on the individual distribution history
When the movement of individual In depends only upon its own distribution history
mn,<t = (mn,t−1, . . . ,mn,0), which is independent from the history of the other individuals,
then the individual transition probability function is given by
pt(mn|mn,<t) = P(Mn,t = mn|Mn,t−1 = mn,t−1, . . . ,Mn,0 = mn,0). (4.9)
The IDPF is then given by
pin,t(mn) =
∑
mn,<t
pn,t(mn|mn,<t)Pn(mn,<t) (4.10)
where Pn(mn,<t) denotes the individual history distribution, that is,
Pn(mn,<t) = pn,t−1(mn,t−1|mn,<t−1) · · · pn,1(mn,1|mn,0)pi0(mn,0) (4.11)
assuming the initial IDPF, pi0(mn,0), is known.
The fully independent movement model
The fully independent movement model assumes that individuals move independently of each
other, history and time. This means that the probability that individual In is in place Pm is
always the same so the individual transition function will be denoted by pn,m. The IDPF is
therefore the same as the individual transition function, that is,
pin,t(m) = pn,m
1︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
mn,<t
Pn(mn,<t) = pn,m (4.12)
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and therefore the PDPF can simply be written
pit(m) = p(m). (4.13)
4.2.2 Fitness
In [16] the contribution to an individual’s fitness depends upon the time t, the current population
distribution m and historical population distributions m<t. The fitness contribution of In is
denoted
fn,t(m|m<t) (4.14)
where the exact form will depend upon the assumptions about the factors that contribute to an
individual’s fitness. The mean fitness contribution at time t is then given by
f¯n,t =
∑
m
∑
m<t
fn,t(m|m<t)pt(m|m<t)P (m<t). (4.15)
It is assumed that the fitness of an individual at time t is given by averaging the mean fitness
contribution across all time periods up to and including t. The fitness of individual In at time
t is then given by
Fn,t =
1
t
t∑
k=1
f¯n,k. (4.16)
Note that there are other definitions of the fitness function that one can use instead of the
one given here, for example, one could use a weighted average of the mean fitness contribution
instead.
In the fully independent movement model, the mean fitness contribution simplifies to
f¯n,t =
∑
m
∑
m<t
fn,t(m|m<t)p(m)P (m<t). (4.17)
In [16], a further simplifying assumption made is that the fitness contribution of individual
In only depends upon itself and the individuals that it can directly interact with. The set of
individuals that individual In is present with in the same place, given population distribution
m, is called the direct group (or simply the group) of individual In and is given by
Gn(m) = {i : mi = mn}. (4.18)
The fitness contribution is then denoted by fn(Gn(m)). In this case, the mean fitness change is
constant over time and therefore the fitness is equal to the mean fitness contribution, that is
Fn = f¯n =
∑
m
fn(Gn(m))p(m). (4.19)
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4.2.3 Evolutionary Dynamics
This section develops the evolutionary dynamics and is crucially important in completing the
development of the framework. In [16], where the dynamics were not defined, only static analysis
of an evolutionary process was carried out, though, one of the main goals of the framework is
to be able to carry out dynamic analysis. When developing the dynamics, consistency with the
framework was essential, thereby, the notions of dependency on population members, history
and time was carried forward to the dynamics. However, whether replacement is synchronous
or not is independent of the framework and needed to be decided.
Evolutionary graph theory has proved to be a popular approach for implementing dynamics
in a structured population. The framework can benefit by incorporating evolutionary graph
theory into its dynamics as its knowledge base is quite mature. It also makes it easier to
understand for those who are already accustomed to evolutionary graph theory, i.e. there will be
some continuity. To incorporate evolutionary graph theory, the two key assumptions required are
the population size remains constant and that there is only one birth and death per replacement
event, that is, the replacements are asynchronous. Note that a completely different approach
could have been used, in particular, where replacement events are synchronous, but, for the
aforementioned reasons, the dynamics were actively developed to incorporate evolutionary graph
theory.
As seen in section 1.4 (pg. 31), an evolutionary graph controls the replacement events that
take place, which is independent of time. In the framework the time t at which the replacement
event takes place has to be taken into account. A replacement event at time t is then governed by
an evolutionary graph defined using an N×N weighted adjacency matrix Wt = [wi,j,t]i,j=1,...,N
where the replacement weight wi,j,t gives the weight of the edge from node i to node j in the
evolutionary graph that represent individuals Ii and Ij respectively. Note that the time subscript
indicates that the evolutionary graph can change over time.
To construct Wt, an approach similar to calculating the fitnesses of the individuals is used.
In particular, Wt is made up of replacement weight contributions that depend upon the time t
the replacement takes place, the current population distribution m and the historical population
distributions m<t. The replacement weight contribution that individual Ii assigns individual Ij
is denoted by
ui,j,t(m|m<t). (4.20)
The exact form will depend upon the assumptions made about the replacement weight contri-
butions. The mean replacement weight contribution is given as follows
u¯i,j,t =
∑
m
∑
m<t
ui,j,t(m|m<t)pt(m|m<t)P (m<t). (4.21)
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Dynamics
BDB bi,t =
Fi,t∑
n Fn,t
, di,j,t =
wi,j,t∑
n wi,n,t
BDD bi,t =
1
N
, di,j,t =
wi,j,tF
−1
j,t∑
n wi,n,tF
−1
n,t
DBD dj,t =
F−1j,t∑
n F
−1
n,t
, bi,j,t =
wi,j,t∑
n wn,j,t
DBB dj,t =
1
N
, bi,j,t =
wi,j,tFi,t∑
n wn,j,tFn,t
LB ri,j,t =
wi,j,tFi,t∑
n,k wn,k,tFn,t
LD ri,j,t =
wi,j,tF
−1
j,t∑
n,k wn,k,tF
−1
k,t
Table 4.2: Dynamics defined using the evolutionary graph Wt and fitnesses Fn,t.
In is assumed that the replacement weight at time t is chosen to be the mean replacement weight
contribution at time t, that is,
wi,j,t = u¯i,j,t (4.22)
but, as for the fitness function, there are other definitions that one can use. The reason why
this approach is chosen here is that it alludes to the fact that the more individuals interact with
one another the more likely they are likely they are to replace one another. The key observation
here is that the evolutionary graph is derived from the interactions between the individuals,
thereby, if the interactions between individuals change, so should the evolutionary graph.
Now that it known how Wt is constructed, the next step is to calculate the probability that
the offspring of individual Ii replaces individual Ij at time t, denoted ri,j,t. Since Wt is an
evolutionary graph, an analogue of the standard dynamics given in Table 2.2 (pg. 51) suitable
for Wt can be used to calculate ri,j,t. These definitions of the replacement probabilities are
given in Table 4.2.
In the fully independent movement model the mean replacement weight contribution simpli-
fies to
u¯i,j,t =
∑
m
∑
m<t
ui,j,t(m,m<t)p(m)P (m<t). (4.23)
Furthermore, it can be assumed that the replacement weight contributions are independent of
time and history, and depend only on Ii, Ij and the group interactions between them. This
implies that the mean replacement weight is invariant over time and is given by
wi,j = u¯i,j =
∑
m
ui,j(Gi,j(m))p(m) (4.24)
where Gi,j(m) = {k : mk = mi ∧mk = mj}. Note that Gi,j(m) = ∅ if Ii and Ij are not present
in the same place for a population distribution m.
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Note on the dynamics
In this chapter the development of the framework of [16] is completed by defining the dynamics
that can be used with the framework. It is now possible to carry out dynamic analysis of
an evolutionary process in a population with mobile individuals. The dynamics developed here
incorporate evolutionary graph theory and can therefore readily use its vast knowledge base that
includes the material in Chapter 2. In particular, the known behaviour of the standard dynamics
in evolutionary graph theory can be leveraged to get an understanding of their behaviour in a
different context. This is particularly true in the next few chapters where models are developed
using the framework in its fully developed form.
In the classic metapopulation framework [51], it is assumed that there are discrete patches
with extinction-prone populations. This means that it is possible for a population to colonise
an unoccupied patch and a subpopulation within a patch to go extinct, allowing the total
population size to fluctuate. This is different from the Broom-Rychta´rˇ (BR) framework because
the dynamics used specify that the offspring of an individual immediately replaces another
individual, keeping the population size fixed. Since every birth and death is a replacement event,
the population cannot go extinct, instead, different types within the population can go extinct
but the population itself persists. Furthermore, a patch in the metapopulation framework is a
‘fixed’ location in space that an individual and its offspring can occupy. This idea of a patch
is not the same as in the BR framework. Instead, a patch is simply thought of as a place that
an individual can move to, however, its offspring must take the place of another individual. To
bring the BR framework in line with the metapopulation framework would require a different
definition of the dynamics. A possible solution would be to have dynamics with separate birth
and death rates such that an offspring can be placed in an immediate neighbourhood patch.
This way a patch can be colonised by a population and also a population in a patch can go
extinct through death and individuals moving away.
4.3 The Territorial Raider model
The territorial raider population evolution model is a simple application of the BR framework.
It is assumed that each individual has their own unique territory that overlaps with other
individuals. Where these territories overlap, individuals can meet and interact with one another.
Meetings between individuals can take place in groups and, therefore, multiplayer Hawk-Dove
and public goods games, see chapter 3, are used to determine the payoffs an individual receives.
Each individual has a unique home within their territory and the proportion of time that an
individuals spends at home is controlled by a global home fidelity parameter that is the same
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for all individuals. The higher this home fidelity parameter, the more time individuals spend at
home and less time interacting with one another. Furthermore, it is assumed that individuals
are allowed to make one movement within their territory before returning home. Replacement
events are assumed to happen at discrete time intervals. Between these intervals individuals
are assumed to meet with one another in order to determine their fitness. Dynamics where
birth happens first followed by death with selection acting on birth (BDB) are considered such
that an individual’s offspring replaces another individual proportional to how often they meet.
The quantity that will be calculated to measure the evolutionary success of a strategy is the
fixation probability. Special cases of small graphs where all of the population states can be
identified allowing exact analyses to be carried out are considered. Interesting general features
of the model are identified by comparing the fixation probability value for both games on several
graphs under different parameter values and assumptions. The new notation used in this chapter
is given in Table 4.3.
The motivation behind the territorial raider model is the territorial behaviour of animals.
Animals of many species live alone or in distinct groups on a certain territory. Although animals
generally forage for food within their territory, it can happen that the territory size varies
considerably over time. In some cases, it can expand and overlap with other territories, when
food becomes rarer, or for the purpose of mating for example. Thus the same place is used
by two or more individuals that will interact and sometimes compete when some major items
of food are at stake. The territorial raider model incorporates these more general types of
interaction, therefore, allowing multi-player games to be played among the population.
In comparison to the population evolution model considered in chapter 2, the territorial raider
model determines the fitness of individuals through multiplayer game-theoretic interactions that
depends upon the movement structure of the individuals. Whilst both models consider an
evolutionary graph to determine the replacement events, the evolutionary graph for the latter
model is derived from the movement structure of the population. Therefore, studying the
evolutionary graph on its own is not sufficient to understand what is happening in the territorial
raider model. In particular, factors that affect the movement structure of the population are
also studied.
4.3.1 The population structure and distribution
The territorial raider model (see Figure 4.1) was developed by [16] and is used to represent
interactions within a population with overlapping territories. The territorial raider model con-
siders a population of N individuals I1, . . . , IN (see also Section 4.3.3 for an interpretation of In
in relation to the evolutionary dynamics) who can move and eventually interact in N different
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Notation Definition Description
pnm ∈ [0, 1] Probability of In being at Pm.
h ∈ [0,∞) Home fidelity : likelihood of individual staying in its home vertex.
d ∈ Z+ \ {0} Number of neighbours.
G ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N} Group of indiviuals.
χ(m,G) ∈ [0, 1] Probability of group G meeting at Pm.
RA(a, b) ∈ [0,∞) Payoff to type A individual present with a (b) other type A (B).
R ∈ [0,∞) Background payoff that individuals start with.
V ∈ [0,∞) Reward.
K ∈ (0,∞) Cost.
v = V/K Reduced parameter.
r = R/K Reduced parameter.
Tj =
∑
i 6=j wij Temperature of Ij .
Table 4.3: New notation used in this chapter.
places P1, . . . , PN , see Figure 4.1(a). The individual In lives in a place Pn and can also move to
neighbouring places.
The population is represented using a graph where vertices represent individuals as well
as places of interaction. The graphs studied are representations of territorial raider models.
Therefore, it is important to bear in mind that they relate to a more general representation
where places and individuals are disconnected as shown in Figure 4.1(b). In other words, the
graphs shown here stands for the kind of models in Figure 4.1(a). All of the three and four
vertex connected undirected graphs shown in Figure 4.2 are considered.
It is assumed that there is fully independent movement, that is, individuals move indepen-
dently of each other, history and time (see Section 4.2.1 on Page 88). In general each individual
could have a different probability of movement, but a natural model where all movements are
governed by a single parameter is selected. It will be assumed that an individual with d neigh-
bours will stay with probability pn,n = h/(h + d) and move to one of its neighbouring places
with probability 1/(h+ d). Thus h is a measure of the preference of an individual to stay on its
home vertex, and will be called its home fidelity. In each case setting h = 1 gives the natural
parameters of each individual visiting all allowable places (including its home vertex) with equal
probability. Note that, for a given value of h, an individual is more likely to move away if it has
a larger number of neighbouring places d. The probability that an individual In is at place Pm,
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Figure 4.1: The territorial raider model from [16]. (a) Individual In lives in place Pn but can
visit neighbouring places. The territory of I1 consists of all places P1, P2, P3 and P4, the territory
of I2 consists of P1 and P2, the territory of I3 consists of P1 and P3, the territory of P4 consists
of P1 and P4. (b) An alternative visualization as multi-player interactions on a bi-partite graph
where individuals and places are clearly separated. The vertices I1, . . . In will be called the
I-vertices.
i.e. the IDPF, will be given by
pn,m =

h/(h+ d) n = m,
1/(h+ d) n 6= m and vertices n,m connected,
0 otherwise.
(4.25)
4.3.2 Fitness
To calculate the fitness of individuals it is assumed that the fitness contribution only depends
upon itself and the group of individuals that it interacts with. The fitness of an individual is
therefore given by equation (4.19, pg. 89) that is rewritten more simply as follows
Fn =
N∑
m=1
∑
G
n∈G
χ(m,G)fn(G), (4.26)
where G is a group of individuals and
χ(m,G) =
∏
i∈G
pi,m
∏
j 6∈G
(1− pj,m) (4.27)
gives the probability that group G forms in place m. The fitness contribution, fn(G), will be
determined by the payoff received in a multi-player game. It is assumed that there are two types
of strategies, A and B, that individuals can choose from. The payoff to an individual of type A
present with a (b) other type A (B) will be denoted RA(a, b) and, similarly, RB(a, b) for a type
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Figure 4.2: The population structures and movement probabilities for small graphs on 3 and 4
vertices. An individual moves to a neighbouring vertex with probability 1/(h+ d) and stays at
home with probability h/(h+d) where d is the number of neighbours. (a) The line of 3 vertices,
which in this case, is also the star. (b) the triangle. (c) the square with both diagonals, the
complete graph for four vertices. (d) the “circle” graph, or a square with no diagonals. (e) the
star graph with 4 vertices. (f) the diamond, a square with one diagonal. (g) the line with 4
vertices. (h) the paw.
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B individual. The fitness contribution is then given by
fn(G) =
RA(|G|A − 1, |G|B) In type A,RB(|G|A, |G|B − 1) In type B (4.28)
where |G|A (|G|B) is the number of type A (B) individuals in group G.
The charitable prisoner’s dilemma (see Section 3.3.1, pg. 76), which is referred to as the
public goods game in the remainder of this chapter and thesis, and the Hawk-Dove game (see
Section 3.3.2, pg. 80) are considered. The payoffs for the fixed fitness case are also introduced,
which can be seen as a limiting case in this model. The payoffs for each case are given below
where a background payoff R has been added. The background payoff R has no effect in static
games, but is important for the dynamics. In general for discrete dynamics, including the one
considered here, the larger the value of R, the weaker the effect of evolution [17, Chapter 2].
Here, it will be always assumed that R is sufficiently large that no fitness can ever go negative.
Furthermore, scaling all payoffs by a constant has no effect on the game outcomes. All payoffs
have therefore been divided by the cost K so that the reduced background payoff is given by
r = R/K, which is fixed to 10, and the reduced reward is given by v = V/K.
• The Public Goods game: A stands for a Cooperator and B for a Defector. Both types
start with a reduced background payoff r. A Cooperator (always) pays a cost of 1 so that
other individuals in the group share the the reduced reward v and Defectors do nothing.
The payoffs are given by
RA(a, b) =
r − 1 a = 0, b = 0,r − 1 + aa+bv otherwise, (4.29)
RB(a, b) = r +
a
a+ b+ 1
v. (4.30)
• The Hawk-Dove game: A stands for a Hawk, and B for a Dove. They both start with a
background payoff r and compete for a single reduced reward v. If all individuals in the
group are Doves, they split the reward so that each one gets the same share. If there is
at least one Hawk then all the Doves concede. The Hawks fight so that the winner gets
the reduced reward v while the other Hawks incur a cost of 1 such that each Hawk has an
equal chance of winning. The payoffs are given by
RA(a, b) = r +
v − a
a+ 1
, (4.31)
RB(a, b) =
r if a > 0,r + vb+1 if a = 0. (4.32)
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• Fixed fitness case: In this game, the individuals do not really interact with each other but
rather receive a constant payoff depending on their type and irrespective of the groups
size or types of the other group members. The payoffs are given by
RA(a, b) = r + v, (4.33)
RB(a, b) = r. (4.34)
4.3.3 Evolutionary dynamics
It will be assumed that the replacement weight contributions depend only the birth individual
Ii, the death individual Ij and the group interactions between them. This means that the
replacement weights, which are used in the evolutionary dynamics, are given by equation (4.24,
pg. 91), which is rewritten more simply here as follows
wij =
N∑
m=1
∑
G
i,j∈G
uij(m,G). (4.35)
An individual Ij can be replaced by a copy of individual Ii if and only if Ii and Ij could
meet in the spatial structure (which here means that Pi and Pj are at most two edges apart
from each other). Thus the types of the individuals change through time, and so Ii is more
properly thought of as a position in our structure which has a particular relationship to the
places P1, . . . , PN , rather than an actual individual. The relationship between the position Ii
and the potential individuals that can be thought of as similar to that between a gene and its
possible alleles. The positions In will be called the I-vertices of this structure, but will often
simply be referred to as “individuals”, unless this distinction needs to be emphasised (see Figure
4.1(b)).
For the replacement weight contribution uij(G), it is assumed that each individual Ij in
group G contributes equally except Ii. This represents the fact that individual Ii can replace
any one of the other individuals in a group G that it is present in. Therefore, the contribution of
each individual Ij in group G will be set to 1/(|G|− 1). However, when Ii is alone, it is assumed
that it can replace itself and so contributes 1. The replacement weight contribution for all G
such that i, j ∈ G is then given by
uij(m,G) =

0 i = j ∧ |G| > 1,
χ(m,G) i = j ∧ |G| = 1,
χ(m,G)
|G|−1 i 6= j.
(4.36)
With this definition of the replacement weight contribution, the replacement weights have the
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Figure 4.3: The average temperatures as given by (4.37) for small graphs on 3 and 4 vertices. The
average temperature for Line(3), Star(4) and paw monotonically decrease with h, the average
temperature for other graphs peaks around h ≈ 1 for other graphs.
property that wi,j = wj,i. Also, the quantity
Tj =
∑
i 6=j
wij (4.37)
could be regarded as the temperature [52] of the I-vertex Ij as it is proportional to the frequency
of an individual Ij being replaced by another individual (if all individuals are equally likely to
produce an offspring). Note that in this setting, the (mean) temperature depends not only on
the graph but also on the parameter h, see Figure 4.3.
4.3.4 The fixation probability of A
To calculate the fixation probability of type A among B individuals at a given spatial structure,
the first step is to list all the states that describe all the possible distributions of individuals of
both types on the different places throughout the evolutionary process, from the insertion of one
individual from type A in a population made up of B individuals until its fixation or elimination.
Not accounting for the symmetries, a given population structure with N individuals yields a
transition graph with 2N different states that can be indexed by subsets S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
State ∅ will be used to represent a population composed entirely of B individuals, and state
N a population of A individuals only. Let PSS′ denote the transition probability from state
S to state S′ in the dynamic process. Figure 4.4 shows the transition graphs (when all graph
symmetries are taken into account) for the corresponding graphs from Figure 4.2.
Having previously defined the replacements weights wij , the appropriate definition from
Table 4.2 (pg. 91) can be chosen to give the replacement probabilities rij . Using the replacement
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probabilities, for S 6= S′, the transition probabilities are given by
PSS′ =

∑
i6∈S
rij ; if S
′ = S \ {j} for some j ∈ S
∑
i∈S
rij ; if S
′ = S ∪ {j} for some j 6∈ S
0; otherwise
(4.38)
and, therefore,
PSS = 1−
∑
S′ 6=S
PSS′ . (4.39)
The probability ρAS that type A fixates from state S is given by
ρAS =
∑
S′⊂{1,2,...,N}
PSS′ρ
A
S′ (4.40)
with boundary conditions
ρA∅ = 0, (4.41)
ρAN = 1. (4.42)
The mean fixation probability of type A, ρA, will be an appropriately weighted average of the
fixation probabilities from all states including exactly one individual of type A. Following [5],
the mean fixation probability is defined
ρA =
∑
i
Ti∑
j
Tj
ρA{i}. (4.43)
The temperature weighted mean fixation probability assumes that a new type of individual is
more likely to appear at a place whose inhabitants are replaced more often (relative to others).
Note, however, that the difference between ρA and the uniformly weighted average
∑
i
1
N ρ
A
{i} is
negligible for all the small graphs considered here. In fact, the latter quantity is never less than
ρA which is in agreement with results from [3].
4.4 Results
For the Hawk-Dove game, the results for the fixation probabilities of Hawks on small graphs are
shown in Figure 4.5. The fixation probabilities of Doves on small graphs are shown in Figure
4.6. For the Public Goods game, the results for the fixation probabilities of Cooperators on
small graphs are shown in Figure 4.7 and the fixation probabilities of Defectors are shown in
Figure 4.8. The fixation probability ρA, depends on the underlying graph structure, the home
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
Figure 4.4: The transition graphs for small graphs on 3 and 4 vertices. (a) The line of 3 vertices.
(b) the triangle. (c) the square with both diagonals, the complete graph for four vertices. (d)
the “circle” graph, or a square with no diagonals. (e) the star graph with 4 vertices. (f) the
diamond, a square with one diagonal. (g) the line with 4 vertices. (h) the paw.
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Figure 4.5: The fixation probabilities of a single Hawk in a population of Doves for small graphs
on 3 and 4 vertices.
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Figure 4.6: The fixation probabilities of a single Dove in a population of Hawks for small graphs
on 3 and 4 vertices.
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Figure 4.7: The fixation probabilities of a single Cooperator in a population of Defectors for
small graphs on 3 and 4 vertices.
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Figure 4.8: The fixation probabilities of a single Defector in a population of Cooperators for
small graphs on 3 and 4 vertices.
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Figure 4.9: The mean temperature versus the
mean group size for graphs with 4 vertices (as h
varies from 0 to 100). For complete graphs, the
line with 4 vertices and the diamond, i.e. the
graphs where the mean temperature peaks at
h ≈ 1, there is a spike in the correlation figure
corresponding to the fact that the mean tem-
perature and the mean group size increase (de-
crease) at different speeds as h < 1 (or h > 1).
Note that Star(4) has the largest possible mean
group size.
fidelity parameter h, the game and the parameters of the game v (the parameter r was fixed at
10), as well as the type of the invading individual/ resident population.
There are a number of features common to both games, and both types of invading mutant
within the Hawk-Dove game. The fixation probability in each case naturally depends upon the
size of the reward, and the strength of this dependency itself depends upon h. For low values of
h, which have a high mean temperature, there is a wide spread of values of fixation probability
depending upon the value of v. For high h, corresponding to low mean temperature, the fixation
probability depends very little upon v. This can be seen from Figure 4.10, where the biggest
differences between fixation probabilities are for the highest temperatures. In the Hawk-Dove
game, a large v is good for Hawks, and a small v is good for Doves (since Hawks still pay costs
against other Hawks) and the effect of changing v is most profound when the temperature is
highest. In general, it is observed that low temperatures suppress the effect of fitness and thus
suppress selection, whereas high temperatures enhance it.
4.4.1 Fixation probability, temperature and mean group size
The mean size of an individual’s group (the group size from the individual’s perspective) is
studied in [16, 18], whose definition is given by
G =
∑
m
∑
G
χ(m,G)|G|2∑
m
∑
G
χ(m,G)|G|
. (4.44)
Note the distinction between (4.44) and the mean group size from an observer’s perspective as,
here, the groups are weighted by the numbers of individuals within a group. For example, if half
of groups are of size 6 and half are of size 12, from the observer’s perspective the mean group
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size is 9, but from the individual’s perspective this is 10, as 2/3 of individuals are in the larger
groups.
In [16] it was observed that the mean group size was an important factor affecting the fitness,
and thus it was expected that this would be the case for the fixation probability too. In fact
this is so, but it turns out that the mean temperature and the mean group size are strongly
correlated, see Figure 4.9. The effect of the mean group size on the fixation probability is less
strong than that of the mean temperature, hence, the mean temperature will be focused on in
the discussion of the results. It is observed in Figure 4.10 that ρA strongly correlates with the
mean temperature for the underlying graphs. The correlation is negative for the Public Goods
game and ranges from positive to negative as v decreases for Hawks or increases for Doves in
the Hawk-Dove game.
4.4.2 High home fidelity h
For low temperatures, the relationship between mean temperature and fixation probability is
effectively linear, although this linear dependence breaks down for high temperatures, and breaks
down fast for larger or more heterogeneous graphs like the star with 7 vertices, see Figure 4.10.
For example consider the case of the complete graph, where every I-vertex has the same
temperature, which will be simply denoted by T . In this case the fixation probability is given
by equation (1.6, pg. 29), rewritten here as follows
ρA =
1
1 +
∑N−1
j=1
∏j
k=1 γk
, (4.45)
where γk is the ratio of the probability of a decrease in the number of type A individuals and the
probability of an increase in that number (given there are currently k type A individuals). Since
dij = dji, in this case γk = bA,k/bB,k = FA,k/FB,k, where the latter expressions are the ratios
of the birth probabilities of types B and A and the fitnesses of types B and A (that depends on
k but does not depend on position).
For both games this is the ratio of two terms that are approximately linear in the I-vertex
temperature, when this temperature is low, as is shown below. Any individual is only likely
to be with at most one other individual, and a payoff above the baseline will only occur if
this is a cooperator (each with probability roughly 1/h). The temperature at each I-vertex is
approximately (N − 1)/h. Recalling that the (reduced) background fitness and reward values
are denoted by r and v, respectively, if type A is a Cooperator in the Public Goods game, the
following is obtained
FA,k ≈ r − 1 + (k − 1)v
h
≈ r − 1 + k − 1
N − 1vT, (4.46)
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FB,k ≈ r + kv
h
≈ r + k
N − 1vT. (4.47)
For sufficiently small temperatures, it is thus clear that γk is approximately linear in the
mean temperature, and so consequently it is seen that the fixation probability will also be
approximately linear in the mean temperature, although this linearity breaks down as soon as
the temperature becomes sufficiently large.
For the fixed fitness case, the situation can actually be seen from the point of view of
classical evolutionary graph theory [52]. No matter what the underlying population structure,
an evolutionary graph W can be constructed with the vertices given by the set of I-vertices
{Ii; i = 1, . . . N} and the edges between Ii and Ij weighted by wij = dij corresponding to
the fact that Ij is being replaced by Ii with probability dij . Since dij = dji, the resulting
evolutionary graph W is a circulation [52, Appendix]. Consequently, type A, having a relative
fitness (r + v)/r when compared to type B, will fixate with the Moran probability [58]
ρA = PMoran
(
r + v
r
)
=
1− rr+v
1−
(
r
r+v
)N . (4.48)
The above results hold for any graph and the fixed fitness case; and it holds approximately for
any graph and any game where the payoffs of different types of individuals are nearly constant.
Within the framework here, this happens if h → ∞ because then the individuals rarely move
and thus rarely interact. For the Public Goods game, it also happens if v → 0. In this case,
Cooperators receive payoff r − 1 while Defectors receive payoffs r, resulting in
ρA = PMoran
(
r − 1
r
)
=
1− rr−1
1−
(
r
r−1
)N . (4.49)
When r = 10 and N = 4, then PMoran ≈ 0.2119 which corresponds to the results for h → ∞
or v → 0 as seen in Figure 4.11. For the Hawk-Dove game, as h→∞, the fitnesses of both the
Hawk and the Dove tend to r as the individuals rarely meet. Thus, the fixation probability of
either Hawk or a Dove tends to 1/N as h→∞ as seen in Figures 4.5 and 4.6.
Note that for the Hawk-Dove game, when v → 0 but h is not too large, the fixation probability
of Hawks and Doves is not 1/N . This is caused by the fact that Hawks still interact and thus have
a disadvantage over Doves. The disadvantage grows with growing mean group size (i.e. with
growing mean temperature). Consequently, the fixation probability is not the Moran probability
if h∞.
4.4.3 Effects of the graph and the game
The fixation probability also depends upon the population structure more generally over and
above the mean temperature. For low h in particular the heterogenous star graph, and to a
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Figure 4.10: The fixation probability as a function of the mean temperature for various graphs.
For all small graphs, the correlations look similar and depend primarily on the game played.
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lesser extent the paw, have a wider range of fixation probabilities for differing values of v than
any of the other graphs. Note, however, that the line is less variable than the homogeneous
well-mixed population. This may be the effect of the temperature (note that the star has the
highest mean temperature as well as the widest range of fixation probabilities), or the variance
in the group size, or possibly both effects working in conjunction.
A second observation that can be made on these graphs is that the ordering of fixation
probabilities for different graphs can change as the parameters vary. For example, for the
Hawk-Dove game with three vertices, whatever the value of the reduced gain v, the fixation
probability of the triangle and the line cross for h ≈ 0.66 ≈ 10−0.18. Note that this approximately
corresponds to the point where the mean temperature gets higher on the triangle than on the line.
Similar observations are true for some (but not all) of the graphs (and other games considered
here), see Figure 4.12.
There are some features specific to the particular game in question. For the Hawk-Dove
game, the highest fixation probabilities can occur for intermediate values of log(h) ≈ 0, both
for Dove invaders and for Hawk invaders. This is particularly the case for the square and the
line. This occurs when the reward value v is high for Hawk invaders, and the effect disappears
for low v. The figures are noticeably different for different graphs, and it can thus be said that
there is a significant graph effect for the Hawk-Dove game. For the Public Goods game these
features do not appear, and eight broadly similar figures are seen. Thus for the Public Goods
game, we can say that there is not a significant graph effect, at least for the small graphs that
have been considered. The main features where the graphs differ is in the broader spread on the
star as mentioned above, and the dip in the fixation probability for intermediate values of v.
4.5 Discussion
In this chapter the modelling framework of Broom-Rychta´rˇ is used to consider interactions of
individuals in a non-homogeneous environment. A birth-death dynamics is used so that dynamic
analysis can be carried out. The dynamics of some simple games on different spatial structures
were analysed and compared to try to determine some general features. In particular the
fixation probability was shown to be strongly correlated with the mean temperature. Within the
population, individuals play games, and each game as well as being distinct, has specific features
(in this case reward, cost and baseline reward) which govern how well individuals do. The value
of the reward v was shown to have a potentially significant effect on the fixation probability;
the size of this effect depended upon aspects of the population structure. In particular, a high
mean temperature made the effect of this parameter much more critical, and the effect will be
stronger when the graph is highly heterogeneous, on the star for example.
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Figure 4.11: Dependence of the fixation probability on v for h = 1.
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Figure 4.12: Dependence of the fixation probability on the graph.
The territorial raider model is set up in a way that given any graph structure and any
multi-player game, one can automatically generate a system of linear equations yielding fixation
probabilities. The results for graphs on 3 and 4 vertices are shown in this chapter. The results
for graphs on more vertices can theoretically be obtained in a similar fashion. For some highly
symmetrical classes of graphs (such as complete graphs, or stars), the analysis can still be
performed even for large graphs. However, the system of linear equations grows exponentially
with the number of vertices [see 13, for similar scenario] and the number of possible graphs
grows even faster [35, p. 240]. It is difficult to say where the exact limits of these brute force
numerical methods lie, however, the methods we used seemed to manage around 10 vertices
before becoming cumbersomely slow. Rewriting the code underlying the numerical methods
more efficiently should push this limit higher. The alternative to using brute force numerical
methods would be to run multi-agent simulations. For this approach, [92] showed that, in the
fixed fitness case, for a 100 vertex graph it took around 4000 seconds to compute the fixation
probability. In the territorial raider model, due to the extra computation required for calculating
the fitness, it would be reasonable to assume that it would take around this much time for a
25 to 30 vertex graph. With more efficient and advanced programming methods this should
reduce the time even further thereby allowing larger populations sizes to be considered. Using
multi-agent simulations would help understand how these results generalise to more general
networks. Due to the small size of the current networks considered, it is difficult to say whether
a given strategy would do better or worse on a larger network. However, we expect certain
fundamental relationships such as that between the fixation probability and mean temperature,
and the fixation probability and the game parameters to hold. This is in particular due to the
consistency shown by these relationships for the different graphs considered.
The two games consider here, Hawk-Dove and the Public Goods game, can be said to repre-
sent cooperative dilemmas, with the cooperative strategies being Dove and Cooperate, respec-
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tively. In the territorial raider model, for the cases shown, the cooperative strategies generally
do poorly. For the Public Goods game, the fixation probability of a single Cooperator (Defector)
is always less (more) than 1/N . Similarly, for the Hawk-Dove game, the fixation probability for
a single Hawk is often greater than 1/N , although it can fall below this value for small v. The
fixation probability of a single Dove is often less than 1/N , although it can climb above this
value for small v. One reason for this is that the Invasion process, like birth-death processes in
general, does not favour cooperation [see e.g. 70]. Thus it may be that cooperation is generally
disfavoured in the Public Goods game. For the Hawk-Dove game, an important factor could be
the small size of the graphs used, which means that in turn the groups formed remain small.
Large groups will tend to disfavour Hawks, as all but one Hawk in any group incurs a cost.
Thus for larger graphs, more cooperative behaviour may be obtained, in the form of relatively
higher fixation probabilities for Doves as opposed to Hawks.
The territorial raider model illustrates how to calculate the fitness of an individual receives
more realistically in comparison to, for example, games on graphs [70] that simply aggregates
the pairwise payoffs to calculate the fitness. The problem with the latter approach is that it
assumes an individual spends the same amount of time with all the individuals it can interact
with. The territorial raider model addresses this issue by accounting for the proportion of time
that individuals spend in the same place i.e. individuals only interact with one another if they
are present in the same place at the same time. Furthermore, it also highlights the fact that
individuals can be alone and, therefore, this situation needs to be accounted for. Note that
this approach used by the territorial model is only one possibility that is available within the
Broom-Rychta´rˇ framework.
The different graphs in the model here can be considered to represent different ways in which
biological territories overlap. Alternatively the graphs can represent distinct social relationships
within a group. As mentioned above, mean temperature seems to be a more important factor
than the specific structure. In the biological context, this represents a measure of interaction
between the individuals within the population. High mean temperature corresponds to highly
mobile individuals which interact potentially in larger groups than when the mean temperature
is low. This provides a natural measure of the strength of the effect of a particular game in a
population. In addition to that, temperatures can be estimated in real populations, as long as
the meetings between individuals in groups can be reliably recorded, so that the frequency of
the formation of different groups can be estimated. It would be of great interest to work out the
temperatures in various real population scenarios, and to ascertain how accurate our general
conclusions are.
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Chapter 5
Generalized Territorial Raider
Model
5.1 Introduction
The generalised territorial raider model is a population evolution model based on the BR frame-
work and is an extension of the territorial raider model of chapter 4. In this model individuals
are allowed to share the same territory and home, as opposed to each individual having a unique
territory and home as seen in chapter 4. Individuals who have the same territory are said to
be a subpopulation. The movement of the individuals are as before, such that they are allowed
one movement within their territory before returning home and the proportion of time spent
at home is controlled by the home fidelity parameter. The fitness and dynamics are also de-
termined as before. For fitness, the individuals have multiplayer interactions, though, the only
game considered here is the public goods game. These interactions take place between replace-
ment events that occur between discrete time points. For the dynamics, the complete set of
standard evolutionary dynamics given in Table 4.2 (pg. 91) are considered, before, only the BDB
dynamics was considered. For each of these dynamics, the fixation probability is calculated to
measure the relative success between cooperators and defectors in the multiplayer public goods
game that takes place on various different population structures.
This chapter uses the generalized territorial raider to study whether cooperation can evolve,
i.e. cooperators have a higher fixation probability than cooperators. It was previously shown,
in the territorial raider model, that the defectors always did better than the cooperators. One
of the reasons could be due to the structure. In [66], several rules were identified that allow
cooperation to evolve, one of which was a population structure that allows cooperators to have
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more frequent interactions, particularly when hubs or clusters of cooperators can form [91]. This
in turn made them resistant to exploitation by defectors [70, 86]. Considering subpopulations
within the context of the territorial raider model will allow such hubs or clusters to form.
Another reason could be the dynamics used. In [70] showed that death-birth or birth-death
dynamics with selection on the second event, i.e BDD or DBB, promotes cooperation but not
when selection happens in the first event. Therefore, in this chapter all the standard dynamics
are considered to see which ones allow cooperation to evolve. Any new notation used in this
chapter is given in Table 5.1.
The main difference between the territorial raider model and the generalised territorial raider
model is that the latter allows individuals to share the same territory. In the former case,
increasing the home fidelity parameter implied that individuals spent more time alone. In the
latter case, this would now mean that individuals spend more time interacting with individuals
who are part of the same subpopulation. It is this effect that is investigated to see whether it
can help the evolution of cooperation.
Notation Definition Description
Qm ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N} Subpopulation of individuals.
TQm =
∑
i∈N\Qm
∑
j∈Qm wij Strict subpopulation temperature.
Table 5.1: New notation used in the chapter.
5.2 The Model
5.2.1 The population structure and distribution
In this section the territorial raider model (Chapter 4) is generalised to include subpopula-
tions, based upon their movement distributions. A subpopulation of individuals in the fully
independent model is defined as a division of individuals from the main population that is
well-mixed [16], which simply means that all of these individuals have an identical distribution
over the places. In particular, for a subpopulation Q we have that pim = pjm ∀ i, j ∈ Q and
m = 1, . . . ,M .
For simplicity it will be assumed that individuals move as they do in the territorial raider
model. Thus a population of N individuals is divided into M non-overlapping subpopulations
Q1, . . . ,QM where |Qm| ≥ 0 such that N =
∑
m |Qm|. The individuals in subpopulation Qm
are assumed to treat place Pm as their home place, so that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between subpopulations and places. However, subpopulations are allowed to be empty and,
therefore, places in which no individuals reside can exist. As in the territorial raider model, the
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movement probabilities of the individuals are governed by the home fidelity h (see Section 4.3.1
pg. 93). In particular, a subpopulation Qm that can visit d neighbouring places will stay in home
place Pm with probability h/(h+ d) or move to one of its neighbouring places with probability
1/(h+ d). Note that when there is one individual in each subpopulation, that is |Qm| = 1 ∀m,
the territorial raider model is obtained. This information can be visually represented in two
different ways as shown in Figure 5.1, which includes a graph whose vertices represent both
subpopulations and places.
I1, I2 I3, I4 I5
(a)
I1 I2 I3 I4 I5
P1 P2 P3
(b)
Figure 5.1: The territorial raider model with subpopulations. (a) Individuals that are members
of subpopulation Qm live in place Pm but can visit neighbouring places. The territory of
subpopulation {I1, I2} consists of places P1 and P2, the territory of subpopulation {I3, I4}
consists of places P1, P2 and P3, the territory of subpopulation {I5} consists of P2 and P3. (b)
An alternative visualization as multiplayer interactions on a bi-partite graph where individuals
and places are clearly separated.
In this chapter only complete graphs will be considered. To indicate the number of nodes and
size of each subpopulation at each node, one of the following naming conventions will be used.
If there are subpopulations of different sizes, then a list with the size of each subpopulation will
be used. For example, 2-2-2-0 implies that there are 3 subpopulations of size 2 and 1 of size 0;
and 6-6-3-1 implies that there are 2 subpopulation of size 6, 1 of size 3 and 1 of size 1. On the
other hand, if all the subpopulations are of the same size then (M, δ) will be used where M , as
mentioned earlier, is the number of subpopulations and δ is the size of each subpopulation.
5.2.2 Fitness
The fitness will be calculated as in the territorial raider model and focuses on the multiplayer
public goods game as defined using the reduced parameters (see Section 4.3.2 pg. 95). This
means that the fitness contribution only depends upon the individual itself and the group of
individuals that it is interacting with.
117
5.2.3 Evolutionary dynamics
The replacement weights are calculated as in the territorial raider model (see Section 4.3.3
pg. 98). That is, the replacement weight contributions depend only on the the birth individual,
the death individual and the group interactions between them.
In this chapter, all the standard dynamics as defined in Table 4.2 (pg. 91) have been consid-
ered. However, in terms of presenting the results, only DB dynamics have been used. This is
because the results for BDB and DBD are identical (as are those for BDD and DBB), because
the replacement structure W is symmetric and doubly stochastic, so whether birth or death
occurs first is irrelevant. Furthermore, the LB and LD dynamics are equivalent to the BDB and
DBD dynamics, respectively, because W is isothermal (see Section 2.5.1 pg. 55).
Concepts of temperature
In the territorial raider model the concept of the temperature of an individual was given as the
likelihood of an individual being replaced. This is developed further here.
The original definition given in [52] states that the temperature of a vertex of an evolutionary
graph measures how likely an individual occupying a particular vertex is to be replaced by an-
other individual’s offspring. [54] extended this definition and introduced the out temperature of
a vertex of an evolutionary graph to measure how likely the offspring of the individual occupying
that vertex will replace another individual. These definitions of the in and out temperatures of
individual In for an evolutionary graph W are respectively defined as follows
T−n =
∑
i
win and T
+
n =
∑
i
wni. (5.1)
In general, the in and out temperatures can be different. However, W is doubly stochastic and
symmetric and, therefore, the in and out temperatures are identical. Thereby, the definition of
the in temperature is used and is simply referred to as the temperature.
An alternative version of the definition of temperature is the strict temperature that measures
how often an individual is likely to be replaced by other individuals excluding itself. The strict
temperature of individual In for an evolutionary graph W is given by
Tn =
∑
i 6=n
win = 1− wnn. (5.2)
The definition of strict temperature can be extended to subpopulations to give the strict
subpopulation temperature. This measures how likely an individual in subpopulation Qm is to
be replaced by an individual in another subpopulation. Clearly all individuals in a subpopulation
have the same temperature (for any of the temperature definitions), since they all have the
same movement distribution. The strict subpopulation temperature is calculated by summing
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all weights wij such that Ii is not part of subpopulation Qm and Ij is part of subpopulation
Qm giving
TQm =
∑
i∈N\Qm
∑
j∈Qm
wij . (5.3)
This means that if there is only one subpopulation then its strict subpopulation temperature is
0 by definition, that is, TQm = 0 if Qm = N .
A strategy introduced in one subpopulation can spread throughout the population because
W is strongly connected. This implies that if there is more that one non-empty subpopulation
then the strict subpopulation temperature is non-zero for all non-empty subpopulations, that
is, TQm > 0 if |Qm| > 0. The mean strict subpopulation temperature is used to measure the
likelihood of the individuals in a subpopulations being replaced by an individual from another
subpopulation. The definition of the means strict subpopulation temperature is given by
〈TQm〉 =
1
N
M∑
m=1
|Qm|TQm . (5.4)
Note that the means strict subpopulation temperature also indicates how connected the sub-
populations are with one another.
5.2.4 Fixation probability
The fixation probability is calculated as in the territorial raider model (see Section 4.3.4 pg. 99).
However, an arithmetic mean of the fixation probabilities is taken instead of using the temper-
ature weighted fixation probabilities as the difference between the two means is insignificant.
5.3 Results: Cooperation in generalized territorial raider
models
This section studies the effect that different model parameters have on the evolution of coop-
eration. For models investigating the evolution of cooperation using evolutionary graph theory,
both the evolution and interaction of individuals are dictated by a fixed structure, following
games with a fixed number of players (almost always two). In the generalized territorial raider
model the replacement structure emerges from the interactions between individuals, involving
games with a varying number of players, and therefore gives a different perspective on the
evolution of cooperation.
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Figure 5.2: Comparing different complete structures for the public goods game. Each number
indicates a subpopulation of a certain density e.g. 6-0 is a complete structure with 2 subpopu-
lations of size 6 and 0 respectively. In each case the parameters are r = 30, v = 10 and h = 30.
It is seen that in the first figure for the DBD dynamics, cooperators perform poorly in all cases.
In the second figure, cooperators do better for small groups (greater than one). Increasing the
number of empty places is beneficial for defectors.
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Figure 5.3: Public goods game plot for the
complete graph with 4 subpopulations each
having size (or density) δ. The game pa-
rameters are set to r = 30 and v = 11, the
movement parameters are set to h = 30
and dynamics used are DBB. As in Fig-
ure 5.2, cooperators evolve better in small
groups (larger than 1), namely groups of
size two and three, with a small advantage
for groups of size four.
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5.3.1 The effect of the dynamics
For evolutionary graph theory models, cooperation is favoured when using DBB or BDD dy-
namics, but not DBD or BDB dynamics, if the structure allows a cluster of cooperators to form
(see [70]). This is consistent with territorial raider model (Chapter 4) that studied the effect
of BDB dynamics on the public goods game and cooperators generally performed poorly. It
was shown that defectors dominate regardless of the structure of the population and the game
parameters. The public goods game can now be revisited with more flexibility both in terms of
the dynamics and the structure of the population.
For DBD dynamics, the defectors do better than cooperators regardless of the population
structure. However, for DBB dynamics, cooperators are favoured over defectors for certain pop-
ulation structures. In particular, these structures that favour cooperators contain small sub-
populations, ideally of two individuals. This is seen in Figure 5.2, where the fixation probability
is plotted against different complete population structures for the DBD and DBB dynamics.
For example, for the complete structure 2-2-2 where there are 3 subpopulations of size 2, the
cooperators outperform defectors by a large amount.
To understand why this is the case, consider a population of two individuals where one
individual is of type A and the other type B. Within such a population, the cooperative type
A will be less fit than the selfish type B. For DBD dynamics, the least fit individual is most
likely to be chosen for death and the fixation probability is proportional to the fitness of the
individual. This means that a type A individual has a low fixation probability compared to a
type B individual. However, when using DBB dynamics, one of the two individuals is randomly
chosen for death and immediately replaced by the offspring of the other individual. This means
that regardless of the fitness of the individual, each type will fixate with probability 1/2. For
sufficiently high home fidelity parameter h, individuals primarily interact with their groupmates.
Therefore, in such a population where there exists a subpopulation of two individuals, a cluster
of two cooperators is more likely to form when using DBB dynamics. This cluster of cooperators
has a fitness larger than that of a cluster of defectors, provided that v > 1, thereby establishing
a stronghold against defectors. In fact, a subpopulation of larger than two individuals can
establish a stronghold against defectors as shown in Figure 5.3. Here the fixation probability is
plotted against a complete structure with four subpopulations that each have size ranging from
1 to 6. Subpopulations of size two are best for cooperation, with their advantage over defectors
declining as the size of the subpopulation decreases. Given the parameters used, subpopulations
of two to four cooperators can successfully resist invasion, but larger subpopulations cannot.
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Figure 5.4: The figure on the left hand side plots the mean subpopulation temperature against
the home fidelity h for a complete population structure with 3 subpopulations of size 2 each.
The figure on the right then plots the fixation probabilities against these values of the mean
subpopulation temperature where r = 30 and v = 10 for the public goods game, and the
dynamics used are DBB. In particular, notice that the fixation probability of the cooperators is
decreasing with the mean subpopulation temperature.
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Figure 5.5: Comparing different population
structures for the public goods game with
various complete graphs for a population
size of 12 where (1,12) means there is 1 sub-
population with 12 individuals, (2,6) means
there are 2 subpopulations with 6 individ-
uals and so on. The parameters are set to
r = 30 and v = 10, the dynamics used are
DBB and for home fidelity h = 30.
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5.3.2 The effect of the temperature
In the territorial raider model, the strict temperature and mean group size were both shown to
be strongly correlated with the fixation probability, with the effect of the former shown to be
stronger (see Figure 4.9 pg. 106). This chapter therefore focuses on the temperature, namely
the strict subpopulation temperature. Note that in the territorial raider model there is one-to-
one correspondence between individuals and places, which implies that the strict temperature
and strict subpopulation temperature are identical, but this is not the case for the generalized
territorial raider model.
The individual temperature is a measure of how often an individual interacts with other
individuals including those who are part of the same subpopulation; thus an individual may
have a high temperature but that does not mean it is interacting with individuals from other
subpopulations. In particular whenever individuals are not alone very often, this temperature
does not vary so much between different individuals, and so is not a useful concept for when there
are non-trivial subgroups. The strict subpopulation temperature, on the other hand, considers
interactions with individuals only from other subpopulations, and thus can be very variable. It
will be shown that this temperature is a good predictor of important population properties.
The mean strict subpopulation temperature decreases when home fidelity increases as shown
on the left hand side plot in Figure 5.4. This is because the individuals are more likely to remain
on their home place than visit another place as home fidelity increases, therefore reducing
interactions with other subpopulations, and in particular the probability that a member of one
subpopulation replaces a member of another at any given time.
In the territorial raider model it was shown that for BDB dynamics for structures where each
subpopulation is of size one, there was a linear relationship between the strict (subpopulation)
temperature and the fixation probability, with the higher the temperature, the stronger the
effect of selection (see Figure 4.10 pg. 109). This was investigated for DBB dynamics and found
that there is an opposite linear effect, which is consistent with [54] who showed that the DBB
dynamics suppresses the effect of selection the most for the complete graph. Note that this
relationship only holds for relatively weak selection, and we can reverse the relationship (and
make it non-linear) by increasing the value of the reward.
To promote cooperation a structure involving a subpopulation of size at least two is required.
However, whether these structures promote cooperation or not also depends upon the base fitness
and reward, and so it is assumed that the base fitness and reward are sufficiently large for this to
be the case (this is further investigated in Section 5.3.4). In this case, decreasing the temperature
by increasing the home fidelity promotes cooperation. In particular, the relationship between
the mean fixation probability of cooperators and the mean strict subpopulation temperature
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Figure 5.6: The figure on the left shows the effect of compensating for empty places by increasing
the home fidelity such that the probability of staying in their home place, pnn, remains the same.
We start at h = 30 for the 3-3 and 2-2-2 structures. As an empty place is added, h is increased
so that pnn = 30/31 for the 3-3-0, . . . , 3-3-0-0-0-0 structures and pnn = 30/32 for 2-2-2-0, . . . ,
2-2-2-0-0-0 structures. In all cases r = 30 and v = 10. We can see that after compensating
for the above effect, the influence of introducing empty places is both reversed and weakened.
The figure on the right shows the mean strict subpopulation temperature dropping off when
we compensate for the empty places by increasing the home fidelity such that pnn remains the
same.
is negative and nonlinear as shown in Figure 5.4. The nonlinearity arises not only from the
nonlinear payoff function of the public good game, but also from the fact that there exists a
subpopulation that has size at least two. For cooperators, the mean fixation probability is
negatively correlated with the mean strict subpopulation temperature because the mean strict
subpopulation temperature is highest when home fidelity is lowest, when cooperators cannot
separate themselves from the population and form clusters, consequently defection evolves. On
the other hand, for low mean strict subpopulation temperature, and so high home fidelity, it is
easier to form clusters of cooperators that allows cooperation to evolve. This kind of behaviour
is also evident in Figures 5.2 and 5.5.
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5.3.3 The effect of the number of places
In the territorial raider model, each individual had their home place and there were no empty
places (non home places) that individuals could visit (see Figure 4.1 pg. 95). In the generalized
territorial raider model, individuals can visit non home places and therefore the effect this has
on the evolution of cooperation is investigated.
As seen in Figure 5.2, increasing the number of empty places that subpopulations can visit
reduces, whilst keeping all other parameters constant, makes it more difficult for cooperation
to evolve. In particular, this effect is prominent for structures where cooperators were initially
doing well. For example, for the structure 2-2-2 where the cooperators do best, increasing the
number of places significantly reduces their fixation probability whilst increasing that of the
defectors. Here increasing the number of places acts in the same way as decreasing the home
fidelity, decreasing the amount of time an individual spends in its home place with members
of its subpopulation. Thus the amount of time an individual spends alone or with individuals
not from its subpopulation increases, so that the overall fitness of a cooperative subpopulation
will decrease (they still pay a cost but do not receive a benefit when alone). In terms of
the dynamics, spending more time alone would increase the effect of selection in DBB dynamics
because an individual with higher fitness randomly chosen for death is more likely to be replaced
by its own offspring, which affects the cooperators adversely. A cooperative subpopulation will
also have lower fitness because its members are more likely to interact with individuals from
other subpopulations, therefore exposing them to defectors. The increased interaction between
individuals will also increase the effect of selection in DBB dynamics because an individual with
higher fitness randomly chosen for death is less likely to be replaced by an individual with lower
fitness in the same subpopulation.
The increase in the number of places can be compensated for by increasing the home fidelity,
so that individuals stay in their home place with the same probability. This has the effect of
decreasing the mean strict subpopulation temperature as individuals are more likely to spend
time with members of their subpopulation. This is shown in Figure 5.6, where it is seen that
the effect of adding empty places is now reversed, although the strength of this reverse effect is
weak.
5.3.4 The effect of a large home fidelity
Consider a well-mixed population of M subpopulations each containing L individuals, so that
N = ML, as described in Section 5.2.1, where h is very large. Consequently, the probability
of group G forming, χ(m,G), is approximately 1 if G = Qm, and is approximately 0 otherwise.
Thus the fitness of an individual can be evaluated assuming that we have a group containing
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precisely all individuals from its subpopulation with probability 1. Due to the symmetric nature
of a population in the generalized territorial raider model, the weights for any two individuals in
the same subpopulation will be the same, as will the weights for any two members of different
subpopulations. Denoting the latter as wO, which will be small, such that wij = wO when Ii
and Ij are not in the same subpopulation, and wij = wI ≈ [1− (M −1)LwO]/(L−1) otherwise,
with the probability of self-replacement negligible.
It follows that only replacements within subpopulations will happen, except very rarely.
Thus it can be assumed that the battle within any mixed subpopulation of type A and type
B individuals will be resolved with fixation of one type or the other before any new mixed
subpopulation appears.
A two stage process is considered. Firstly, a new mixed group appears. This occurs rarely,
through the invasion of a type A cooperator into a defector subpopulation, or a type B defector
into a cooperator subpopulation. Assuming that there are currently MA(MB = M −MA) type
A (B) subpopulations, such a transition happens with probability
pAI =
MB
M
MALwOFL(A)
(L− 1)wIFL(B) +O(wO) (5.5)
of a type A into a type B subpopulation, or
pBI =
MA
M
MBLwOFL(B)
(L− 1)wIFL(A) +O(wO) (5.6)
of a type B into a type A subpopulation. The terms FL(A) and FL(B) are the fitnesses of type
A and B individuals within their own subpopulations, and the terms O(wO) are of the order of
wO, and so small. Let x = v/[r(L− 1)] then the ratio of the two expressions in equations (5.5)
and (5.6), and thus the relative frequency that the new invasions happen, is thus
pAI
pBI
≈
(
FL(A)
FL(B)
)2
=
(
1 +
v − 1
r
)2
≈ (1 + (L− 1)x)2 (5.7)
for large v and r.
The second process considers fixation within a well-mixed group of size L. Following [41],
this is given by
xi =
1 +
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1
δk
βk
1 +
∑L−1
j=1
∏j
k=1
δk
βk
, (5.8)
where xi is the fixation probability of i type A individuals within a population of size L. Here
βk (δk) is the probability that the next event is the replacement of a type B (A) by a type A
(B), when the number of type A is k. These probabilities are given by
βk =
k(L− k)
L
r + (k−1)vL−1 − 1
(L− 1)r + ((L− k − 1)k + k(k − 1)) vL−1 − k
. (5.9)
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δk =
k(L− k)
L
r + kvL−1
(L− 1)r + ((L− k)k + (k − 1)2) vL−1 − (k − 1)
, (5.10)
For sufficiently large r, the following is obtained
δk
βk
≈ 1 + kx
1 + (k − 1)xfk(x), (5.11)
where
fk(x) =
L− 1 + (L− 2)kx
L− 1 + ((L− 2)k + 1)x < 1. (5.12)
The fixation probability of a single type A individual in a group of type Bs is given by ρA,L = x1,
and the fixation probability of a single type B individual in a group of type As is ρB,L = 1−xL−1.
This gives
ρB,L
ρA,L
=
L−1∏
k=1
δk
βk
=
L−1∏
k=1
1 + kx
1 + (k − 1)xfk(x) = (1 + (L− 1)x)
L−1∏
k=1
fk(x). (5.13)
This implies that
pAI
pBI
>
ρB,L
ρA,L
. (5.14)
Following our assumptions, the population evolves following a succession of invasions of
subpopulations either of type A cooperators by type B defectors or defectors by cooperators.
The probability that the next such event will be the invasion of a defector by a cooperator is
simply
pAIρA,L
pAIρA,L + pBIρB,L
=
rS
1 + rS
, (5.15)
where rS = pAIρA,L/pBIρB,L is the forward bias (see Section 2.5.2 pg. 56) of cooperative groups
within our population. For a single type A to fixate in the population it must first fixate within
its group with probability ρA,L, after which, there is a competition between groups proceeding
precisely as in a Moran process, so this gives
ρA = ρA,L
1− 1/rS
1− (1/rS)M , (5.16)
with the equivalent expression for ρB ,
ρB = ρB,L
rS − 1
rMS − 1
. (5.17)
It is clear from equation (5.14) that rS > 1, so that ρA is greater than ρA,L(1−1/rS) for any M .
Letting M become large means that 1/N = 1/ML will be less than ρA, but larger than ρB , so
that ρB < 1/N < ρA holds. This means that for sufficiently large h, r and v, cooperation evolves
for any given subpopulation size L. Thus cooperation can potentially evolve for arbitrarily large
subpopulations, although as shown previously, it is easier for smaller subpopulations.
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5.4 Discussion
The territorial raider model has been developed to incorporate subpopulations. This is beneficial
because the territorial raider model, represented in the bipartite graph in Figure 4.1 pg. 95, would
require a vertex for every individual as well as an additional vertex for every available place.
Now only a vertex per subpopulation is required, potentially allowing a small number of very
large subpopulations to be considered, which would not have been possible previously.
This type of structure has been considered in a slightly different context, for example, the
island- or community-structured populations of [104]. In this model interactions occur at mul-
tiple levels, interactions between community members being more common than those with
non-community members where interaction occurs at multiple levels. Members of one com-
munity first play a public goods game and then join the members of another community and
play a public goods game such that, at the highest level, the entire population plays a public
goods game. This is in contrast to the generalized territorial raider model, where individuals
only play a game if they are present in the same place at the same time. In the community
structured populations, it was shown that cooperation can evolve when DBB dynamics are used
and selection is weak within communities, which is consistent with the results in this chapter.
There are some differences between the generalized territorial raider model and a metapopu-
lation model [51]. In the territorial raider model, each place is either a home to a subpopulation
or not. This means that an individual can place its offspring in a place if there is already a sub-
population present there by replacing an individual in that subpopulation. In a metapopulation
model, an offspring can be placed in a place regardless of whether a subpopulation is already
present there or not, unless that place has reached peak capacity. Furthermore, individuals
are allowed to migrate in a metapopulation model but not in the generalized territorial raider
model. In the latter case, individuals are allowed to move to places in their territory but always
return home, i.e. they do not migrate.
It is shown that the choice of dynamics is crucial, and that DBD (and BDB) dynamics would
not allow cooperation to evolve, but that DBB (and BDD) would, which is consistent with [70].
Further, using the latter dynamics, the size and the level of isolation of the subpopulations is
important, with the smaller the subpopulations and the greater the isolation, the greater the
chance for cooperation to evolve. Unsurprisingly, the larger the level of reward v, the better the
cooperators do. In particular, the larger the subpopulations, the larger the reward v required
for cooperation to evolve; note that this is similar to the requirement that the benefit-to-cost
ratio exceeds the average number of neighbours an individual has from [70].
The generalized territorial raider model improves on the territorial raider model in chapter
4 by allowing multiple individuals to have the same territory, who are then said to be part of
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the same subpopulation. This idea played a crucial role in the evolution of cooperation, which
could not be achieved before, by allowing more effective cooperation between cooperators when
they are part of the same subpopulation. Previously, individuals had their own unique territory
and it was difficult to get two cooperating individuals to spend enough time with each other.
Reducing the home fidelity parameter meant that individuals spent more time with one another
but it was difficult to control with whom this time was spent with. However, in the generalized
territorial raider model, increasing the home fidelity parameter means that individuals that
are part of the same subpopulation spend more time with one another. Consequently, with
either DBB or BDD dynamics, a cooperative subpopulation can form that allows cooperators
to propagate throughout the population.
The results in this chapter only apply to complete graphs where each node represents a place
where a subpopulation can reside. Heterogeneity was considered in terms of the size of each
subpopulation present on each node, and it was shown that for large home fidelity cooperation
can evolve for arbitrarily large subpopulations. In order to generalise these results to more
general graphs, further study will have to be carried out on more heterogeneous graph structures.
However, as is seen from Figure 5.4, the idea that strict subgroup temperature is important in
explaining the level of cooperation that evolves, would hold for graphs in general. In particular,
low (high) temperature helps promote the invasion of cooperators (defectors) such that higher
temperatures allow cooperators to cluster more strongly and benefit more from cooperating
with one another. The reason for this is that, with higher strict subgroup temperatures, the
individuals are likely to interact locally within their subpopulation and, therefore, the global
structure of the population will have a less substantial effect on the overall fixation probability.
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Chapter 6
Markov Movement Model
6.1 Introduction
The Markov movement population evolution model is based on the BR framework. As the name
suggests, the movement of the individuals is Markov such that they would decide to stay where
they are or move depending upon the current interaction they had. The likelihood of staying is
larger for a beneficial interaction. It is assumed that individuals have a unique home and are
allowed to make a finite number of movements before returning home, called the exploration
time. The topology of the places that individuals can visit is represented by a complete graph and
therefore individuals can directly move from one place to another. The fitness of the individuals
is impacted by the amount they move such that a cost is incurred for each movement made. In
addition to this, the individuals have multiplayer interactions as governed by the multiplayer
public good game. Movement and interactions are assumed to take place between successive
discrete time points at which replacement events take place. The dynamics considered for the
replacement events are the complete set of standard evolutionary dynamics given in Table 4.2
(pg. 91). The success of the cooperate and defect strategy in the multiplayer goods game will be
studied by calculating the fixation probability of each type under various different assumptions
and parameter values. Any new notation used in this chapter is given in Table 6.1.
The motivation behind the Markov movement model is to study whether cooperation can
evolve in the mutliplayer public goods game, if individuals are allowed to make strategic move-
ments. In this case, individuals make strategic movements by staying where they are if it is
beneficial and moving away if not. Similar strategic movement was considered by [1, 2] but
multiplayer interactions were not accounted for. Therefore, the Markov movement model aims
to better understand how strategic movement can help cooperation evolve in the context of
multiplayer interactions.
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In the generalized territorial raider model of the previous chapter, the problem being stud-
ied is similar, i.e. the evolution of cooperation, but the mechanisms available to achieve this are
different. In the generalized territorial raider model, the mechanism required is quite straightfor-
ward and requires subpopulations of individuals to spend more time with one another allowing
clusters of cooperators to form. However, this mechanism is quite sensitive to the dynamics
being used because a subpopulation cannot be colonized by cooperators if selection happens in
the first event of birth-death or death-birth dynamics. On the other hand strategic movement
is more realistic, and its superiority can be tested by checking its robustness to the dynamics
being used.
Notation Definition Description
hn ∈ [0, 1] Probability that In stays.
αn ∈ [0, 1] Staying propensity : probability of In staying when alone.
C (D) Cooperator (Defector) interactive strategy.
βC (βD) ∈ R Benefit of being with cooperator (defector).
S ∈ (0, 1) Sensitivity shown to group members.
Rn ≥ 0 Payoff to In.
λ ∈ [0,min(Rn)) Movement cost.
T ∈ Z+ Exploration time.
Cα (Dα) Cooperator (defector) with staying propensity α.
γ (δ) ∈ [0, 1] Nash equilibrium staying propensity of cooperator (defector).
Table 6.1: New notation used in this chapter.
6.2 The model
6.2.1 The population structure and distribution
The (generalized) territorial raider model is a special case of the fully independent movement
model, i.e. individuals move independently of time, history and the population. The move-
ment of individuals is limited to their neighbourhood and exogenously controlled by the home
fidelity parameter that measures how likely the individual is to remain in their home. A natural
extension to this is to allow individual distributions to vary with time. A Markov model is
considered based on the assumption that history dependence is Markov, that is, the current
population distribution is only dependent upon the previous population distribution. In par-
ticular, the population distribution probability function (PDPF) given in equation (4.4, pg. 87)
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will simplify to
pit(m) =
∑
m<t
pt(m|mt−1)P (m<t). (6.1)
Individual movement with dependence only upon individual history
Assuming that an individual moves independently of the other individuals in the population
but its current position is dependent upon its previous position, the individual distribution
probability function (IDPF) given in equation (4.8, pg. 88) would then simplify to
pin,t(m) =
∑
mn,<t
pn,t(m|mn,t−1)P (mn,<t). (6.2)
This expression can be rewritten using the M ×M probability matrix pn,t = [pn,t(mn|mn,t−1)]
for mn,mn,t−1 = 1, . . . ,M as follows
pin,t = pin,0
t∏
k=1
pn,k (6.3)
where pin,t = [pin,t(m)]m=1,...,M . Furthermore, if it is assumed that there is time homogeneity,
that is pn,t = pn for all t, then this simplifies to
pin,t = pin,0p
t
n. (6.4)
In this case, assuming that pn is irreducible and aperiodic for all n, then as t → ∞ the IDPF
pin,∞ is stationary for all n. Essentially, this model is then equivalent to the fully independent
movement model, which was considered in the models in the (generalized) territorial raider
model and therefore will not be used in this chapter.
Individual movement with dependence on population history
Assuming that the individuals move to a new position independently of each other but dependent
upon the current distribution of the whole population, the IDPF is then given by
pin,t(m) =
∑
m<t
pn,t(m|mt−1)P (m<t). (6.5)
In this chapter, this type of IDPF with the assumption that the individual transition probabilities
are time homogeneous but dependent upon the previous group and previous position of the
individuals, that is
pn(m|mn,t−1,Gn(mt−1)) =
hn(Gn(mt−1)) m = mn,t−11−hn(Gn(mt−1))
d m 6= mn,t−1
(6.6)
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where hn(Gn(mt−1)) denotes the staying probability of individual In and N − 1 is the number
of neighbouring places that an individual can move to in a complete graph where each node
represents a place. The population is assumed to be of size N where each individuals has a
home that they can return to such that every place is home to precisely one individual.
The staying probability hn(Gn(mt−1)) will depend upon the staying propensity αn of indi-
vidual In and the attractiveness of remaining in group Gn(mt−1). The staying propensity αn
measures the likelihood that individual In will stay where it is, in particular, hn(Gn(mt−1)) = αn
when In is alone (Gn(mt−1) = {n}). The staying propensity is assumed to be one of the
characteristics that makes up the type of an individual. However, when present in a group
(|Gn(mt−1)| > 1), individual In would take into account the benefit of remaining in that group.
The benefit βi of group member Ii to others depends upon its interactive strategy, the second
characteristic that makes up the type of an individual. It will be assumed that there are two
interactive strategies, cooperate (C) and defect (D). The benefit function, βi is then defined as
follows
βi =
βC if Ii is a cooperator,βD if Ii is a defector (6.7)
where βC and βD are the benefits of being with a cooperator and defector, respectively. The
benefit of group Gn(mt−1) to individual In is then defined as follows
βGn(mt−1)\{n} =
∑
i∈Gn(mt−1)\{n}
βi. (6.8)
Finally, combining the effects of the staying propensity and the group benefit, in the rest of
the chapter the staying probability is expressed as the following sigmoid function
hn(Gn(mt−1)) = αn
αn + (1− αn)SβGn(mt−1)\{n}
(6.9)
where 0 < S < 1 is the sensitivity shown to group members. So, for example, S → 0 implies that
In shows great sensitivity and would move away immediately if remaining in group Gn(mt−1)
is unattractive, which is the case when βGn(mt−1)\{n} < 0. An alternative way of representing
the S → 0 limit involves the staying probability being defined using the following step function
hn(Gn(mt−1)) =

0 |Gn(mt−1)| > 1 and βGn(mt−1)\{n} < 0,
αn |Gn(mt−1)| = 1,
1 |Gn(mt−1)| > 1 and βGn(mt−1)\{n} ≥ 0.
(6.10)
For example, if αn = 0 ∀n, βC = 0 and βD < 0 then the attractiveness of a group is completely
determined by the presence or absence of defectors. An individual would therefore leave with
probability 1 if a defector is present in the group. This was referred to as the ‘walk away’
strategy in [1].
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6.2.2 Fitness
For the Markov movement model the mean fitness contribution given by equation (4.15, pg. 89)
simplifies to
f¯n,t =
∑
m
∑
m<t
fn,t(m|m<t)pt(m|mt−1)P (m<t) (6.11)
It will be assumed that the fitness contribution fn,t(m|m<t) of an individual depends upon
(direct) group interactions and whether a movement has been made.
For the group interactions, the multiplayer public goods game as in Section 4.3.2 (pg. 95)
will be considered. However, instead of dividing the payoffs by the cost K, they will be dividing
by the background payoff R such that the reduced reward is given by v = V/R and the reduced
cost is given by c = K/R. This means that the base payoff has been normalised to 1 and the
reward v and cost c are multiples of the base payoff. The cost cannot exceed 1 in order to
prevent the fitness contribution from going negative (this is done for convenience of calculation;
it is important that total fitness is not negative, and large costs could be dealt with, if necessary,
by truncating the resulting total fitness at 0). The direct group interaction payoff functions are
then defined as follows
Rn(Gn(m)) =

1 + |Gn(m)|C−1|Gn(m)|−1 v − c In cooperator and |Gn(m)| > 1,
1− c In cooperator and |Gn(m)| = 1,
1 + |Gn(m)|C|Gn(m)|−1v In defector and |Gn(m)| > 1,
1 In defector and |Gn(m)| = 1
(6.12)
where |G|C is the number of cooperators in group G.
An individual will pay a cost of λ for every movement that it makes. The movement cost
is chosen so that it does not exceed the direct group interaction payoff an individual receives
(for the same reasons as for the cooperative cost c, and large movement costs could be similarly
accommodated if necessary), that is 0 ≤ λ < min(Rn(Gn(m))). The fitness contribution is then
given by
fn(m,Gn(m)|mt−1) =
Rn(Gn(m))− λ m 6= mt−1,Rn(Gn(m)) m = mt−1. (6.13)
6.2.3 Evolutionary dynamics
For the Markov movement model the mean replacement weight contribution given by equation
(4.21, pg. 90) simplifies to
u¯i,j,t =
∑
m
∑
m<t
ui,j,t(m|m<t)pt(m|mt−1)P (m<t). (6.14)
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It will be assumed that the replacement weight contribution will only depend upon the direct
group. As in the territorial raider model (see Section 4.3.3 pg. 98), the replacement weight
contribution will depend upon the amount of time spent with each individual. In particular, it
is assumed that an individual spends an equal amount of time with each individual in the group
excluding itself. However, if the individual is alone, then it effectively allocates all the time to
itself. The replacement weight contribution function is then defined as follows
ui,j(Gi(m)) =

1/|Gi(m) \ {i}| i 6= j and j ∈ Gi(m),
0 i 6= j and j /∈ Gi(m),
1 i = j and |Gi(m)| = 1,
0 i = j and |Gi(m)| > 1.
(6.15)
6.2.4 The evolutionary Markov chain
The evolution of the population can now be described in terms of a Markov chain. It will be
assumed that there are only two types of individuals in the population, which are labelled A and
B. What exactly makes a type A or B individual would depend upon its interactive strategy
and staying propensity. For example, setting A = C0.1 and B = D0.5 means that type A is a
cooperator with a staying propensity of 0.1 and type B is a defector with staying propensity 0.5,
or setting A = C0.1 and B = C0.2 means that both types have the same behavioural strategy
but different staying propensities. However, the important thing to note is that, at any one
time, there are only two unique types A and B in the population. Since there are only two
types in the population, the fixation probability is calculated in the same way as described in
section 4.3.4 pg. 99. However, in this chapter an arithmetic mean of the fixation probabilities
is used because there is an insignificant difference to the temperature weighted mean.
Simulating the evolutionary Markov chain
The method used in this chapter to calculate the fixation probability is a semi-analytic one
where the fitnesses of individuals are found by simulation, and these results are then used to
evolve the population using the evolutionary Markov chain, which results in a more accurate
solution than simulating the whole process (the movement process is too complex to allow for a
fully analytic solution).
In this model an exploration time T is selected, which is the number of steps an individual
takes moving around the region before returning to its home place. Individuals start on their
home place and are then allowed to move T times such that their fitness contribution is calculated
for each of these movements; the total of these T fitness contributions gives their fitness for one
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simulation. The position of the individuals is then reset, that is, they return to their home place
before the next simulation is run. Their average fitness for 10,000 simulations is used in the
evolutionary Markov chain.
To calculate the replacement weights, individuals start on their home place and move only
one time to determine their replacement weight. This represents individuals returning to their
home place to reproduce, with individuals being replaced according to the corresponding local
connections. This counts as one simulation and, before the next simulation is run, the position
of the individuals is reset so they all start in their home place. The replacement weights are
calculated exactly because they comprise only one movement. This involves calculating the
probability that an individual is alone, which gives the self-replacement weight. The other
replacement weights are simply 1 minus the self-replacement weight divided by N − 1 because
the probability of replacing the other individuals is the same for a complete graph.
The fitnesses and the replacement weights are all that is required to construct the transition
probabilities of the evolutionary Markov chain. The transition probabilities are substituted into
equation (1.6, pg. 29), given in its more general form here, to give the fixation probability of i
type A mutants in a population of N − i type B residents as follows
ρAi =
1 +
∑i−1
j=1
∏j
k=1
P−k
P+k
1 +
∑N−1
j=1
∏j
k=1
P−k
P+k
(6.16)
where P−k (P
+
k ) is the backward (forward) transition probability for a state with k type A
individuals. Note that this formula can easily be modified to find the fixation probability of
type B individuals.
The advantage of such an approach is that the fixation probability can be calculated relatively
quickly starting from any state. However, this approach necessarily requires that the population
being modelled has individuals who can differ only in terms of their type. This is ensured by
assuming that there is a complete population structure with N places such that each individual
has their own home place.
6.3 Results
In this section the effect of the model parameters on the fixation probability are investigated.
In particular, how the model parameters affect assortment is investigated, which is the mecha-
nism that allows cooperation to evolve as shown in [26]. There is positive assortment between
cooperators if they are more likely to interact with other cooperators than defectors. In the
model considered here, this occurs due to an increase (decrease) in the time it takes for defec-
tors (cooperators) to find cooperators. According to [24] the time to find cooperators should
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depend upon the density of the population and an individual’s movement speed. In their model,
N individuals pair up with one another to form a coalition such that the probability of a pair
forming is exponentially distributed with rate µ, which is a function of N and the population
density. The time to find cooperators in their model is essentially determined by the rate µ.
There is a one-to-one correspondence between individuals and places and therefore the density
remains constant; on the other hand, since a complete graph is considered, the movement speed
is high as individuals can directly get from one place to another. Therefore, the time it takes
to find cooperators is mostly determined by the staying propensity of the individuals’, however,
this relationship is not so straightforward as it is not globally controlled and the individuals
may have different staying propensities (which are subject to the evolutionary process). This
means that some individuals may find cooperators faster than others. The parameters used in
the simulations are summarised in Table 6.2.
Apart from an individual’s interactive strategy and staying propensity, all other parameters
are considered to be fixed. Each individual inherits these two characteristics from its parent, and
different interactive strategies or staying propensities are introduced into the population through
mutations. Staying propensities can take any value 0.01m for m = 1, . . . , 99; this means that
no individual moves all the time or never, and so makes some adjustment to their behaviour
depending upon the group they are in. In particular, max(α) = 0.99; some movement is a
necessary requirement otherwise the replacement weights would be zero and there would be no
evolution within the population. In a real world setting, a minimum movement requirement can
be explained by, for example, foraging behaviour where an individual searches its environment
to find food and therefore needs to move in order to survive.
The mutations of these characteristics are sufficiently infrequent that the population is as-
sumed to consist of a maximum of two types; resident and mutant, whose competition will
result in fixation of one of the types before a new mutant appears. Two different scenarios are
considered to account for the different mutation rates of each characteristic.
6.3.1 Scenario A: Interactive strategy mutations are rare
As previously stated, it is assumed that fixation happens much faster than new mutations arise.
A mutation can result in a change of the interactive strategy and/ or the staying propensity.
In this scenario, the mutation rate of an individual’s interactive strategy is much slower than
the rate of mutations that involve their staying propensity. Since it is much more likely that
the staying propensity mutates than the interactive strategy does, once one of the interactive
strategies (cooperate or defect) is removed from the population, it will be a long time before
a new mutant involving this strategy appears. During this time, there will be a sequence of
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Parameter Set 1 2 3 4 5 6
N 10 10 10 20 10 10
T 10 5 25 10 10 10
λ Variable Variable Variable Variable 0.20 0.20
c 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.09
v 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.4 Variable Variable
Table 6.2: Parameters used for the simulations. The other parameters are fixed such that
the population has a complete structure with each individual having its own home, βC = 1,
βD = −1, S = 0.03 and the dynamics used are BDB.
contests among individuals with the same interactive strategy but different staying propensities
and the population will eventually evolve to the point where all individuals have the same
interactive strategy and are using a (strict) Nash equilibrium staying propensity (a strict Nash
equilibrium propensity is one where the fixation probability is maximised and changing the
staying propensity is disadvantageous). Eventually, a mutant with a different interactive strategy
and staying propensity will appear, and the quantity of interest at this point is the fixation
probability of this mutant type. It will be assumed that the staying propensity of the mutant
can be different from the Nash equilibrium staying propensity of the resident population it is
invading. The resident population will therefore be stable if it can resist invasion from a mutant
using any staying propensity. Rather than considering any arbitrary mutant, the focus will be
on the mutant most likely to invade, i.e. one maximising its fixation probability.
Cooperator residents are of the type CγR where their Nash equilibrium staying propensity
γR is the staying propensity where a = b in the set{
(a, b) : ρCa,Cb1 = max
(
ρCc,Cb1 : c ∈ (0, 1)
)
and b ∈ (0, 1)
}
.
In this set all the points (a, b) are identified where a is the best response staying propensity of
1 individual of type Ca when playing against N − 1 individual of type Cb, who are using some
arbitrary staying propensity b. Therefore, at the point where a = b, Ca is a best response to
itself, i.e. a Nash equilibrium.
A defector mutant is of the type DδM where the staying propensity δM satisfies
ρ
DδM ,CγR
1 = max
(
ρ
Dc,CγR
1 : c ∈ (0, 1)
)
.
Defector residents are of the type D0.99 (i.e. in the equivalent terminology to the above
δR = 0.99) where their Nash equilibrium staying propensity is max(α) = 0.99 whenever the
movement cost is greater than 0 because the only way for them to maximize their fixation
probability is by moving as little as possible.
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A cooperator mutant is of the type CγM where the staying propensity γM satisfies
ρ
CγM ,D0.99
1 = max
(
ρCc,D0.991 : c ∈ (0, 1)
)
.
The Nash equilibrium staying propensity of the resident cooperators γR is calculated as
follows. The fixation probability of one individual of the type Ca against N − 1 residents of the
type Cb is calculated for all values of a in the range [max(0.01, b − 0.09),min(b + 0.09, 0.99)],
and the value of a that gives the highest fixation probability is picked. Note that using a wider
range of values for a gives the same result so this range is used for efficiency. The N−1 residents
then use the staying propensity a that was picked and this process is repeated several times.
After around 20 repetitions, the staying propensity that gives the maximum fixation probability
remains the same, that is, it is a (strict) Nash equilibrium because it is a best response to itself
and any other strategy will be disadvantageous. Therefore, γR is set to the value of a obtained
after 20 repetitions. It is hypothesized that there is only one solution to the Nash equilibrium
staying propensity. The reason for this is that, as seen in Figure 6.1, the Nash equilibrium
staying propensity of one type Ca against N − 1 type Cb is relatively flat. This means that
the Nash equilibrium staying propensity is predominantly determined by the movement cost λ
regardless of what the other players are doing. Therefore, there is only one intersection point
with the line a = b as shown in Figure 6.1, which gives the Nash equilibrium staying propensity
γR of resident cooperators.
The effect of the movement cost
In Figure 6.2 the effect of the movement cost is shown. In particular, it increases the time it
takes to find cooperators by increasing the staying propensity, that is, γR, γM , δM are positively
correlated with movement cost; the (partial) exception is resident defectors, which have a staying
propensity of max(α) = 0.99 regardless of the movement cost.
For very low movement cost, both mutant types have a significantly lower staying propensity
than the resident population that they are invading. They can therefore invade the resident
population because they take less time to find cooperators.
For higher, but still low, movement costs, whilst mutant cooperators can still invade, mutant
defectors cannot. Here the resident cooperators are better at preventing invasion even when
δM < γR for some values of the movement cost. This is because the movement cost impacts
the invading mutant defector more adversely than the resident cooperators, who on average
leave and regroup less often than a defector who will be repeatedly deserted by its cooperator
groupmates.
For intermediate movement costs, neither mutant type can invade. At this point, since
δM > γR, a mutant defector is slower at finding cooperators than the resident cooperators and
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Figure 6.1: This plot shows the Nash equilib-
rium staying propensities for 1 type Ci indi-
vidual playing against N − 1 type Cj individ-
uals. Parameter set 1 is used with λ = 0.2 and
i, j ∈ {0.01, 0.02, . . . , 0.99}. The intersection
point of the plots gives the cooperator resident
Nash equilibrium staying propensity γR, which
is somewhere between 0.3 and 0.4. This value
is similar to the one obtained using the itera-
tive method (see Figure 6.2). The values from
the current figure are approximate only because
of the jagged nature of the lines; these occur
because of the very large number of simulations
that would be necessary to obtain a smooth ver-
sion (the figure uses 10000 simulations for each
combination). The figure is used to illustrate
the uniqueness of the solution only.
therefore cannot take advantage of them. For a mutant cooperator, γM becomes much larger
thereby diminishing their advantage over the resident defectors, in particular, not only are they
paying a higher movement cost but it takes longer to find the other cooperators, which in turn
reduces the amount of time that they can spend with them.
For high movement costs, defecting mutants can invade, but cooperator mutants cannot. At
this point all types have a large staying propensity and therefore do not interact much with one
another. However, a mutant defector is helped by the fact that the resident cooperators always
pay a cooperating cost that they now find difficult to recoup because they are moving very little
and also paying a very large movement cost whenever they do so.
The effect of the exploration time
The exploration time T plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation. Changing the
exploration time has a minimal effect on the time it takes to find cooperators because it will not
alter the speed of movement of the individuals. This is because a complete graph is used and
individuals can directly get from one place to any other. However, increasing the exploration
time has a positive effect on the coalition time, that is, the amount of time that cooperators
spend cooperating with one another. [24] showed that increasing the coalition time helps with
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Figure 6.2: These plots show the effect of movement cost on the evolution of cooperation using
parameter set 1. The left (centre) plot shows the staying propensities δR = 0.99 (γR) for
resident defectors (cooperators) and γM (δM ) for a mutant cooperator (defector) used to invade
the resident population. The right plot shows the fixation probability of a mutant cooperator
CγM (defector DδM ) against N − 1 resident defectors D0.99 (cooperators CγR).
the evolution of cooperation. In the model considered here, one explanation for this is that the
fitness of the individuals, which is the average reward over the exploration time, will naturally
have a higher value the larger the coalition time.
In Figure 6.3 reducing the exploration time T from 10 to 5 steps decreases the coalition
time which adversely affects the cooperators. One of the key differences is that the resident
cooperators now find it much more difficult to prevent invasion from a mutant defector. The
shape of the plot for a mutant cooperator is largely the same but with a consistently lower
fixation probability. In Figure 6.4 increasing the exploration time T from 10 to 25 steps benefits
the cooperators. Not only does it help the resident cooperators prevent invasion from a mutant
defector but it also increases the success of an invading mutant cooperator. This again has to
do with the increased coalition time that allows the cooperators to increase their fitness.
The effect of population size
Increasing the population size has a positive impact on the evolution of cooperation because
it increases the time it takes to find cooperators. Note that it is assumed that there is a one-
to-one correspondence between individuals and places and therefore increasing the number of
individuals also increases the number of places. Even though the density remains the same, there
would be more places for the individuals to search in order to find cooperators thereby increasing
the overall time it takes to find cooperators. In particular, an individual that is currently not
in a cooperating group will have to search N − 1 places to find one, therefore, the probability of
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Figure 6.3: Plots created using parameter set 2. The exploration time T has been decreased
from 10 to 5.
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Figure 6.4: Plots created using parameter set 3. The exploration time T has been increased
from 10 to 25.
a defector finding a cooperating group decreases as N gets larger. This means that cooperators
would do better, which is indeed the case as seen in Figure 6.5 where the population size has
been doubled from 10 to 20. One of the key differences to the previous plots is that a mutant
defector cannot invade even for very low movement cost in a large population.
The effect of reward and cost
The reward to cost ratio v/c is important because, even if other external factors favour cooper-
ation, cooperation will not evolve if the reward to cost ratio is too low. This is seen in Figure
6.6 where the cost is set to 0.04 with the reward written as a multiple of the cost. When v/c is
low, a mutant cooperator cannot invade but a mutant defector can. This is simply because the
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Figure 6.5: Plots created using parameter set 4. The population size has been increased from
10 to 20.
value of v/c is too low to promote cooperation. Increasing v/c makes cooperation more viable
and, in particular, it allows a mutant cooperator to reduce the time it takes to find cooperators
by reducing its staying propensity. It becomes more difficult for a mutant defector to invade
because, on average, resident cooperators move less than the mutant defector as they are more
in number and the larger v/c helps them quickly recoup any movement cost they incur whilst
evading the mutant defector. This is the case even when δ < γR, that is, a mutant defector
takes less time to find cooperators. For comparison with a different value of v/c, in Figure 6.7
the cost is set to 0.09. However, there is no fundamental change in what happens and the figure
is very similar to the one where c = 0.04.
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Figure 6.6: Plots have been created using parameter set 5. The plots here are against the reward
to cost ratio v/c such that c = 0.04.
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Figure 6.7: Plots have been created using parameter set 6. The plots here are against the reward
to cost ratio v/c such that c = 0.09.
6.3.2 Scenario B: Interactive strategy mutation is not rare
In this scenario, the mutation rate of an individual’s interactive strategy is not much slower
than that of their staying propensity. Since the staying propensity would take a number of
mutations to reach the right level for any scenario, any successful strategy will have to repeatedly
face individuals of both types. The (strict) Nash equilibrium staying propensity will then be
determined in a mixed population, i.e. there are individuals of both types. For simplicity only
one mixed state is chosen to determine the Nash equilibrium staying propensity which is the
one where there are N/2 individuals of each type. The Nash equilibrium staying propensity for
each type is therefore the one in which the fixation probability from the mixed state of each
type is maximised.
Resident and mutant defectors are of the same type Dδ. Similarly, resident and mutant
cooperators are of the same type Cγ . The Nash equilibrium staying propensities δ and γ are
determined by the intersection of the following two sets{
(a, b) : ρCa,DbN/2 = max
(
ρCc,DbN/2 : c ∈ (0, 1)
)
and b ∈ (0, 1)
}
,{
(a, b) : ρDb,CaN/2 = max
(
ρDc,CaN/2 : c ∈ (0, 1)
)
and a ∈ (0, 1)
}
.
In the first set the Nash equilibrium staying propensity a is found for N/2 type Ca playing
against N/2 type Db, where b is some arbitrary staying propensity. In the second set the Nash
equilibrium staying propensity b is found for N/2 type Db playing against N/2 type Ca, where
a is some arbitrary staying propensity. The point at which these two sets intersect is (γ, δ), that
is, both types will be using their Nash equilibrium staying propensities.
To calculate γ and δ a similar iterative procedure from scenario A is used. To initialise the
iterative procedure some staying propensities a0 and b0 are arbitrarily chosen, and the iterative
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step is as follows. The fixation probability of N/2 type Ca individuals against N/2 type Db0 is
calculated for all values of a in the range [max(0.01, a0−0.09),min(a0+0.09, 0.99)]. The staying
propensity a that gives the maximum fixation probability is picked, which is labelled a1. The
fixation probability of N/2 type Db individuals against N/2 type Ca1 is then calculated for all
values of b in the range [max(0.01, b0−0.09),min(b0+0.09, 0.99)]. The staying propensity b that
gives the maximum fixation probability is picked, which is labelled b1. Note that using a wider
ranges for a and b gives the same result so these ranges were used for efficiency. After around
20 repetitions of the iterative step, the staying propensities a20 and b20 remain the same. Note
that any other values would be disadvantageous and, therefore, for these values the population
is at a (strict) Nash equilibrium. The values of γ and δ are then set to a20 and b20 respectively,
i.e. γ = a20 and δ = b20.
It is hypothesized that γ and δ are unique. For cooperators, their Nash equilibrium staying
propensity is relatively stable because it is predominantly determined by the movement cost
regardless of what the defectors are doing. As seen in Figure 6.8, the plot for this is a roughly
vertical line. For defectors, their Nash equilibrium staying propensity is negatively correlated
with the staying propensity of the cooperators given that the movement cost is not too large,
otherwise it would be max(α). In Figure 6.8, the plot for this slopes downwards as the staying
propensity of the cooperators increases. There is therefore only one intersection point of the
two curves that gives γ and δ.
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Figure 6.8: This plot shows the Nash equilib-
rium staying propensities for N/2 cooperators
and N/2 defectors. Parameter set 1 is used
with λ = 0.2 and the staying propensities are
chosen from the set {0.01, 0.02, . . . , 0.99}. The
Nash equilibrium staying propensities cross at
one point only where γ ≈ 0.7 and δ ≈ 0.5.
These values are similar to those obtained us-
ing the iterative method described earlier (see
Figure 6.9). As before, the values from the cur-
rent figure are approximate only because of the
jagged nature of the lines; the figure is used to
illustrate the uniqueness of the solution only.
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The effect of movement cost
As in scenario A, the movement cost increases the staying propensity of the individuals and,
therefore, increases the time it takes to find cooperators. As seen in Figure 6.9, what happens in
this case is quite different to the situation in scenario A. Here, the mutant cooperator does not
benefit from the fact that the resident defectors have a very high staying propensity as in scenario
A. In this case, δ changes with the movement cost in a similar way that γ changes. Therefore,
the key difference here is that a mutant cooperator cannot invade for very low movement cost
because the resident defectors have a very low staying propensity, which means that they take
much less time to find cooperators.
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Figure 6.9: These plots show the effect of movement cost λ on the evolution of cooperation and
are created using parameter set 1. The plot on the left shows the Nash equilibrium staying
propensity γ for cooperators and δ for defectors in a mixed population where there are N/2
individuals of each type. The plot in the centre shows the fixation probability of each type from
the mixed state with N/2 individuals of each type. The plot on the right shows the fixation
probability of a mutant cooperator Cγ (defector Dδ) in a population of N − 1 resident defectors
Dδ (cooperators Cγ).
The effect of exploration time
As in scenario A, the cooperators do worse when the exploration time is lower; this is shown in
Figure 6.10 where T is decreased from 10 to 5, and in Figure 6.11 where T is increased from 10
to 25. The explanation is as in scenario A where the coalition time is lower when the exploration
time is lower and the coalition time increases, since, as previously seen, increasing the coalition
time helps the cooperators do better.
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Figure 6.10: Plots created using parameter set 2. Plots are as in Figure 6.9 with exploration
time T decreased from 10 to 5.
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Figure 6.11: Plots created using parameter set 3. Plots are as in Figure 6.9 with exploration
time T increased from 10 to 25.
The effect of population size
Similarly to scenario A, increasing the population size helps cooperators as shown in Figure 6.12,
where N is increased from 10 to 20. As before, increasing the population size increases the time
it takes to find cooperators because there is a one-to-one correspondence between individuals
and places. Increasing the population size therefore increases the number of places that need to
be searched to find cooperators. Furthermore, as in scenario A, a mutant defector can no longer
invade resident cooperators for a very small movement cost.
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Figure 6.12: Plots created using parameter set 4. Plots are as in Figure 6.9 with population size
N increased from 10 to 20.
The effect of reward and cost
For a mutant defector, the effect of the reward to cost ratio v/c is the same as in scenario A.
However, a mutant cooperator does not do better with increasing v/c. In this scenario, the
fixation probability of a mutant cooperator peaks, then starts dropping, as v/c is increased.
This is because the resident defectors have a very low staying propensity, and are therefore
faster at finding cooperators, making it difficult for a mutant cooperator to invade because it
cannot avoid the defectors. This is shown in Figure 6.13 where c = 0.04. Increasing the cost
c though, makes it even more difficult for the cooperators regardless of v/c. In Figure 6.14, a
mutant cooperator cannot invade for any v/c. This is because a larger c reduces the cooperators’
background fitness by a larger amount, increasing the handicap that the cooperators already
have.
6.3.3 The effect of other parameters
The effects of other parameters are not shown using plots but will be explained in this section.
Making the individuals more sensitive to their group members by decreasing the sensitivity
parameter S improves the chances of cooperation evolving. In equation (6.9), it can be seen
that decreasing S will increase the size of the denominator if the group benefit is negative,
thereby increasing the probability that an individual moves away from its current position if it
is undesirable to stay. Therefore, as S → 0 the more sensitive individuals become, which helps
the evolution of cooperation because it reduces the exploitation of cooperators (cooperators are
now more likely to move away if the group they are in becomes undesirable).
Another way in which the group member sensitivity can be changed is by choosing βA > 0
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Figure 6.13: Plots created using parameter set 5. Plots are as in Figure 6.9 but λ is fixed and
reward to cost ratio v/c varied such that c = 0.04.
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Figure 6.14: Plots created using parameter set 5. Plots are as in Figure 6.9 but λ is fixed and
reward to cost ratio v/c varied such that c = 0.09.
and βB < 0 such that βB/βA → −∞. As seen in equation (6.9), this will cause the group benefit
to become negative very quickly in the presence of a defector, even if there are significantly more
cooperators present. Once again, this reduces the exploitation of cooperators by defectors, hence,
improving the chances that cooperation evolves.
In all of the plots shown, only BDB dynamics is used because the effect of a change to
other dynamics is quite small. The reason for this is that the evolutionary graph is always
complete, that is, whilst the replacement weights change, all individuals can still replace one
other. For example, in the case of DBB dynamics, to make a significant difference a defector
randomly chosen for death should be more likely to be replaced with the offspring of a cooperator.
However, this is not the case here and, in particular, the only way the evolutionary graph can
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be changed is by changing the staying propensity such that increasing the staying propensity
increases the probability that an individual replaces itself. Therefore, the dynamics overall have
a small effect. Note that this would not be the case for some other underlying structure that
was not complete.
6.4 Discussion
In this chapter the framework of Broom-Rychtar (Chapter 4) is used to model the evolution of
a mobile population in which the movement of the individuals is Markov such that the place an
individual moves to next depends upon their current position. In the (generalized) territorial
raider model (Chapters 4 and 5), individuals moved independently of their current position so
the Markov movement model in this chapter gives a different perspective on the movement of
individuals in relation to the evolution of cooperation.
The Markov movement model considers the movement of individuals that depend upon
population history. Here, individuals make a decision of whether they should stay or leave their
current position depending upon the other individuals present with them in the same place.
This movement strategy is akin to the “walk away” strategy of [1, 2]. However, note that this
is only one interpretation that can be used for the Markov movement model. The framework
provides the tools to construct different kinds of Markov movement behaviour. For example,
in [25], individuals would study all surrounding areas before making a decision about where
to move to next. In terms of the framework, individuals would consider a larger subset of the
current population distribution rather than just the distribution of individuals that are currently
present with each other. Both simple and complex Markov movement behaviour provide useful
insight into the movement behaviour of individuals.
For cooperation to evolve, [26] showed that there should be assortment, in particular there
should be a mechanism that allows the cooperators to increase their preference for interacting
with other cooperators. Here, this mechanism is provided by the Markov movement of the indi-
viduals. The results presented here are in line with [2] who also modelled the Markov movement
of individuals where individuals would stay where they are if the payoff they received was above
some minimum threshold. However, the Markov movement model in this chapter uses a struc-
ture that is substantially different. A complete graph is used with one-to-one correspondence
between individuals and places instead of a two-dimensional array. This means that there is a
high potential movement speed as individuals can go directly from one place to another, which
is mitigated in the Markov movement model with the introduction of a movement cost. A higher
staying propensity slows down an individual because they are more likely to stay where they are.
Individuals use the staying propensity that maximises their fixation probability. Two different
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scenarios were considered where the staying propensity of an individual mutates very quickly or
slowly. The key difference between the two scenarios was that a mutant cooperator can invade a
resident population of defectors for very low movement cost if their staying propensity mutates
very slowly.
The BDB dynamics used here allows cooperation to evolve even though typically selection
does not favour cooperators with these dynamics [70]. Other dynamics that favour cooperators
showed little improvement over the results obtained for BDB dynamics. This shows that Markov
movement is quite effective in allowing cooperation to evolve. Its effectiveness is further backed
up by the fact that the structure of the evolutionary graph is complete, which is known to be
detrimental for cooperators [70]. In particular, in a complete evolutionary graph all individuals
can replace each other and, therefore, the individuals with the highest fitness are more likely to
be favoured by selection. This shows that conditional movement makes the choice of dynamics
being used less important.
The results of the generalized territorial raider model given in chapter 5 and the Markov
movement model are consistent with one another in that they both require cooperators to spend
more time with one another in order to allow cooperation to evolve. The territorial raider model
achieves this through stronger subpopulation interactions where as the Markov movement model
achieves this through strategic movement. Strategic movement is more realistic than the naive
approach used in the territorial raider model because it allows for the fact that individuals
move away from adversity. Furthermore, strategic movement is more robust in terms of the
dynamics used. The territorial raider model requires that BDD or DBB dynamics are used for
cooperation to evolve and, on the other hand, either BDB, DBD, BDD or DBB dynamics work
for the Markov movement model.
The results in this chapter apply to places whose connections between them represent a
complete graph. For more general graphs, further study will have to be carried out, though,
the current study on a complete graph does give some intuition in terms of what to expect.
For example, with the complete graph, it is possible for cooperators to escape defectors more
easily but, in a graph with less connections, there are fewer places a cooperator can escape to
and also fewer places for a defector to search for cooperators, which would adversely affect the
level of cooperation. Similarly, for graphs with hubs that individuals are forced to go through
would make it difficult for cooperators as they may have to go through these hubs, which may
be populated by defectors. Overall, the key difference that will be observed is that the starting
position of a cooperator or defector will play a crucial role in their success in heterogeneous
graph structures.
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Chapter 7
Alternative Dynamics
7.1 Introduction
This chapter utilizes the territorial raider population evolution model of chapter 4 to study
alternative dynamics that can be used. Whilst these dynamics are applied to the territorial
raider model, they are compatible with the fully independent movement model of the frame-
work of Broom-Rychta´rˇ. They are therefore compatible with the generalized territorial raider
model (Chapter 5) and, under certain assumptions, the Markov movement model (Chapter 6).
These alternative definitions are obtained by altering the definition of the replacement weight
contributions ui,j(m,G) in equation (4.24, pg. 91), reproduced here,
wi,j =
∑
m
∑
G
i,j∈G
ui,j(m,G)χ(m,G). (7.1)
Recall that wi,j are the replacement weights that represent the replacement graph, i.e. it deter-
mines which individual an offspring can replace. These newly defined replacement weights wi,j
can then be used with the standard dynamics given in Table 4.2 (pg. 91). However, some of the
alternative definitions given here cannot be used with the standard dynamics.
The objective of this chapter is not to provide an exhaustive list of dynamics that can be
used with the BR framework but to illustrate how they can be constructed. Analysis is carried
out for the alternative dynamics defined in order to better understand them and compare them
with those used in the previous chapters and, therefore, justify why they were used.
7.2 Standard Dynamics with Selection Bias
Before defining different replacement weights, a definition of the standard dynamics with a
selection bias parameter are given. The selection bias parameter, x, varies the bias that selection
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Standard dynamics with selection bias
BD bi =
F 1−xi∑
n F
1−x
n
, di,j =
wi,jF
−x
j∑
n wi,nF
−x
n
DB dj =
F−1+xj∑
n F
−1+x
n
, bi,j =
wi,jF
x
i∑
n wn,jF
x
n
L ri,j =
wi,jF
1−x
i /F
−x
j∑
n wn,kF
1−x
n /F
−x
k
Table 7.1: Evolutionary dynamics rewritten using the selection bias parameter x. The selection
bias parameter x permits changing the bias that selection has towards the birth and death
processes.
has towards the birth process and death process. The standard dynamics with selection bias
are given in Table 7.1. In the case of the birth-death (BD) dynamics, x = 0 (x = 1) implies
that selection happens only in the birth (death) process. For x ∈ (0, 1), selection happens in
both processes, for example, when x = 0.5 selection is equally biased towards the birth and
death processes. The link dynamics are set up in a similar way to the BD dynamics. On the
other hand, for death-birth (DB) dynamics, x = 0 (x = 1) implies that selection happens only
in the death (birth) process and x ∈ (0, 1) implies that selection happens in both the death and
birth processes. Note that it is set up in this way because x = 0 (x = 1) implies that selection
happens in the first (second) process which is birth (death) for the BD and the opposite for DB.
With link dynamics, the ordering of birth and death is ambiguous so the same convention as
BD is used.
Defining the dynamics in this way generalises the standard dynamics by bridging the gap
between selection on the birth and death events making them more useful in the context of
evolutionary graph theory. One of the advantages is that they are now more suitable when
checking for sensitivity. For example, some of the results obtained hold for the extreme cases
where selection happens in the birth or death event, i.e. x = 0 or 1 in BD dynamics. By
weakening this assumption, it can be checked how sensitive the results are to it. The selection
bias parameter allows one to gradually weaken such assumptions. In particular, setting x = 0.5
implies that selection happens in both the birth and death events. Thereby, each event is given
equal importance and the results obtained should be less sensitive to either the the birth and
death events.
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7.3 Replacement weights that can be used with standard
dynamics
In this section various definition of the replacement weight contributions are given where the re-
placement weights generated are compatible with standard dynamics given in Table 4.2 (pg. 91).
In each case the replacement weight contribution ui,j(m,G) is some function proportional to the
probability of the birth individual Ii and death individual Ij meeting in place m in group G.
7.3.1 Definition 1
The replacement weight contribution is equal to the probability of Ii and Ij meeting in place
m in group G. This is a simple definition where the only feature of group G that matters is
whether Ii and Ij are in G, that is, they meet. Recall, that the probability of group G forming
in place m is χ(m,G), see equation (4.27, pg. 95). In the case of self-replacement, i.e. the birth
and death individuals are the same so i = j, the replacement weight contribution is χ(m,G) if
G = {i}, and 0 otherwise. This captures the notion that self-replacement should be proportional
to an individual being alone. The replacement weight contribution is then given by
ui,j(m,G) =
0 i = j ∧ |G| > 1,χ(m,G) otherwise. (7.2)
7.3.2 Definition 2
This is an extension of Def. 1, however, in this case χ(m,G) is divided by |G|, the size of group G.
The logic behind this is that Ii equally considers all the member of G including itself. Therefore,
smaller groups contribute more than larger groups, which makes sense because individuals Ii
and Ij would spend more time together in a smaller group than a larger group. In the case
of self-replacement, Ii is allowed to replace itself when present with other group members and
does not need to be alone, that is, there is in-group self-replacement. The replacement weight
contribution is then given by
ui,j(m,G) = χ(m,G)|G| . (7.3)
Note that there is no need to account for whether Ii is alone or not because of in-group self-
replacement.
7.3.3 Definition 3
This definition is used in the previous chapters where it was first defined in Section 4.3.3 (pg. 98).
It has been included for continuity as it is an extension of Def. 2. The main difference here is
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that in-group self-replacement is not allowed. Therefore, χ(m,G) is divided by |G| − 1, the size
of group G excluding Ii, and self-replacement is allowed only when Ii is alone. The replacement
weight contribution is then given by
ui,j(m,G) =

0 i = j ∧ |G| > 1
χ(m,G) i = j ∧ |G| = 1
χ(m,G)
|G| − 1 i 6= j
(7.4)
Def. 1 does not take into account the effect of other members in the group G in which Ii and Ij
meet and was therefore not used in the previous chapters. Furthermore, Def. 3 was favoured over
Def. 2 because the latter overemphasizes self-replacement because of in-group self-replacement
and the former does not. Note that there are other implications of in-group self-replacement
that are highlighted later in this chapter.
7.3.4 Definition 4
This definition, as in Def. 1, assumes that the replacement weight contribution is equal to the
probability of Ii and Ij meeting in place m in group G, however, in addition to this, part of the
self-replacement weight contribution is assigned to the other individuals proportional to how
often they meet. This then reduces self-replacement and increases the likelihood of replacing
another individual by emphasizing the connection between individuals based on how often they
meet. The replacement weight is given by
ui,j(m,G) =
χ(m,G)χ(m,G) i = j ∧ G = {i},χ(m,G) + χ(m,G)χ(m, {i}) otherwise. (7.5)
This definition differs from the previous three in that the replacement weights are not symmetric,
i.e wi,j 6= wj,i ∀i, j, except when all individuals have the same probability of being alone and
meeting one another.
7.3.5 Comparing the different weights
The territorial raider model (see Chapter 4 pg. 85) is used to make the comparisons. The
population structures used are the 4-vertex complete, line and star graphs and the game used
is the multiplayer public goods game. For the game, the reduced background fitness is set to
r = 10 and the reduced reward to v = 2. The following plots show an arithmetic mean of the
fixation probabilities instead of the temperature weighted mean because there is no significant
difference. In each of the plots the selection bias is set to 0.5, that is, selection is equally biased
towards birth and death.
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Figure 7.1 compares the different definitions for the BD dynamics. It is observed that Defs. 1
and 3 and are quite similar to one another in the sense that the fixation probabilities closely
follow one another, especially for the line and star graphs. There is a clear ranking amongst
the four definitions in terms of favouring the defectors over the cooperators. Def. 2 favours the
defectors the most and Def. 4 the least, with Defs. 1 and 3 falling almost halfway in between.
This is to be expected because Def. 2 allows in-group self-replacement. This means if individual
In is chosen for death and it has a higher fitness than the individuals that can replace it, In
is more likely to replace itself and this is even more likely to be so in the case of in-group self-
replacement. Note that for the public goods game the defectors generally have a higher fitness
and are therefore favoured. In Def. 4, where the likelihood of self-replacement is diminished,
the advantage of defectors is significantly eroded, especially for low home fidelity. Figure 7.2
compares the different definitions for the DB dynamics. The observations here are very similar
to the BD dynamics. In particular, there is a clear ranking between the four definitions with
Def. 2 favouring defectors the most and Def. 4 the least.
Figure 7.3 compares the different definitions for the Link dynamics. Here, Defs. 1, 2 and 3
all behave in the same way, which is drastically different from what was observed in the BD and
DB dynamics. This is the case because for all three definitions the replacement weight matrix
W = (wi,j) is symmetric, i.e. wi,j = wj,i ∀i, j. This means that W is a circulation, see Section
2.2.3 pg. 49. In the case of circulations, the replacement graph does not impact the fixation
probabilities and only the fitness of the individuals matter. In the case of constant fitness, this
is shown by Proposition 1 pg. 52. Therefore, the differences seen between the complete, line
and star graph are due to the fitnesses of the individuals. However, Def. 4 behaves differently
because the replacement weight matrix is not symmetric and, therefore, the structure of the
population impacts the fixation probability. The overall shape of the fixation probability curves
for the different graph structures are quite similar though. In particular, for low home fidelity
the defectors do very well but this drops off as the home fidelity increases. This would be due
to the fact that the interactions between the individuals would not be vastly different for these
small graphs, though, for larger graphs there could be a more substantial difference.
Figure 7.4 compares the BD, DB and Link dynamics for Def. 1. It can be observed that
the BD and DB dynamics are almost identical because the replacement graph W for Def. 1 is
symmetric. This means that whether birth occurs first or death is irrelevant so both BD and
DB behave almost identically. However, for significantly heterogeneous graphs, like the star,
this behaviour seems to break down with BD being slightly more favourable to the defectors
than DB. The link dynamics behaviour is vastly different from the BD and DB dynamics, most
notably it slopes upwards whilst the other two dynamics slopes downwards. The figures in
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Chapter 4 (pg. 85) for BD dynamics essentially behave like the LD dynamics here, therefore,
the effect observed here is due to the selection bias. Indeed, the selection bias is set to x = 0.5,
which means that for the BD (DB) dynamics the first event, birth (death), is influenced less by
selection and, therefore, subject more to chance. As shown in Section 5.3.1 (pg. 121) this favours
the less fit type, in this case cooperators, especially when self-replacement is low. Note that
the probability of self-replacement is low when the home fidelity is low but increases when the
home fidelity is high, hence the upward slope. In the star graph, self-replacement is lowest when
home fidelity is low as a lot of the individuals converge in the center vertex. The cooperators
are therefore at a much lesser disadvantage than for the other two graphs, so much so, that the
difference between the fixation probability of cooperators and defectors is narrower than for the
LD dynamics. This means that the plots for the LD and the other two dynamics cross over for
the star graph. For the other graphs, there is no cross over and LD seems less favourable to the
defectors than the other two dynamics.
Figure 7.5 compares the three dynamics for Def. 2. It is observed that BD and DB dynamics
are identical and this relationship does not break down for heterogeneous graphs because, in
this case, W is symmetric and doubly stochastic. This means that W is isothermal, see Section
2.2.3 pg. 49. As mentioned before, the order of the birth and death events becomes irrelevant,
and is stronger in the case when W is isothermal. With in-group replacement, the upward slope
disappears. Instead, there is a peak around home fidelity h = 1 for the line graph and, more
clearly, for the star graph. Where as, in the case of the complete graph, it is now downward
sloping. This is expected as self-replacement increases even for low home fidelity with in-group
self-replacement. Figure 7.6 compares the three dynamics for Def. 3. Here, the observations are
similar to those in Def. 1. However, note that W in this case is doubly stochastic and symmetric
as well, so DB and BD are identical in their behaviour. Figure 7.7 compares the three dynamics
for Def. 4. The observations here are characteristically similar to those in Defs. 1 and 3, but
the identical behaviour of DB and BD breaks down, more so than Def. 1, due to the lack of
symmetry in W, particularly for the line and star graphs. The other difference is that the
advantage of the defectors is significantly diminished, especially for the DB and BD dynamics.
This means that DB and BD dynamics are more responsive to there being less self-replacement
than Link dynamics.
Figure 7.8 compares different values of the selection bias for BD Def. 3 dynamics. The values
of the selection bias used are 0, 0.5 and 1. The most noticeable feature is that for x = 0.5, the
fixation probabilities lie in the middle of the cases where x = 0 and x = 1. This was somewhat to
be expected as selection is equally biased towards the birth and death events. For the complete
graph, the effect of the dynamics is consistent regardless of the selection bias, i.e. the fixation
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Figure 7.1: Comparison between Definitions 1, 2, 3 and 4 for BD dynamics. For the game r = 10
and v = 2. The selection bias is x = 0.5.
probability of each type converges as the home fidelity increases. For the line and star graphs,
this is the case when x = 0. However, when x = 0.5 or 1, the fixation probabilities initially
diverge before starting to converge again in the line and star graphs. This shows that, for low
values of home fidelity, as selection shifts to the second event (death in this case), the cooperators
do better. This is because, for low values of home fidelity, there is subgrouping behaviour as
seen in Chapter 5. Note that, as the home fidelity increases and subgrouping behaviour reduces,
there is a point at which the fixation probabilities are identical for all values of the selection
bias.
7.4 Replacement weights that cannot be used with stan-
dard dynamics
The definition of the replacement weights given in this section are applied in a different way
to the ones given in the previous section. In particular, the replacement weight contributions
are functions of the fitnesses of the individuals whose effect is controlled by the selection bias
parameter x. This means that the replacement weights cannot be used with the standard
dynamics. In this case, the replacement weights are not symmetric, i.e. wi,j 6= wj,i ∀i, j, and
changes whenever the state of the population changes because the fitnesses of the individuals
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Figure 7.2: Comparison between Definitions 1, 2, 3 and 4 for DB dynamics. For the game r = 10
and v = 2. The selection bias is x = 0.5.
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Figure 7.3: Comparison between Definitions 1, 2, 3 and 4 for Link dynamics. For the game
r = 10 and v = 2. The selection bias is x = 0.5.
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Figure 7.4: Comparison between BD, DB and Link dynamics for Def. 1. For the game r = 10
and v = 2. The selection bias is x = 0.5.
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Figure 7.5: Comparison between BD, DB and Link dynamics for Def. 2. For the game r = 10
and v = 2. The selection bias is x = 0.5.
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Figure 7.6: Comparison between BD, DB and Link dynamics for Def. 3. For the game r = 10
and v = 2. The selection bias is x = 0.5.
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Figure 7.7: Comparison between BD, DB and Link dynamics for Def. 4. For the game r = 10
and v = 2. The selection bias is x = 0.5.
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Figure 7.8: Comparing different values of the selection bias for BD Def. 3 dynamics. For the
game r = 10 and v = 2.
change. Overall, this means that the replacement weights cannot be used with the standard
definition of the dynamics.
7.4.1 Alternative Birth-Death (Alt. BD) Dynamics
These dynamics follow the same logic as the standard birth-death dynamics. In particular, with
probability bi an individual Ii is chosen for birth who then replaces individual Ij with probability
di,j so ri,j = bidi,j . The probability that individual Ii is chosen for birth is given by
bi =
F 1−xi∑
n F
1−x
n
. (7.6)
The replacement weights wi,j will still be used to determine the probabilities di,j . The replace-
ment weight contributions used to determine wi,j are an extension of Def. 3 above. In Def. 3,
individual Ii is equally likely to replace each member of the group it is present with, excluding
itself. Here, individual Ii is likely to replace a group member inversely proportional to their
fitness. This takes into account the fact that Ii is most likely to replace the weakest individual
163
it meets. The replacement weight contribution, for all G such that i, j ∈ G, is then given by
ui,j(m,G, x) =

0 i = j ∧ |G| > 1,
χ(m,G) i = j ∧ |G| = 1,
χ(m,G)F−xj∑
n∈G\{i}
F−xn
i 6= j.
(7.7)
Plugging the replacement weight contributions into equation (7.1) gives the replacement weights
wi,j . The probability di,j is then set to di,j = wi,j . Note that this is possible because W = (wi,j)
is right-stochastic, i.e. the rows sum to 1. The selection bias parameter x is used in both the
birth and death probabilities such that x = 0 (x = 1) implies that selection influences only the
birth (death) event. Note that for x = 0, Alt. BD. is identical to the standard BD with Def. 3.
7.4.2 Alternative DB (Alt. DB) Dynamics
These dynamics are defined in a similar fashion to the standard death-birth dynamics where
individual Ij is chosen for death with probability dj and is then replaced by individual Ii with
probability bi,j . The death probability is given by
dj =
F−1+xj
N∑
n=1
F−1+xn
. (7.8)
The birth probability is function of the replacement weights, which are defined using the re-
placement contributions that are an extension of Def. 3 given above. Rather than using an
equal weighting as in Def. 3, death individual Ij is most likely to be replaced by the fittest
group member and, therefore, the birth individual Ii is chosen proportional to its fitness. The
replacement weight contribution, for all groups G such that i, j ∈ G, is then given by
ui,j(m,G) =

0 i = j ∧ |G| > 1,
χ(m,G) i = j ∧ |G| = 1,
χ(m,G)F xi∑
n∈G\{j}
F xn
i 6= j.
(7.9)
The birth probability is then given by bi,j = wi,j where this is possible because W = (wi,j) is
left-stochastic, i.e. all columns sum to 1. The selection bias parameter x is once again used in
both the birth and death probabilities. For x = 0, selection only influences the death event,
which happens first, and Alt. DB is identical to standard DB with Def. 3. For x = 1, selection
only influences the birth event, which happens second.
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7.4.3 DB dynamics with no self-replacement (No self-rep. DB)
These dynamics are defined in the same way as Alt. DB with a slight adjustment replacement
weight contribution to prevent self-replacement. The self-replacement weight contribution is
set to zero, that is, uj,j(m,G, x) = 0 for j = 1, . . . , N . However, the probability that the
death individual Ij is alone, χ(m, {j}), still has to be accounted for. It is assumed that, when-
ever Ij is alone, Ii will replace Ij proportional to Ii, Ij meeting and the fitness of Ii, that
is, F xi
∑
m pi,mpj,m. This simply means that resampling takes place when Ij is alone. The
replacement weight contribution, for all G such that j ∈ G, is then given by
ui,j(m,G, x) =

0 i = j,
χ(m,G)F xi
M∑
m=1
pi,mpj,m
N∑
n=1
n 6=j
F xn
M∑
m=1
pn,mpj,m
i 6= j ∧ G = {j},
χ(m,G)F xi∑
n∈G
n 6=j
F xn
otherwise.
(7.10)
7.4.4 Comparing the different dynamics
Figure 7.9 compares the Alt. BD and standard BD Def. 3 dynamics. For Alt. BD the difference
between fixation probabilities converges even though its definition is derived from the standard
BD Def. 3 dynamics, where the fixation probabilities diverge. In particular, it was previously
mentioned that for the standard BD Def. 3 dynamics the fixation probabilities diverge because
the selection bias is set to x = 0.5. This implies that the first event, birth, is influenced more
by randomness with selection playing a smaller role. This gives the less fit cooperators a chance
to replace a fitter defector, especially when home fidelity is low and individuals are in groups
more often. The effect wears off as home fidelity increases, hence the divergence. However, for
Alt. BD dynamics the overall effect of selection gets muted the larger the value of the selection
bias gets. This is because, not only does selection take place in the second event, the effect of
fitness is concentrated within the groups that form. Note the difference between the fixation
probabilities is significantly narrower for Alt. BD than for standard BD Def. 3. However, when
the groups on average are large, as is the case with the star graph for low home-fidelity where
all individual converge to the center, it seems to match the standard BD Def. 3 dynamics.
Figure 7.9 compares the standard DB Def. 3 dynamics, Alt. DB and no self-rep. DB. Here,
standard DB Def. 3 dynamics and Alt. DB essentially behave in the same way as their BD
equivalents. The no self-rep. DB dynamics somewhat behaves like the Alt. DB dynamics since
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Figure 7.9: Comparison between Alt. BD and standard BD Def. 3. For the game r = 10 and
v = 2. The selection bias is x = 0.5.
the difference between the fixation probabilities is also compressed. For the complete graph, it
shows very little variability but for the star graph there is much more variation in its behaviour.
7.5 Discussion
In this chapter a generalised definition of the standard dynamics is given that uses a selection bias
parameter, which controls the extent to which selection acts on birth or death in a replacement
event. Several different definitions of the replacement weights that can be used with the fully
independent model of the Broom-Rychta´rˇ framework are also given. Whilst only one of these
definitions is used in the previous chapters, the objective is to demonstrate the flexibility with
which different definitions can be accommodated within the framework.
The key difference between the definitions of the replacement weights is whether or not
they can used with the standard dynamics. That is, whether the replacement weights can
be plugged directly into the formula for the replacement probabilities given by the standard
dynamics. Def. 1, 2, 3 and 4 are of this kind such that they are weights that associate each pair
of individuals in terms of the likelihood of one replacing the other, and vice versa. Where as
Alt. BD, Alt. DB and No self-rep. DB are nonstandard as they cannot be used with the standard
dynamics, instead, a separate definition of the replacement probabilities needs to be given that
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Figure 7.10: Comparison between standard DB Def. 3, Alt. DB and No self-rep. DB. For the
game r = 10 and v = 2. The selection bias is x = 0.5.
can accommodate them. In particular, the replacement weights in these cases are probabilities,
hence, they give the probability that one individual replaces another.
The nonstandard replacement weights compress the overall effect of selection. This is because
with these dynamics the fitness of the individuals is accounted for within the groups they meet,
therefore, if they meet less often, the fitness does not really play a major role. However, with
the standard replacement weights, the fitness plays a more significant role as it is accounted
for independently of the groups in which the individuals meet. This can therefore be used to
argue that the standard replacement weights are more superior in that they are more effective
at capturing the effect of selection. In particular, this is why Def. 3 was used in the previous
chapters as, not only is it standard, but it is effective at accounting for the groups in which the
individuals meet.
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Chapter 81
Conclusions and Future Work2
This research completes the development of the framework of Broom-Rychta´rˇ by implementing3
new evolutionary dynamics that can be used with this framework. The framework can now4
be used in its full capacity to model the evolution of a structured population consisting of5
mobile individuals who interact in groups. In order to implement the dynamics, a general6
understanding of evolutionary dynamics in a structured population was required that led to the7
study of evolutionary graph theory, which fits naturally in the case of structured populations.8
This culminated in a set of results that identify structured populations whose evolutionary9
process is a Moran process, which has homogeneous population structure, in the fixed fitness10
case for a set of standard evolutionary dynamics. A set of multiplayer interactions that can11
be used in the framework were then mathematically defined called social dilemmas, of which12
there are two kinds: public goods and commons dilemmas. Various models were then derived13
using the framework to illustrate its different applications, each of which give an insight into the14
evolutionary process. The territorial raider model showed that the mean temperature, i.e. the15
average likelihood an individual in a population is going to be replaced by another individual, is a16
better indicator of evolutionary success than the mean group size. Its extension, the generalized17
territorial raider model, included subpopulations to study the evolution of cooperation, where18
both the dynamics and structure were found to play a key role. Dynamics with selection second19
(DBB and BDD) and structures with, ideally, subpopulations of size two gave the cooperators20
a selective advantage. In this case, the subpopulation temperature was a better measure of21
the relative success of cooperators. The Markov movement model also studied the evolution22
of cooperation but, more importantly, made inroads into the development of history dependent23
models for added realism in modelling populations. It was found that slowing movement down24
using a movement cost and increasing the time allowed to interact helped cooperation evolve.25
Some of the results provided were analytical in the cases where the evolutionary process26
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was quite simple. However, once more complex evolutionary processes were considered, a state27
transition matrix was constructed and numerically solved. This meant that results could be28
obtained quickly and accurately but the size of the population that could be considered was29
restricted. This was purposely done to be aligned with with the project’s main aim of developing30
the dynamics. Large population sizes was of lower priority and could be considered in future31
work. This would necessarily involve carrying out simulations as the number of states of the32
population would be very large. The results for larger population sizes can be checked for33
consistency using the results already available for the smaller population sizes.34
A strength of these models is that they all consider multiplayer interactions in groups of35
variables sizes, thereby allowing more general group behaviours to be considered. Furthermore,36
rather than arbitrarily forming groups of various size, the group formations are dependent on the37
underlying movement parameters of the individuals. This results in the possibility of individuals38
being alone and not interacting with anyone, bringing into light the question what an individual39
should do when alone. The lone behaviour of an individual plays an important role as it could40
potentially give it an advantage or hinder it. Another benefit of using the underlying movement41
parameters is that the time spent interacting with each individual is accounted for. Individuals42
would interact with each other as often as they meet with these meetings being controlled by the43
movement parameters and, for the same topographical structure, the results could be different44
if this is changed. On the other hand, models that use pairwise interactions commonly assume45
that an equal amount of time is spent interacting with each individual and, even though this46
could be changed, there is no obvious underlying parameters with which to do this. An extension47
that can be considered in terms of generating a more varied multiplayer interaction between the48
individuals would be to allow each individual control over their own movement. Whilst this49
would be more complicated, it would be interesting to see if individuals with similar interactive50
strategies end up with similar movement strategies. Alternatively, instead of having individual51
movement, i.e. individuals move independently of others, movement that depends upon other52
individuals would be interesting to consider as, for example, some animals move in groups.53
The models of population evolution considered do not take into account mutation during a54
replacement event. Instead, as is the case with many other models, it is assumed that mutation55
is a one of event in which a mutant type is introduced into a population. For very low mutation56
rates, the results presented here would hold because mutations would take a long time to appear,57
which is consistent with the assumptions made. For high mutation rates, the analytical results58
given would not hold. The way in which the results are presented would have to change as well59
since the population would now approach a stationary probability distribution that gives the60
amount of time the population stays in each state. For a highly beneficial mutation, it would61
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be expected that the population spends a significant amount of time in the states where the62
number of mutant types exceed the resident type. High mutation rates can be incorporated63
into models in this research that numerically solve for the fixation probability using the state64
transition matrix. This is because the number of states would remain the same and all that is65
required is that the state transition matrix is recalculated to allow for mutations, which means66
that the number of transitions between the states would increase. The expected observation in67
the case of high mutation rates is that strategies that require continued synergy over a period68
of time would be adversely affected, as is the case with cooperative strategies.69
A limiting feature in this research is that the replacement graphs considered remain constant70
throughout the evolutionary process. However, this is not a defining feature and the models71
can be altered to consider evolutionary graphs that evolve with the evolutionary process. For72
example, relaxing the time homogeneity assumption, implying that movement probabilities can73
change over time, allows the evolutionary graphs to evolve as they are a function of the indi-74
viduals’ movements. In this case it would be interesting to investigate the effect of individuals75
spending more or less time together on the evolutionary process. Certain strategies could po-76
tentially benefit if the amount of time spent together by certain groups of individuals increases,77
like cooperators.78
Another limiting feature of the models considered is their theoretical nature, that is, the79
findings have not been checked against data collected in the field. In terms of developing the80
framework, this does not necessarily pose a major weakness because a lot of the development81
work revolved around mathematically describing the components of the framework. The models82
considered were simple illustrations of what can be achieved using the framework. By fully83
developing the framework and demonstrating how it can be applied, the foundation have been84
laid for future work using the framework. Furthermore, it is now more clear what kind of real-life85
scenarios the framework can be used to model. This in turn informs the modeller what kind of86
data will be required to support the results.87
Overall, using the Broom-Rychta´rˇ framework, it has been shown how mathematics can be88
used to highlight the intricacies of an evolutionary process, by enabling the systematic con-89
struction of a population evolution model. This has led to an overall better understanding of90
population evolution with multiplayer interactions.91
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